太平洋战争前美国远东政策中的苏联因素（1931-1941）
发布时间：2018-09-17 11:55
【摘要】：在远东国际政治格局和美国远东政策的演进过程中,苏联因素无疑产生了不可忽视的重要影响。苏联作为一个远东大国,它的一举一动不仅攸关远东国际关系全局,也是美国政府的决策层理解远东局势、制定远东政策的重要依据。本文拟通过考察太平洋战争爆发前十年美国对苏联远东动向的观察与反应,系统地梳理苏联因素在这一时期美国远东政策各阶段中的作用。本文的基本观点是,从排斥苏联到援助苏联,太平洋战争爆发前十年美国远东政策每一个阶段的发展变化都打下了苏联因素的烙印。 除导论和结论部分以外,论文共分为六章。第一章作为背景部分,主要说明从美国远东政策形成之初,俄国因素就一直在其中发挥着重要作用。十九世纪末,俄国、日本、美国三国长期向远东地区的扩张终于迎头相撞,三者互为竞争关系。对于美国而言,俄国既是竞争者,也可能成为在对付日本时的合作伙伴。美国的最大利益在于保持俄国与日本之间的力量均衡,从而使它们的任何一方都无法取得在远东地区的主导地位。因此,每当俄、日之间的力量对比发生变化,都会引起美国政府的极大关注,并试图居间施加影响。美国的远东政策从传统上看实质上是一种均势政策。在第一次世界大战以后,美、苏、日三国关系又增添了一个新的因素,即意识形态因素。“均势外交”理论和意识形态上对苏联的敌视作为一种传统,为三十年代美国政府所承继,对后来美国远东政策的发展产生了很大的影响。 第二章旨在论述“九一八”事变中苏联因素对美国远东政策的影响,以及事变中美国对苏联认识的转变。在事变初期,美国依然受到敌视苏联的传统政策的影响,不愿苏联介入到中日冲突中来；而且,意识形态的偏见阻碍了美国政府内的部分人士认清日本发动九一八事变的真实性质和危害,反而将日本视为防范共产主义渗透的防波堤,这一定程度上推动了美国政府对日本的侵略扩张持放任态度。美国政府希望日本能自行回归华盛顿体系的轨道上来。而日本最终占领了中国东北三省全境,有力地打破了美国的迷梦。但与此同时,美国也密切关注着苏联的反应及其与日本关系的进展。在观察中,美国再次确认了苏日矛盾根深蒂固的判断。随着远东局势的逐步恶化,美国政府开始重新认识到苏联在远东国际格局中的重要作用,1933年底,新上任的罗斯福政府主动改变了十几年来的僵化政策,承认了苏联,迈出了美苏两国在制约日本扩张问题上合作的第一步。 第三章着力探讨1934-1937年美国在远东采取的静观政策与苏联因素之间的关联。首先,这一时期正是苏日对峙最为紧张的阶段,苏日战争的传闻不绝于耳,美国政府本身也高度怀疑苏联远东外交的动机,不愿意为苏联火中取栗,因此,自然在对日政策上小心谨慎,避免被推向对抗日本的前台。其次,美国政府也期待苏联在远东的国防实力的增长,希望苏联增强了的国力能够自发地起到约束日本的作用,这也促使它在远东地区采取静观姿态,而不主动刺激局势。1935年以后,美国政府注意到苏联在远东的国防能力逐渐增强,苏联与英法等国的关系逐渐改善,苏日战争的危险局面暂时缓和,这进一步印证了静观政策的可行性。此外,美苏关系恶化影响了美国和苏联在合作制日上的进一步合作,这种互信和合作计划的缺失也阻挠了美国政府采取更主动的态度来对付日本。 第四章意在阐述苏联因素在1938-1939年美国远东政策的调整时发挥的作用。随着中日战事的进行,日本的行动越来越危及美国在远东地区的利益和在全球的安全。在这种形势下,美国的远东政策势必调整,美国势必站到对抗日本的前台来。但是,苏联因素仍然没有退席。首先,正是由于看到苏联与日本存在着根深蒂固的矛盾,而且苏联在远东的政治军事实力没有受到“大清洗”的太大冲击,美国政府才能够得以较少顾忌地对日本实施威慑策略.其次,苏联援华可能造成的政治影响,也促使美国政府加大了援助中国的力度,力图保持对中国未来政局的影响力。美国政府提供对华桐油贷款、中止《美日通商航海条约》的政策就是在这样的背景下制定的。 第五章详述了在第二次世界大战爆发以后美国对苏日关系、苏德关系发展中的重要事件的观察。经过一段时间的细致观察,美国政府基本上可以认定：《苏德互不侵犯条约》对远东局势而言反而有利,苏联也未从根本上改变自己的对日对华政策,苏日关系难以真正改善。而且,苏联并未完全倒向轴心国一边。在法国败降以后,苏德矛盾的趋势更是日益明显,苏德战争的可能性骤然增加。因此,在这一时期,美国政府抵制了国内部分官员提出的“为防止苏日妥协而绥靖日本”的主张,依然沿袭着既定的远东政策,继续坚持对日本施加逐渐加重的压力,《苏日中立条约》的订立也没有使之有所动摇。 第六章说明了苏德战争爆发后美、苏、日三国关系发生的根本性变化。苏德战争爆发后,苏联与美国结成了正式的同盟关系,而日本成为了美苏共同的敌人。由于苏联忙于抗击德国,这就可能使远东地区的力量对比失衡,美国必须更主动地介入到远东事务中来,更坚决地对日本施加更大压力：首先,美国政府需要保证苏联在对德作战中不受日本北进的威胁。其次,苏德战场的压力也使得中国战场的存在显得尤为重要,美国必须加强对中国抗战的支持,在与日本谈判交涉中也不敢轻易牺牲中国与日本妥协。再次,美国援助苏联更直接刺激了美日关系,也是美日谈判达成妥协的一个重大障碍。此外,苏联与美英结盟,并且抵挡住了德国的强烈攻势,这更增强了美国政府对日本实行威慑策略的信心和决心。美国积极在太平洋进行军事部署,在菲律宾部署空军战略部队,建立远程轰炸基地,并且设想利用苏联在符拉迪沃斯托克的空军基地等等,都与苏联在欧洲方面成为制约德国重要战场的问题有明显的关联。
[Abstract]:The Soviet Union, as a great power in the Far East, has exerted an important influence on the international political pattern in the Far East and the evolution of American policies in the Far East. This paper aims to systematically review the role of Soviet factors in the various stages of American Far East policy during the period of the Pacific War by investigating the observation and reaction of the United States to the Soviet Union's Far East trend ten years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. All the changes have taken the branding of Soviet factors.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the background part, mainly explaining that the Russian factors have been playing an important role in the formation of the American Far East policy since the early days. For the United States, Russia is both a competitor and a possible partner in dealing with Japan. The greatest interest of the United States is to maintain a balance of power between Russia and Japan, so that neither of them can gain a dominant position in the Far East. The Far East policy of the United States has traditionally been a policy of balance of power. After the First World War, the relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan have added a new factor, namely, the ideological factor. The tradition was inherited by the American government in the 1930s and exerted a great influence on the development of American Far East policy.
The second chapter is to discuss the Soviet Union's influence on American Far East policy in the September 18th Incident and the change of American understanding of the Soviet Union in the Incident. Some people recognize the real nature and harm of the September 18th Incident in Japan, but regard Japan as a breakwater against Communist infiltration, which to some extent impels the U.S. government to take a laissez-faire attitude towards Japan's aggression and expansion. The U.S. government wants Japan to return to the track of the Washington system on its own. But at the same time, the United States also closely watched the reaction of the Soviet Union and the progress of its relations with Japan. During the observation, the United States again confirmed the deep-rooted judgment of the Soviet-Japanese contradiction. At the end of 1933, the new Roosevelt administration took the initiative to change the rigid policy for more than a decade, recognized the Soviet Union, and took the first step in the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting Japan's expansion.
The third chapter focuses on the relationship between the US policy of meditation in the Far East in 1934-1937 and the Soviet Union's factors. Second, the U.S. government expects the Soviet Union's defense strength in the Far East to grow, and hopes that the Soviet Union's strengthened national strength will act spontaneously as a restraint on Japan, which also prompts it to take a posture of quiet observation in the Far East without actively stimulating the situation. The U.S. government noted that the Soviet Union's defense capability in the Far East was gradually strengthened, the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and France were gradually improved, and the dangerous situation of the Soviet-Japanese War was temporarily eased, which further confirmed the feasibility of the "sit-by" policy. The lack of planning also obstructed the US government from taking a more proactive approach to Japan.
The fourth chapter is intended to elaborate the role played by the Soviet Union in the adjustment of American Far East policy in 1938-1939. As the Sino-Japanese war progressed, Japan's actions increasingly endangered the interests of the United States in the Far East and global security. However, the Soviet Union has not yet withdrawn. First of all, it is precisely because of the deep-rooted contradictions between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the fact that the Soviet Union's political and military strength in the Far East has not been greatly impacted by the "big purge", that the United States government is able to implement a deterrent strategy against Japan with less scruple. Second, the possible result of Soviet aid to China. Political influence has also prompted the U.S. government to increase its aid to China in an effort to maintain its influence on China's future political situation.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the observation of the important events in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Soviet-German relations after the outbreak of the Second World War. After a period of careful observation, the US government can basically conclude that the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty is beneficial to the situation in the Far East, and the Soviet Union has not fundamentally changed its relations with Japan. After the defeat of France, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Germany became more and more obvious, and the possibility of the Soviet-German war suddenly increased. Therefore, during this period, the U.S. government boycotted the "Pacification Day for Preventing the Soviet-Japanese Compromise" proposed by some domestic officials. Ben's proposition still follows the established Far East policy and continues to exert increasing pressure on Japan. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty did not shake it.
After the Soviet-German War, the Soviet Union formed a formal alliance with the United States, and Japan became a common enemy of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the U.S. government needs to ensure that the Soviet Union is not threatened by Japan's northward advance in the war against Germany. Second, the pressure on the Soviet-German battlefield makes the existence of the Chinese battlefield particularly important. The U.S. must strengthen its support for China's anti-Japanese war and negotiate with Japan. Again, U.S. aid to the Soviet Union directly stimulated U.S. -Japanese relations and was a major obstacle to the negotiation of a compromise between the United States and Japan. China's active military deployment in the Pacific, the deployment of strategic air forces in the Philippines, the establishment of long-range bombing bases, and the use of Soviet air bases in Vladivostok are all obviously related to the fact that the Soviet Union has become an important battlefield restricting Germany in Europe.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：K712.52
本文编号：2245829
[Abstract]:The Soviet Union, as a great power in the Far East, has exerted an important influence on the international political pattern in the Far East and the evolution of American policies in the Far East. This paper aims to systematically review the role of Soviet factors in the various stages of American Far East policy during the period of the Pacific War by investigating the observation and reaction of the United States to the Soviet Union's Far East trend ten years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. All the changes have taken the branding of Soviet factors.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the background part, mainly explaining that the Russian factors have been playing an important role in the formation of the American Far East policy since the early days. For the United States, Russia is both a competitor and a possible partner in dealing with Japan. The greatest interest of the United States is to maintain a balance of power between Russia and Japan, so that neither of them can gain a dominant position in the Far East. The Far East policy of the United States has traditionally been a policy of balance of power. After the First World War, the relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan have added a new factor, namely, the ideological factor. The tradition was inherited by the American government in the 1930s and exerted a great influence on the development of American Far East policy.
The second chapter is to discuss the Soviet Union's influence on American Far East policy in the September 18th Incident and the change of American understanding of the Soviet Union in the Incident. Some people recognize the real nature and harm of the September 18th Incident in Japan, but regard Japan as a breakwater against Communist infiltration, which to some extent impels the U.S. government to take a laissez-faire attitude towards Japan's aggression and expansion. The U.S. government wants Japan to return to the track of the Washington system on its own. But at the same time, the United States also closely watched the reaction of the Soviet Union and the progress of its relations with Japan. During the observation, the United States again confirmed the deep-rooted judgment of the Soviet-Japanese contradiction. At the end of 1933, the new Roosevelt administration took the initiative to change the rigid policy for more than a decade, recognized the Soviet Union, and took the first step in the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting Japan's expansion.
The third chapter focuses on the relationship between the US policy of meditation in the Far East in 1934-1937 and the Soviet Union's factors. Second, the U.S. government expects the Soviet Union's defense strength in the Far East to grow, and hopes that the Soviet Union's strengthened national strength will act spontaneously as a restraint on Japan, which also prompts it to take a posture of quiet observation in the Far East without actively stimulating the situation. The U.S. government noted that the Soviet Union's defense capability in the Far East was gradually strengthened, the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and France were gradually improved, and the dangerous situation of the Soviet-Japanese War was temporarily eased, which further confirmed the feasibility of the "sit-by" policy. The lack of planning also obstructed the US government from taking a more proactive approach to Japan.
The fourth chapter is intended to elaborate the role played by the Soviet Union in the adjustment of American Far East policy in 1938-1939. As the Sino-Japanese war progressed, Japan's actions increasingly endangered the interests of the United States in the Far East and global security. However, the Soviet Union has not yet withdrawn. First of all, it is precisely because of the deep-rooted contradictions between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the fact that the Soviet Union's political and military strength in the Far East has not been greatly impacted by the "big purge", that the United States government is able to implement a deterrent strategy against Japan with less scruple. Second, the possible result of Soviet aid to China. Political influence has also prompted the U.S. government to increase its aid to China in an effort to maintain its influence on China's future political situation.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the observation of the important events in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Soviet-German relations after the outbreak of the Second World War. After a period of careful observation, the US government can basically conclude that the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty is beneficial to the situation in the Far East, and the Soviet Union has not fundamentally changed its relations with Japan. After the defeat of France, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Germany became more and more obvious, and the possibility of the Soviet-German war suddenly increased. Therefore, during this period, the U.S. government boycotted the "Pacification Day for Preventing the Soviet-Japanese Compromise" proposed by some domestic officials. Ben's proposition still follows the established Far East policy and continues to exert increasing pressure on Japan. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty did not shake it.
After the Soviet-German War, the Soviet Union formed a formal alliance with the United States, and Japan became a common enemy of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the U.S. government needs to ensure that the Soviet Union is not threatened by Japan's northward advance in the war against Germany. Second, the pressure on the Soviet-German battlefield makes the existence of the Chinese battlefield particularly important. The U.S. must strengthen its support for China's anti-Japanese war and negotiate with Japan. Again, U.S. aid to the Soviet Union directly stimulated U.S. -Japanese relations and was a major obstacle to the negotiation of a compromise between the United States and Japan. China's active military deployment in the Pacific, the deployment of strategic air forces in the Philippines, the establishment of long-range bombing bases, and the use of Soviet air bases in Vladivostok are all obviously related to the fact that the Soviet Union has become an important battlefield restricting Germany in Europe.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：K712.52
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 朱卫斌;罗斯福的以日制俄政策与中国东北的“完整”——以日俄战争为中心的探讨[J];东北师大学报;2005年04期
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