战后美国对印度尼西亚外交政策与隐蔽行动研究（1945—1966年）

发布时间：2018-09-13 14:38

【摘要】： 迫使印度尼西亚服从并服务于美国遏制共产主义的冷战战略，是战后美国对印度尼西亚政策构建的出发点。印度尼西亚特殊的地理位置、丰富的战略资源和众多的人口是美国意将其作为“亚洲反共桥头堡”的必然逻辑。战后苏加诺执政时期(1945-1966年)的印度尼西亚坚持在东西方集团之间寻求中间路线。这既是曾长期遭受西方殖民压迫的印尼国家的本能反应，也是其民族领导人苏加诺现实主义政治观的直接体现。苏加诺政权的意识形态走向与美国对其政策的转与变处在同一曲线上。印尼独立革命给了最好的解释。当印尼的独立诉求破坏了美国与荷兰的同盟关系时，杜鲁门政府选择了沉默。但当冷战已经爆发，遏制共产主义的扩张成为美国的当务之急，而苏加诺政权在“茉莉芬事件”中又恰恰表现出对左翼力量的排斥，美国转而支持其完全政治独立。美国相信，支持构建一个具有反共性质的新兴独立国家，无疑将给自己带来丰厚的政治回报。但是美国不能理解一个长期遭受殖民压迫的国家对主权的珍视和对领土完整的渴望。在印尼最为关心的西伊里安问题上，美国消极的中立态度破坏了美国与印尼关系亲密发展的可能。这也使得艾森豪威尔极力拉拢印尼进入西方阵营的努力成为徒劳。印尼高举中立主义外交的旗帜是历史传统和维护民族独立发展现实对策的必然结果。如何扭转印尼的发展方向?美国在印尼要实现怎样的目标?艾森豪威尔政府在战后美国针对印尼的首个外交政策文件——NSC5518号文件中给出答案，即促使印尼走向反共并最终构筑一个稳定的、亲西方政权。通过这个文件，艾森豪威尔给后几任美国政府的印尼政策定下了基调。在实现这个目标的过程中，迫于特殊的冷战对峙，美国不得不为自己有限的军事和外交手段而苦恼。但在和印尼情况类似的伊朗和危地马拉，美国中央情报局策划的一系列颠覆左翼政府建立反共亲美政权的隐蔽行动却捷报频传，这给了美国在印尼复制其行动的遐想空间。 1956-1958年爆发的印尼外岛危机给了美国中情局施行隐蔽行动来影响印尼政治走向的机会。在外岛危机中，中情局秘密地为叛军提供各种支持，最终导致印尼内战的爆发。由于叛军低下的军事素质，加之美国秘密支持的杯水车薪，，中情局的隐蔽行动宣告失败。中情局的失败暴露了艾森豪威尔政府这一时期对印尼认识及决策机制的缺陷。自1958年起，艾森豪威尔政府的印尼政策开始回归内岛，容忍了苏加诺及其中立主义外交的倾向，把反共作为一个长远的目标，并确定把印尼陆军作为其新反共代理人。艾森豪威尔政府在1959年和1960年相继出台的NSC5901和NSC6023号文件中贯彻了这一思路。美国政府为修复与苏加诺的裂痕，恢复了对印尼政府的各种援助，继任的肯尼迪政府还积极促成了西伊里安问题的最终解决。 60年代中期印尼陆军内部爆发了“翁东政变”，即“九·三零运动”。“翁东政变”的发生及被镇压打开了印尼社会政治矛盾的潘多拉魔盒，但同时也给因为印尼与马来西亚冲突逐步恶化的美印关系一个转变的契机。翁东被镇压后，美国认识到以苏哈托为首的新陆军集团有可能主导未来印尼的发展方向，随即中情局联合其他部门对印尼发动了新一轮的隐蔽行动，秘密地为陆军提供各种援助，促使陆军对印尼共产党和进步人士进行大规模屠杀。随后苏哈托在美国支持下罢黜了苏加诺，执掌印尼政权，而全面倒向西方。美国最终实现其对印尼政策的长远目标——构建一个非共产主义和亲西方的政权。本文循着这一思路，主要分为四章进行论述，即：战后美国对印尼政策的形成与确立；中情局隐蔽行动与1956-1958年印尼外岛叛乱；回到内岛：拉拢陆军与修复裂痕；“九·三零事件”与美国的隐蔽行动。文章在理论视角和研究方法上首次把美国对印尼外交政策与隐蔽行动进行互动研究，认为隐蔽行动是冷战期间美国实现对外政策目标的重要战略工具抑或有效途径。同时首次把美国战后几任总统的印尼政策联系起来进行整体研究，从而更全面深刻地揭示了美国对印尼政策的实质和发展演变。在资料运用和论证上通过对美国最新解密档案资料的查阅、对比与甄别，对印尼外岛叛乱和“九·三零事件”与美国的隐蔽行动作了系统梳理，提出了自己的新观点。
[Abstract]:Indonesia's special geographical position, abundant strategic resources and large population are the inevitable logic for the United States to regard Indonesia as the "bridgehead of anti-communism in Asia". During the political period (1945-1966), Indonesia insisted on seeking a middle line between the East and West. This was not only the instinctive reaction of Indonesia, which had been oppressed by the Western colonies for a long time, but also the direct embodiment of its national leader Sukarno's realistic political outlook.
The ideological trend of the Sukarno regime is on the same curve as the U.S. policy shift. The Indonesian Revolution of Independence gave the best explanation. The U.S. turned to support its full political independence. The U.S. believed that its support for the establishment of a new independent state with an anti-Communist character would undoubtedly bring substantial political returns to itself.
But the United States can't understand the value of sovereignty and the desire for territorial integrity of a long-time colonial oppressed country. On Indonesia's most concerned West Irian issue, the negative neutrality of the United States undermined the possibility of a close relationship between the United States and Indonesia. Efforts to become futile. Indonesia holds high the banner of neutralism diplomacy is the inevitable result of historical tradition and realistic countermeasures to safeguard national independence. How to reverse Indonesia's development direction? What goals should the United States achieve in Indonesia? The Eisenhower administration's first foreign policy document for Indonesia after the war, NSC 5518 Through the document, Eisenhower set the tone for the Indonesian policies of the subsequent U.S. governments.
In the process of achieving this goal, the United States had to fret about its limited military and diplomatic means because of the special Cold War confrontation. But in Iran and Guatemala, like Indonesia, the CIA plotted a series of covert actions to subvert the left-wing government and establish an anti-Communist and pro-American regime, which were quickly reported. The United States copied its daydream space in Indonesia.
The outbreak of the 1956-1958 Outer Islands Crisis in Indonesia gave the CIA the opportunity to conduct covert operations to influence Indonesia's political direction. In the Outer Islands Crisis, the CIA secretly provided various kinds of support to the rebels, which eventually led to the outbreak of the Indonesian civil war. The failure of the CIA exposed the defects of the Eisenhower administration's understanding of Indonesia and its decision-making mechanism during this period.
Since 1958, the Eisenhower Administration's Indonesian policy has returned to the island, tolerated Sukarno and his neutral diplomacy, made anti-Communist a long-term goal, and established the Indonesian Army as its new anti-Communist agent. In order to repair the rift with Sukarno, the U.S. government resumed all kinds of aid to the Indonesian government. The successor Kennedy government also actively contributed to the final settlement of the Sierra Leone issue.
In the mid-1960s, the "Wengdong coup" broke out within the Indonesian army, namely the "Nine-Thirty Movement". The occurrence and suppression of the "Wengdong coup" opened the Pandora magic box of Indonesian social and political contradictions, but also gave a turning point to the US-Indonesian relations, which gradually deteriorated because of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Recognizing that the new army group headed by Suharto might lead the way for the future of Indonesia, the CIA, in conjunction with other departments, launched a new round of covert operations against Indonesia, secretly providing various assistance to the Army, prompting the Army to massacre the Communist Party of Indonesia and progressives on a large scale. Subsequently, Suharto branch in the United States. The United States eventually achieved its long-term goal of policy toward Indonesia - to build a non-communist and pro-Western regime.
Following this train of thought, this article mainly divides into four chapters, namely: the formation and establishment of the US policy toward Indonesia after the war; the CIA's covert operations and the 1956-1958 rebellion on the Indonesian outer island; returning to the inner island: drawing up the army and repairing the rift; the "September 30 incident" and the concealed actions of the United States. It is the first time to study the interaction between US foreign policy towards Indonesia and covert action, and to consider covert action as an important strategic tool or an effective way for the US to achieve its foreign policy objectives during the cold war. This paper reviews the essence and evolution of Indonesian policy, compares and discriminates the latest declassified archives in the United States, systematically combs the rebellion on Indonesia's outer islands, the September 30th Incident and the concealed actions of the United States, and puts forward some new viewpoints.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：K342.2;K712.54

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