城市跨区公共服务供给中政府集体行动的困境与对策研究

发布时间：2018-06-21 10:58

本文选题：跨区公共服务 + 市场性排斥　；参考：《东北财经大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】：当前,随着我国经济的发展和城市化进程的不断推进,城市逐渐成为人们生存与生活的主要载体,也成为经济、文化、信息、资源交汇的重要场所。与此同时,面对着市民日益增长的公共服务需求,城市辖区政府更多的倾向于以集体行动代替传统的单独提供公共服务的方式来实现公共治理的目标,而如何深层次的协调集体行动主体之间的关系,防止合作过程中的集体行动困境,这将成为城市辖区政府有效提供公共服务的关键,也成为公共治理目标实现的核心。因此,对城市跨区公共服务供给中政府集体行动根源的探究显得尤为重要。城市辖区政府集体行动是指城市辖区政府基于共同获益的利益结构和获益预期而采取的共同行动及其行为过程,其本质则是集体行动参与者之间的博弈过程。西方学者所倡导的集体行动研究的博弈论视角及其核心思想——“囚徒困境”,“集体行动的逻辑”,“阿罗悖论”为我们的研究提供了很好的平台。通过把集体行动的三大模型引入到城市跨区公共服务供给的具体环境中,并结合集体行动的理论基础,我们研究发现,城市辖区政府跨区公共服务供给过程中的集体行动困境主要源于以下三个因素,即,不确定性,外部性与内生结构性。而基于公共决策机制的内生结构性变量是引发集体行动困境的内在根源,不确定性、外部性所引发的“道德风险”与“逆向选择”是其外在表现,本文正是基于这条主线展开研究和写作的。公共服务供给的市场性排斥使得政府成为公共服务供给的唯一主体,而政府决策机制的结构性排斥又使得政府对公共服务的供给力不从心,这主要源于提供公共服务并不是政府采取行动的根本出发点,获取政治资源与行政租金才是政府存在的最大目标,这使得城市政府,尤其是自身资源有限的城市辖区政府在公共需求的发现方面是被动的,在公共服务的供给方面是非理性的,在治理结果上是寻求自身利益最大化的,更是缺少问责机制约束的。因此,本文基于政府经济人的假设,提出公共决策机制是引发城市辖区政府集体行动困境的重要动因,而一系列行之有效的制度安排是避免政府集体行动的有效措施。本文既是对西方学术成果的继承,也是对国内传统研究领域的突破。我们以“跨区公共服务”为切入点,运用公共管理学和经济学的相关理论与研究方法,对城市辖区政府集体行动困境的根源、外在表现进行了深度分析,弥补了国内现有研究存在的缺陷,把学术研究的触角首度延伸到城市微观与宏观的交叉地带。但是,由于本文是从纯理论的角度对城市跨区公共服务供给中政府集体行动困境进行的分析,缺乏数据上的支持,使得论文显得十分单薄,但至少为今后城市公共治理的研究提供了一个方向。
[Abstract]:At present, with the development of our country's economy and the development of urbanization, cities are becoming the main carrier of people's existence and life, as well as the important places where economy, culture, information and resources intersect. At the same time, in the face of the increasing demand for public services, the governments of urban districts tend to replace the traditional way of providing public services by collective action to achieve the goal of public governance. How to coordinate the relationship between the subjects of collective action and prevent the plight of collective action in the process of cooperation will become the key to the effective provision of public services by the government of urban districts and the core of the realization of the goal of public governance. Therefore, it is particularly important to explore the root causes of government collective action in the supply of public services in urban cross-districts. The collective action of the government in urban district refers to the common action and its course of action taken by the government of urban district based on the benefit structure and expectation of mutual benefit, and its essence is the game process among the participants of collective action. The game theory angle of view and its core thought of collective action research advocated by western scholars "Prisoner's Dilemma", "Logic of Collective Action" and "Arrow Paradox" provide a good platform for our research. By introducing the three models of collective action into the specific environment of public service supply in urban cross-district, and combining the theoretical basis of collective action, we find that, The dilemma of collective action in the process of public service supply in urban districts is mainly caused by the following three factors: uncertainty, externality and endogenous structure. The endogenous structural variables based on the public decision-making mechanism are the internal source of collective action dilemma, uncertainty, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" caused by externality are its external manifestation. This paper is based on this main line of research and writing. The market exclusion of the public service supply makes the government become the only main body of the public service supply, and the structural exclusion of the government decision-making mechanism makes the government unable to supply the public service. This is mainly due to the fact that the provision of public services is not the fundamental starting point for government action. It is the access to political resources and administrative rent that is the greatest goal of the government. In particular, the government of urban districts with limited resources is passive in the discovery of public demand, irrational in the supply of public services, seeking maximum self-interest in the governance results, and lack of accountability mechanism constraints. Therefore, based on the assumption of government economic man, this paper puts forward that the public decision-making mechanism is an important motivation to trigger the plight of collective action of the government in urban areas, and a series of effective institutional arrangements are effective measures to avoid collective action of government. This paper not only inherits the western academic achievements, but also breaks through the domestic traditional research field. Based on the cross-district public service, using the relevant theories and research methods of public management and economics, this paper makes a deep analysis of the causes and external manifestations of the plight of collective action of the governments in urban districts. It makes up for the defects of the existing research in China, and extends the tentacles of academic research to the intersection of urban micro and macro for the first time. However, due to the analysis of the plight of government collective action in the supply of public services in urban cross-area from the point of view of pure theory, the paper is very thin because of the lack of data support. But at least for the future study of urban public governance provides a direction.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D035

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