超越权利的焦虑——“积极的人权”与“诚”之为工夫

发布时间：2018-08-22 13:21

【摘要】：儒家与人权的关系是一个不得不加以考虑的问题。以往论者或认为权利可兼容于儒家,或认为其可填补后者思想观念或制度设计上的空白,或认为两者本来在功能上存在相通或对等之处,仅仅是表达方式与关怀重点不同。通常意义上的人权具备防御的性质,保护人免于强权的随意触摸,或许可被称之为"消极的权利"。但此种人权是现代性的社会治理不断精密化以后才可能产生的某种具有补偿性质的东西。这一伴随社会规训机制的现代化而被凸显出来,并对于儒家来说完全陌生的观念,在实际上也无需被置于同后者对话的语境中。相对于此,我们仍有可能去探寻另一种"积极的权利",即某种塑造人格与追求德性的权利。以古希腊所谈论的"坦陈真相"与儒家之所谓"诚"的比较为例,这种意义上的权利完全具有与儒家传统对话的可能。
[Abstract]:The relationship between Confucianism and human rights is an issue that must be considered. Previous theorists either think that rights can be compatible with Confucianism, or that they can fill in the blank of the latter's ideology or system design, or that there are similarities or equivalents between the two in their functions, only that the way of expression is different from the focus of care. Human rights in general are defensive in nature and protect people from the random touch of power, which may be called "negative rights". However, this kind of human rights is a kind of compensatory thing that can be produced after the modern social governance becomes more and more sophisticated. With the modernization of social discipline, this concept, which is completely unfamiliar to Confucianism, does not need to be placed in the context of dialogue with the latter. In contrast, it is still possible to explore another kind of "positive right", that is, the right to shape personality and pursue virtue. Taking the comparison between the "truth" in ancient Greece and the so-called "sincerity" of Confucianism as an example, the right in this sense has the possibility of dialogue with the Confucian tradition.
【作者单位】：《中国社会科学》杂志社;
【分类号】：D082;B222

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