唯识宗的记忆观与时间观——耿宁先生文章引出的进一步现象学探讨

发布时间：2018-01-16 10:44

本文关键词：唯识宗的记忆观与时间观——耿宁先生文章引出的进一步现象学探讨　出处：《现代哲学》2015年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：耿宁对唯识宗回忆观的批评很有道理,但他的现象学补充还未最终解决问题,还可以沿着他提及的两个方面——唯识宗对开悟经验和阿赖耶识的阐发——再做深度探索。转识成智的开悟没有消除时间经验,反而在某些方面突出了它。而阿赖耶识而非第六识作为回忆的最终依据,其"能藏"性就在于它在刹那生灭中还具有的保持能力。它与胡塞尔揭示的内时间意识之流有一些可比之处。它们都是流性的,在根本的转变中具有非实体的连续;它们对于双方都是终极的发生源头,使得熏习或习性可能。胡塞尔的时晕说似乎可以补足唯识刹那生灭说中一个缺口,而唯识对阿识流性的贯彻始终和对我执的深刻批评,也可以反衬胡塞尔先验主体说的未化之处。
[Abstract]:Geng Ning's criticism of the memory view of the literate sect is very reasonable, but his phenomenological supplement has not finally solved the problem. It is also possible to do further exploration along the two aspects he mentioned-the elucidation of enlightened experience and Ariel consciousness by the idealist sect-and then the deep exploration. The enlightenment of turning knowledge into wisdom does not eliminate the experience of time. On the contrary, it is highlighted in some ways. And Alain knowledge, rather than 6th, is the ultimate basis for memory. Its "ability to hide" lies in its ability to maintain itself in an instant. It has some parallels with the stream of inner time consciousness revealed by Husserl. They are all fluid. Having a non-physical continuity in a fundamental transformation; They are the ultimate source of occurrence for both parties, making smoking or habits possible. Husserl's dizziness seems to fill a gap in the theory of birth and death in an intellectual moment. However, the thorough and profound criticism of the fuzziness of knowledge can also contrast with the absence of Husserl's transcendental subject.
【作者单位】：山东大学哲学与社会发展学院;
【分类号】：B948
【正文快照】： 耿宁(Iso Kern)先生的文章《从现象学角度看唯识三世(现在、过去、未来)》(《心的现象》,155-166)1篇幅不长,却很有启发性。它通过玄奘、窥基、熊十力等人的著作来阐述唯识宗的时间观,并从胡塞尔现象学时间观的角度来批评或补充前者。实际上,作者以这种方式还提出了更多的问题

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