1939-1941年苏军装甲兵的发展
发布时间:2018-11-15 17:40
【摘要】:在现代战争中,装甲兵以其兼具火力、机动力和装甲防护力的特点,作为陆军最重要的突击力量,在合同战斗中遂行机动作战任务。1939——1941年在欧洲战火四起的局面下,苏联将装甲兵列为其着重发展的军事力量。本文以这一时期苏军装甲兵的发展为研究对象,重点介绍了苏军装甲兵在二战前的基本状况、所存在的问题,以及苏军发展装甲兵的战略决策过程和苏军装甲兵在苏德战争爆发前有针对性的发展等内容。研究这一问题,有利于我们更加深入了解二战前苏联的战备工作。 本文分为五个部分对1939——1941年苏军装甲兵部队的发展进行研究: 第一部分,主要介绍了1939年以前的苏军装甲兵部队。苏联作为陆军大国,早期高级将领又多成长于骑兵部队,国防的需要使其急需发展进攻性地面作战力量。随着军事工业的发展和外国技术经验的引进,苏联装甲兵部队在二战爆发前已经成为世界上规模最大的装甲部队。 第二部分,主要分析了二战前苏军装甲兵部队所存在的问题。苏军装甲兵部队虽然在规模上无人能及,但其在理论上与西欧陆军强国存在差距,在技术兵器、部队编制和战略战术等方面也都存在问题。因此,其战斗力不能有效发挥,在实战中屡遭败绩。 第三部分,主要论述了1939——1941年间苏联在是否重点发展装甲兵问题上进行的讨论和最终的决策。在1939年苏芬战争和1940年西线战役的军事实践中,苏军认识到在陆军诸兵种中重点发展装甲兵的必要性。 第四部分,主要阐明了苏军装甲兵在这一阶段各方面的发展。尤其是针对上文所提到的诸多问题,,苏军在战争爆发前有限的时间内进行了有针对性的调整和改进。在技术上,采用了新型坦克装甲车辆;在编制上,组建装甲和机械化快速集群;在战术思想上也进行了调整。 第五部分,通过分析苏军装甲兵在这一阶段的发展,客观的看待这一阶段的发展对于苏军装甲兵产生的影响,苏军装甲兵对于二战的影响以及苏军装甲兵在世界军事发展史中的地位。 论文认为,苏军装甲兵在苏德临战前夕,在技术上赶上并超过了世界先进水平;采用了从理论上讲十分先进甚至超前的编制;相应调整了其战术思想。这些方面的发展都在一定程度上增强了苏军装甲兵的战斗力,并且在二战乃至战后产生了深远的影响。但是,所有这些措施受限于准备时间、工业生产能力、传统战略思想等方面因素,没有能及时发挥其最大效力,因此在苏德战争初期的逆境中,还没有发挥出扭转战局的作用。
[Abstract]:In modern warfare, armored forces, with their characteristics of firepower, aircraft power and armored protection, are the most important assault forces of the army, carrying out mobile combat tasks in contractual combat. Under the circumstances of the four wars in Europe from 1939 to 1941, The Soviet Union listed armored forces as its development-oriented military force. In this paper, the development of Soviet armored forces in this period as the research object, focusing on the Soviet armored forces in the pre-World War II basic situation, the existing problems, The strategic decision-making process of Soviet armored forces and the development of Soviet armored forces before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war were also discussed. Studying this issue will help us to understand the Soviet Union's war preparedness work before World War II. This paper is divided into five parts to study the development of Soviet armored forces from 1939 to 1941. The first part mainly introduces the Soviet armored forces before 1939. The Soviet Union, as a large army country, grew up in cavalry troops in the early years, and the need for national defense made it urgent to develop offensive ground combat forces. With the development of military industry and the introduction of foreign technological experience, the Soviet armored forces had become the largest armored forces in the world before the outbreak of World War II. The second part mainly analyzes the problems of Soviet armored forces before World War II. Although no one can match the Soviet armored forces in terms of scale, there is a gap in theory between the Soviet armored forces and the western European army powers, as well as problems in technical weapons, troop establishment, strategy and tactics, and so on. Therefore, its combat effectiveness can not be effectively brought into play, in actual combat repeatedly suffered defeat. The third part mainly discusses the Soviet Union's discussion and final decision on whether to develop armored forces from 1939 to 1941. In the military practice of the Sufen War of 1939 and the Battle of the Western Front in 1940, the Soviet Army realized the necessity of developing armored troops in all arms of the army. The fourth part mainly expounds the development of the Soviet armored forces in this stage. In particular, in response to the problems mentioned above, the Soviet Army made targeted adjustments and improvements in the limited time before the outbreak of the war. Technically, a new type of tank armored vehicle was adopted; in terms of configuration, an armored and mechanized fast cluster was formed; and tactical ideas were adjusted. In the fifth part, by analyzing the development of the Soviet armored forces at this stage, the influence of the development of this stage on the Soviet armored forces is viewed objectively. The influence of Soviet armored forces on World War II and the position of Soviet armored forces in the history of world military development. The paper holds that the Soviet armored forces caught up with and surpassed the advanced level of the world technically on the eve of the Soviet Union and Germany's impending war; adopted a very advanced or even advanced system in theory; and adjusted their tactical thinking accordingly. To a certain extent, these developments strengthened the combat effectiveness of the Soviet armored forces, and had a profound impact in World War II and even after the war. However, all these measures were limited by the preparation time, industrial production capacity, traditional strategic thinking and other factors, and failed to give full play to their maximum effectiveness in time. Therefore, in the early adversity of the Soviet and German wars, they had not yet played a role in reversing the war situation.
【学位授予单位】:河北师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:E512;K512.54
本文编号:2333993
[Abstract]:In modern warfare, armored forces, with their characteristics of firepower, aircraft power and armored protection, are the most important assault forces of the army, carrying out mobile combat tasks in contractual combat. Under the circumstances of the four wars in Europe from 1939 to 1941, The Soviet Union listed armored forces as its development-oriented military force. In this paper, the development of Soviet armored forces in this period as the research object, focusing on the Soviet armored forces in the pre-World War II basic situation, the existing problems, The strategic decision-making process of Soviet armored forces and the development of Soviet armored forces before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war were also discussed. Studying this issue will help us to understand the Soviet Union's war preparedness work before World War II. This paper is divided into five parts to study the development of Soviet armored forces from 1939 to 1941. The first part mainly introduces the Soviet armored forces before 1939. The Soviet Union, as a large army country, grew up in cavalry troops in the early years, and the need for national defense made it urgent to develop offensive ground combat forces. With the development of military industry and the introduction of foreign technological experience, the Soviet armored forces had become the largest armored forces in the world before the outbreak of World War II. The second part mainly analyzes the problems of Soviet armored forces before World War II. Although no one can match the Soviet armored forces in terms of scale, there is a gap in theory between the Soviet armored forces and the western European army powers, as well as problems in technical weapons, troop establishment, strategy and tactics, and so on. Therefore, its combat effectiveness can not be effectively brought into play, in actual combat repeatedly suffered defeat. The third part mainly discusses the Soviet Union's discussion and final decision on whether to develop armored forces from 1939 to 1941. In the military practice of the Sufen War of 1939 and the Battle of the Western Front in 1940, the Soviet Army realized the necessity of developing armored troops in all arms of the army. The fourth part mainly expounds the development of the Soviet armored forces in this stage. In particular, in response to the problems mentioned above, the Soviet Army made targeted adjustments and improvements in the limited time before the outbreak of the war. Technically, a new type of tank armored vehicle was adopted; in terms of configuration, an armored and mechanized fast cluster was formed; and tactical ideas were adjusted. In the fifth part, by analyzing the development of the Soviet armored forces at this stage, the influence of the development of this stage on the Soviet armored forces is viewed objectively. The influence of Soviet armored forces on World War II and the position of Soviet armored forces in the history of world military development. The paper holds that the Soviet armored forces caught up with and surpassed the advanced level of the world technically on the eve of the Soviet Union and Germany's impending war; adopted a very advanced or even advanced system in theory; and adjusted their tactical thinking accordingly. To a certain extent, these developments strengthened the combat effectiveness of the Soviet armored forces, and had a profound impact in World War II and even after the war. However, all these measures were limited by the preparation time, industrial production capacity, traditional strategic thinking and other factors, and failed to give full play to their maximum effectiveness in time. Therefore, in the early adversity of the Soviet and German wars, they had not yet played a role in reversing the war situation.
【学位授予单位】:河北师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:E512;K512.54
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