宪政经济学视角下的腐败问题研究
本文选题:宪政经济学 + 腐败 ; 参考:《东北财经大学》2010年硕士论文
【摘要】:腐败问题从古至今一直困扰着人们,它不仅损害公民的利益,更是对政治的稳定造成严重的影响。世界各国的学者们一直努力的寻求治理腐败的方法,但是从根本上解决腐败问题仍然是条漫长的道路。宪政经济学的理论的发展,使人们对制度的选择回归到元规则上,这或许可以为治理腐败问题提供新的思路。 首先,腐败是公职人员运用公共权力来谋取个人或小集团的私利,并侵害公共利益和个人合法利益的行为。腐败带来的效应,学术界仍一定的争论。本文认为,腐败现象是不应该被容忍的。腐败会使市场失灵更加恶化,并带来严重的政府失灵。如果任由腐败蔓延,政治稳定也将受到影响。所以,对腐败的治理一刻也不能松懈。这是本文研究的出发点。 接着,本文回顾了宪政经济学思想的理论形成。从亚当·斯密对政府权力与公民利益冲突的研究,到哈耶克的自由和法治模型的形成,最后到布坎南宪政经济学理论的确立,宪政经济学所倡导的核心思想就是限制政府权力和保护公民权利。宪政经济学认为限制政府权力应该改革宪法,建立民主政府模型。公民权利相对政府权力始终处于劣势,需要以契约的方式进行保护,从而使公民获得自由和安全感。这种契约即为宪法,只有宪法确立的公民基本权利得到有效实现,才能算真正实现宪政。 从政府权力和公民权利的两个角度出发,本文对腐败产生的原因展开了深入的研究。在政府权力的方面,政府权力和腐败之间有着必然的联系,政府权力过大和分配失衡为腐败的发生提供了条件。政府官员用手中的权力通过干预市场资源配置,寻租必然发生;行政权力的过分集中使少数官员的权力远远超出了职务权力,为领导腐败提供了“方便之门”。行政权力运行缺乏法制化规定,使权力的运行得不到有效地制约。对政府权力的监督不到位,也使得腐败分子有机可乘。在公民权利保护方面,公民权利意识淡薄,不仅助长了公共权力滥用的势头,更导致“潜规则”在市场横行;在宪法制度上,对公民权利保障也存在一定的缺陷,使公民在受到利益侵害时,不能有效地用法律保护自己。本文通过对公民选举问题的探讨,指出选举中的腐败问题,强调了保护公民权利的重要。 最后,本文提出了治理腐败问题的几点建议。构建权力制衡的分权政府,通过权力约束遏制腐败行为发生;推进政务公开,实行听证制度,使权力的运行更加阳光透明;完善权力监督机制,让腐败现象无法滋生;建立违宪审查制度,使公民的权利真正得到宪法保障。
[Abstract]:Corruption has been troubling people since ancient times. It not only damages the interests of citizens, but also has a serious impact on political stability. Scholars all over the world have been trying to find ways to deal with corruption, but it is still a long way to solve the problem of corruption. The development of the theory of constitutional economics makes people's choice of system return to the meta-rule, which may provide a new way of thinking for dealing with the problem of corruption. Firstly, corruption is the behavior of public officials to use public power to seek private interests of individuals or groups, and to infringe on public interests and legitimate interests of individuals. The effect of corruption is still controversial in academia. This paper argues that corruption should not be tolerated. Corruption exacerbates market failures and leads to serious government failures. If corruption is allowed to spread, political stability will also be affected. Therefore, the governance of corruption can not be lax for a moment. This is the starting point of this study. Then, this paper reviews the formation of the theory of constitutional economics. From Adam Smith's research on the conflict between government power and citizen's interests, to the formation of Hayek's model of freedom and rule of law, and finally to the establishment of Buchanan's theory of constitutional economics. The core idea advocated by constitutional economics is to limit government power and protect civil rights. Constitutional economics holds that restricting government power should reform the constitution and establish a democratic government model. Civil rights are always at a disadvantage relative to government power and need to be protected by contract so that citizens can obtain freedom and security. This kind of contract is the constitution. Only when the basic rights of citizens established by the constitution are effectively realized, can constitutionalism be truly realized. From the two angles of government power and civil right, this paper makes an in-depth study on the causes of corruption. In the aspect of government power, there is an inevitable connection between government power and corruption. The excessive power of government and the imbalance of distribution provide the conditions for the occurrence of corruption. Government officials use their power to interfere with the allocation of market resources, rent-seeking will inevitably occur; the excessive concentration of administrative power makes the power of a small number of officials far beyond the power of office, and provides a "convenient door" for leading corruption. The operation of administrative power is not regulated by law, and the operation of power can not be restricted effectively. Oversight of government power is not in place, and corrupt elements can also take advantage of it. In the protection of civil rights, the weak awareness of civil rights not only contributes to the momentum of abuse of public power, but also leads to the "hidden rules" in the market; in the constitutional system, there are also some defects in the protection of civil rights. So that citizens in the interests of infringement, can not effectively use the law to protect themselves. This paper points out the problem of corruption in election and emphasizes the importance of protecting citizens' rights. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with corruption. To build a decentralized government with checks and balances of power, to curb corruption through power restraint, to promote the openness of government affairs, to implement the hearing system, to make the operation of power more sunny and transparent, to perfect the mechanism of power supervision, and to make corruption impossible to breed; The establishment of unconstitutional review system, so that citizens' rights are truly guaranteed by the Constitution.
【学位授予单位】:东北财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:D911;D035.4
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