简述伊斯兰哲学中的“本性共相”问题

发布时间：2018-03-17 01:20

本文选题：本性共相　切入点：逻辑共相　出处：《世界哲学》2017年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：阿维森纳提出的本性共相(即共有本性)是中世纪各大哲学传统探讨共相问题的共同出发点和中心议题。本性共相具有某种"中立"地位,既非一,又非多,既非普遍,又非特殊,既不存在于心外客观世界,也不存在于灵魂之中。正是这种特性引发了哲学史上关于其本体论地位的长久争论。本文旨在简单梳理伊斯兰哲学传统中本性共相问题的提出、发展和演变,以及各学术派别的处理方式及基本立场。
[Abstract]:Avicenna put forward that the universal nature (that is, the common nature) is the common starting point and central topic of the philosophical tradition of the Middle Ages to discuss the problem of the common phase. The nature common phase has a certain "neutral" status, which is neither one, nor many, nor is it universal. It's not special, it doesn't exist in the outside world, Nor does it exist in the soul. It is this characteristic that has caused a long debate about its ontological status in the history of philosophy. As well as each academic school's processing method and the basic stand.
【作者单位】：中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所;
【分类号】：B968

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