垃圾焚烧产业中邻避效应的形成机理与治理政策
发布时间:2017-12-27 20:10
本文关键词:垃圾焚烧产业中邻避效应的形成机理与治理政策 出处:《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:近年来,中国城市化发展进入新阶段,人们对生活质量的要求不断增加。然而邻避效应这一问题却严重阻碍着弥补城市功能产业的发展,“邻避”设施给全体民众带来福利的同时却让部分居民遭受损害,使得邻避产业发展受阻。在此背景下,我国面临着引发大规模冲突、降低社会经济效率和破坏政府公信力的“邻避”困局。而中国式“邻避”冲突又极其猛烈和难以调和,独具中国特色,不可照搬发达国家处理邻避冲突的模式,需要我们对症下药。垃圾焚烧设施作为最典型的“邻避”体,具有十足的代表性。对它的研究能够帮助我们理清“邻避”冲突的脉络,探寻冲突中最核心的因子。本文旨在以垃圾焚烧设施为例,寻找出“邻避”效应形成机理,再根据机理提出相关建议。本文在充分考虑了以往文献中学者的研究成果之后,将信息缺乏作为“邻避”效应机理的核心构建了主观效用模型,运用博弈论方法解释在“邻避”冲突中,信息不对称导致人们对环境损失评价的偏离。然后,运用案例分析方法,总结归纳十例典型垃圾焚烧产业“邻避”冲突共因,得出“邻避”冲突中普遍缺乏的是居民与建造者信息沟通,验证了模型中核心的部分,即沟通不畅导致信息不对称,以至于人们在博弈中对损失作出错估,从而居民采取强硬的反抗策略,造成“邻避”冲突。本文的研究论述中,将信息不对称转化为居民效用函数中主观概率判断的偏离,采用等级依赖效用函数来描述“邻避”设施给居民带来的损害,此模型将主观概率判断作为居民对损失评价的权重,将这种主观判断以“情绪”的形式表现出来。因此,本文将建造者与居民作为博弈双方,谈论信息不对称下的决策行为。引用“鹰鸽”博弈中‘鹰’与‘鸽’的形态代表居民和建造者双方所选择的博弈决策:强硬和妥协,对照现实中居民的强烈抵抗和政府的强制推行建设等行为。本文的重点在于引入信息不对称因素,在案例分析中分析“邻避”冲突过程的重点缺乏环节,从结果来看,在颇具代表性的案例中选址、环评和建设监督都缺少公众参与,推断“邻避”冲突中信息沟通不畅乃关键因子。指出信息缺乏导致居民的情绪化,从而在博弈中带有主观色彩,导致反对“邻避”建设的活动成为情绪的发泄,而不是心平气和的商议解决方案。政府在处理“邻避”问题上经验不足,因而与居民存在矛盾误解,让居民参与到“邻避”项目的建设中来必然能够解决“邻避”冲突,消除信息不对称即“邻避”出路。通过对现有文献的梳理,可以看出“邻避”问题的研究还不成体系,“邻避”补贴问题并没有考虑到信息不对称的因素,本文将行为学上的一些理论纳入邻避效应解释中,具有一定的示范意义。并且现有研究使用价值不高,需要综合分析“邻避”的各种因素,才能不有失偏颇。本文系统构建了信息不对称下“邻避”效应模型,丰富了此类研究的相关文献。本文使用等级依赖效用函数,其中的情绪函数十分贴切的刻画了居民和政府双方的行为。主观效用函数与博弈论说明双方选择对抗决策的原因和结果,与中国邻避冲突现状相符,将研究方法赋予了实践的价值。纵观全文,文章的研究在于解决类似垃圾焚烧此类“邻避”设施对应产业的发展困局,而信息不对称是其核心,处理问题的落脚点在于加强建造者居民双方关于项目的沟通。这又涉及到公共政策的旧疾,所以“邻避”冲突尚需在后续的研究中找到更成熟的解决之道。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the development of China's urbanization has entered a new stage, and people's demands for the quality of life have been increasing. However, the problem of the "near avoidance effect" has seriously hindered the development of the urban functional industry. The "near neighbor" facility has brought benefits to all the people, but at the same time, some residents have been damaged, making the development of the adjacent industry blocked. In this context, China is faced with a "neighbour" dilemma that triggers large-scale conflicts, reduces social and economic efficiency and destroys the public credibility of the government. The Chinese style "next to avoid" conflict is extremely fierce and difficult to reconcile. With Chinese characteristics, it cannot copy the pattern of the neighboring countries to deal with the "near neighbor conflict". We need to prescribe the right medicine. As the most typical "adjacent" body, garbage incineration facilities are full of representativeness. The study of it can help us clarify the context of the conflict and explore the most important factors in the conflict. The purpose of this paper is to find out the formation mechanism of the "adjacent avoidance" effect by taking the waste incineration facility as an example, and then put forward some relevant suggestions according to the mechanism. After considering the results of previous studies in the literature of the scholars, the lack of information as the core of "NIMBY effect mechanism construction of subjective utility model, by using the game theory to explain in NIMBY conflicts, information asymmetry lead to deviations from the evaluation of environmental loss. Then, using the method of case study, summarizing ten cases of typical industrial waste incineration NIMBY conflict is due to that, "O general lack of avoid conflict is to communicate with the residents of builders information, validation of the model in the core part, namely, poor communication leads to information asymmetry, so that people in the game to make a loss wrong, so residents to take tough resistance strategy, causing NIMBY conflict. This paper, from the information asymmetry into residents' subjective probability judgment in the utility function, the rank dependent utility function to describe the NIMBY facilities to the residents of the damage, the model will be judged as the residents of the weight loss evaluation of subjective probability, the subjective judgment in the form of "emotion" out. Therefore, in this paper, the builders and residents are used as two parties to discuss the decision-making behavior under asymmetric information. In the hawk dove game, the hawk and pigeon form represents the game decisions of the residents and Builders: tough and compromise, contrasting the strong resistance of the real residents and the compulsory implementation of the government. The focus of this paper is to introduce the information asymmetry factors, in the case of "focus on the analysis of NIMBY conflict process lack of links, from the results, the location, in a representative case of EIA and construction supervision are the lack of public participation, to infer the NIMBY conflict of interest is the key to CITIC communication factor. It is pointed out that the lack of information leads to the emotion of the residents, so that they are subjective in the game, which leads to the activity of opposing "neighbouring" construction, which is the outlet of emotion rather than the deliberate solution of peace. The government is lack of experience in dealing with the problem of "near and avoid". Therefore, there is a misunderstanding between residents and residents. If residents participate in the construction of "near and avoid" project, it will solve the "near neighbor" conflict and eliminate the information asymmetry, namely the way of "near and avoiding". Through the combing of the existing literature, we can see that the research on the "near neighbor" problem is not systematic. The "near neighbor" subsidy problem does not take into account the factors of information asymmetry. In this paper, some theories of behavior are included in the interpretation of the neighborhood avoidance effect, which has a certain exemplary significance. And the value of existing research is not high, it needs to analyze the various factors of "adjacent to avoid", so that it can not be biased. This paper systematically constructs the "adjacent avoidance" effect model under information asymmetry, which enriches the related literature of this kind of research. This paper uses a class dependent utility function, the emotional function of which depicts the behavior of both the residents and the government. The subjective utility function and game theory show that both sides choose the reason and result of decision making, which is consistent with the present situation of China's near future conflict, and the research method is endowed with the value of practice. Throughout the whole article, the research of this article is to solve the dilemma similar to garbage burning such "near neighbor" facilities corresponding to the industry, and the core of the problem is information asymmetry. This also involves public policy attention, so the NIMBY conflicts still need to find a solution to the more mature in subsequent research.
【学位授予单位】:浙江财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:X705;X32
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