公共政策终结中的政府利益博弈研究

发布时间：2018-11-04 20:53

【摘要】：在整个公共政策的生命周期之中,政策终结是最后一环,但也被认为是承上启下的一环,对公共政策的更新与延续至关重要。利益博弈是研究公共政策问题极为重要的视角之一,对一项公共政策的终结必然涉及原有利益格局的重新调整与分配,与此相关的利益主体也必然会围绕政策进行利益博弈来影响公共政策的有效终结。在我国,各级政府和部门作为公共政策终结的主体,公共政策的终结也会影响到政府间的利益分配,也必然产生政府间的利益博弈,而政府间利益博弈导致的政策终结问题远比其他利益主体间利益博弈的影响要大的多,实践中也因政府间的利益博弈产生政策终结的障碍。因此,研究公共政策终结中的政府利益博弈问题,具有十分重要的理论和现实意义。本文以利益博弈为视角,分析了公共政策终结中的政府利益博弈的表现和原因,并提出了公共政策终结中政府之间的利益优化途径。文章共分为五个部分:第一部分为绪论,主要叙述了论文研究的背景与意义、国内外研究现状述评、研究的创新点与难点、研究的思路和方法等。第二部分探讨了公共政策终结与政府利益博弈的相关概念与理论。第三部分论述了公共政策终结中政府之间利益博弈的表现,主要有中央政府与地方政府之间、地方政府之间、政府部门之间的利益博弈。第四部分分析了公共政策终结中政府之间利益博弈的原因,这些原因包括表层原因、深层原因和行政人格化层面原因。第五部分是本文的落脚点,主要阐述了公共政策终结中政府之间的利益优化途径,即政策终结的认同、多元利益的协调、行政伦理的建设。通过公共政策终结中政府间的利益优化,促进公共政策的有效终结,最终达到政策系统优化的目的。
[Abstract]:In the whole life cycle of public policy, the end of policy is the last link, but it is also regarded as the link between the preceding and the following, which is of great importance to the renewal and continuation of public policy. The game of interests is one of the most important perspectives to study the problem of public policy. The end of a public policy must involve the readjustment and distribution of the original pattern of interests. The relevant stakeholders will inevitably play an interest game around the policy to influence the effective end of the public policy. In our country, governments and departments at all levels as the main body of the end of public policy, the end of public policy will also affect the distribution of interests among governments, and will inevitably result in a game of interests between governments. The problem of policy termination caused by inter-governmental interest game is much greater than that of other stakeholders. In practice, there are obstacles to the end of policy because of inter-government interest game. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the game of government interests in the end of public policy. From the perspective of interest game, this paper analyzes the performance and reasons of the government interest game in the end of public policy, and puts forward the ways to optimize the interests of the government in the end of public policy. The paper is divided into five parts: the first part is the introduction, which mainly describes the background and significance of the research, the current situation of research at home and abroad, the innovative points and difficulties of the research, the ideas and methods of the research, etc. The second part discusses the concept and theory of the game between the end of public policy and government interests. The third part discusses the performance of interest game between governments in the end of public policy, mainly between central government and local government, and between government departments. The fourth part analyzes the reasons of the interest game between the governments in the end of public policy. These reasons include the superficial reasons, the deep reasons and the reasons of administrative personalization. The fifth part is the foothold of this article, mainly elaborated the public policy termination between the government benefit optimization way, namely the policy terminates the identification, the multivariate benefit coordination, the administrative ethics construction. Through the benefit optimization between governments in the end of public policy, it promotes the effective end of public policy, and finally achieves the goal of policy system optimization.
【学位授予单位】：广州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D035

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