对“作为公平正义的康德式解释”的再解释

发布时间：2019-06-10 07:26

【摘要】：在《正义论》第40节“作为公平正义的康德式解释”中，罗尔斯为自己的正义理论提供了一个形而上学意义上的“康德式解释”，并从多个方面论述了自己的正义原则与康德的道德哲学之间的关系。本文从康德的《道德形而上学基础》与《实践理性批判》等道德哲学著作出发，顺着罗尔斯的思路，从文本层面更为细致深入地对康德与罗尔斯之间的关系进行了再解释，意在表明罗尔斯正义原则中的原初状态理论（包括其中的无知之幕、相互冷淡的动机假设以及本体自我的观念）与康德的道德自律之间，以及基本善理论与康德的绝对命令之间存在着某种内在联系，，这种内在联系通过讨论康德哲学中自律与他律、假言命令与定言命令的区分而彰显出来。在本节末尾，罗尔斯对自己与康德哲学的差别提出了两个要点：一、“我们”的问题而非“我”的问题；二、基本善在正义环境中的必要性。本文意在指出：罗尔斯对康德的这两点超越在为其正义理论服务的前提下有其合理之处：为了讨论社会正义问题，对康德道德哲学某些细节上的偏离是必须的。但是在第二点关于基本善的讨论中，罗尔斯提出的基本善理论仍然是值得商榷的：罗尔斯的基本善理论是为了标示出人们的共性与现实性，但这种共性是否具有真正的普遍性？这些基本善又是否是“基本的”？内格尔的批评回答了这些问题，同时也表明了这些理论上的瑕疵之处使罗尔斯的康德式解释缺乏足够的说服力：如果作为正义原则支撑的基本善理论无法让人信服，那么罗尔斯的康德式解释就无法成立。而在人们越来越不相信形而上学的今天，不再将一种正义理论建立在形而上学的基础之上，似乎是一条更好的出路。
[Abstract]:In Section 40 of the Theory of Justice, "Kant interpretation as Fairness and Justice", Rawls provides a metaphysical "Kant interpretation" for his theory of justice. And discusses the relationship between their own principle of justice and Kant's moral philosophy from many aspects. Starting from Kant's moral philosophical works such as moral metaphysical basis and practical rational criticism, and following Rawls' train of thought, this paper reinterprets the relationship between Kant and Rawls more carefully and deeply from the text level. It is intended to show that the original state theory in Rawls' principle of justice (including the curtain of ignorance, the hypothesis of mutual indifference motivation and the concept of Noumenon self) and Kant's moral self-discipline. And there is an internal relationship between the basic good theory and Kant's absolute command, which is manifested by the discussion of the distinction between self-discipline and heteronomy, hypothetical command and definite order in Kant's philosophy. At the end of this section, Rawls puts forward two main points about the difference between himself and Kant's philosophy: first, the problem of "we" rather than the question of "I"; and second, the necessity of basic good in the environment of justice. The purpose of this paper is to point out that Rawls' transcendence of these two points to Kant has its reasonableness under the premise of serving his theory of justice: in order to discuss the problem of social justice, it is necessary to deviate from some details of Kant's moral philosophy. However, in the second discussion on basic good, Rawls' basic good theory is still debatable: Rawls' basic good theory is to indicate people's commonness and reality, but does this commonness have real universality? Are these basic goodness "basic"? Nagle's criticism answers these questions and shows that these theoretical flaws make Rawls' Kant explanation unconvincing: if the basic good theory underpinned by the principle of justice is not convincing, Then Rawls' Kant explanation is untenable. Nowadays, people do not believe in metaphysics more and more, it seems that it is a better way out that a kind of justice theory is no longer based on metaphysics.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D081

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