地方政府环境管制行为与工业污染治理绩效研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 16:42

本文关键词：地方政府环境管制行为与工业污染治理绩效研究　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国经济高速发展的同时,也引起了巨大的环境成本。粗放型的工业增长方式所带来的资源过度消耗以及生态系统恶化已成为制约我国持续发展的瓶颈之一。经济快速发展的同时,人们各方面要求都不断提高,当前的生态状况已经不能满足人们对生活环境的需求,环境质量供求失衡。中央政府虽然逐渐提高了对当前环境污染的管制强度和治理力度,积极制定并实施了多部环境保护法规政策,但污染治理的效果却未能实现同比增长,污染治理绩效偏低,污染治理有效性有待提高。环境管制作为政府进行环境保护的有力工具,控制污染物排放的作用毋庸置疑。然而环境管制或者说污染治理需要巨大的成本投入,如何在既定的环境治理目标前提下实现成本投入最小化是经济发展背景下需要解决的资源配置与效率问题。地方政府在现行的环境管制模式之下,具有比中央政府更加重要的环境治理作用,地方政府对中央环境管制政策的执行力度直接影响污染治理的效果,对地方政府环境管制有效性的研究能够较好的解释当前环境治理绩效偏低问题。本文首先在理论分析的基础上,运用考虑非期望产出的SE-SBM模型对我国大陆各地区近年来的环境污染治理效率进行测评,揭示了我国近年来环境治理效率的区域差异和动态特征;同时运用熵值法测算了各省市的工业污染指数,以此来考察工业污染强度和治理效果。然后分析了环境管制怎样对企业的污染治理产生影响,在此基础上,运用省级层面的数据把环境管制等因素对污染治理效率和效果的影响进行了实证检验。其次,本文对地方政府的环境管制行为特征进行了理论与实证分析,并将公众参与纳入研究框架,探究了非政府力量对当地政府环境管制行为的影响。从博弈论的视角,对工业污染治理中所涉及的利益主体之间的行为关系进行了分析。研究发现,(1)我国各地区的污染治理效率存在很大不平衡性,呈现出“东高西低”的状态,污染治理效率总体偏低,且存在非常明显的空间集聚现象,但与中部和西部相比,东部地区的集聚现象较弱。(2)各地区的工业污染排放存在显著的动态持续特征,上一期的工业污染对本期具有重要影响;排污费征收额占工业GDP的比例与污染治理效率之间存在“U”型特征关系,而环境管制的立法并未能显著提升污染治理效率,执法在东部地区比中西部地区更能发挥良好的效果;环境管制在工业污染控制方面所发挥的作用不够明显,未能显著改善工业污染程度。人均实际GDP与污染治理效率和工业污染指数之间均存在一定的倒“U”型关系,工业总产值比重越高的地区工业污染越严重,治理效率也越低,国有企业的存在对污染治理效率具有提升作用,城镇化带来工业污染物排放量增加,对污染治理效率也具有一定的消极影响,而贸易开放能让东部地区因得到环境友好型生产技术而提高了污染治理技术效率,但中西部地区的贸易开放则对污染治理效率具有抑制作用。(3)本地政府的环境管制立法、实施与监督执法行为除了会受相邻地方政府行为的影响之外,还会受到自身过去行为的影响。公众参与能够显著促进地方政府的环境管制实施与监督执法。第四,中央政府核查成本及发现合谋的概率、中央政府核查的概率、合谋双方的收益、对合谋的惩罚力度,是影响地方政府与企业合谋的主要因素。基于此,本文提出如下建议:(1)中央政府要进一步加强对地方政府的监管,将环境绩效纳入政府考核体系,促进地方官员晋升体系向绿色化和多元化发展。(2)地方政府应进一步加强环境管制立法的科学性,并同时提高执法的有效性,提高对违法企业的惩处力度。(3)完善排污收费制度,优化工业污染治理的资金结构。政府可以适当提高污染收费标准,按照“谁污染谁付费”的原则,适当提高企业自筹资金比重。(4)优化公众参与机制,增强社会监督,完善环境监管与奖惩机制,避免合谋发生。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of China's economy at the same time, also caused a huge environmental cost. The extensive mode of industrial growth caused by excessive consumption of resources and deterioration of ecological system has become one of the bottlenecks which restricts the sustainable development of our country. The rapid development of economy at the same time, the requirements of people are increasing, the current ecological situation has been unable to meet needs of people living environment, imbalance between supply and demand of environmental quality. Although the central government has gradually increased to the current intensity of environmental pollution control and governance efforts, actively develop and implement a number of laws and regulations on environmental protection policy, but the effects of pollution control has failed to achieve an increase, low pollution performance, effective pollution control needs to be improved a powerful tool for environmental regulation. As the government environmental protection function, no doubt. However, the emission of pollutants of environmental regulation or pollution treatment Needs huge cost, how to achieve cost minimization is the allocation of resources and efficiency in the background of economic development need to be solved in environmental management objectives established under the premise of local government. Under the current model of environmental regulation, has more than the central government to increase the environmental governance role to the local government to the central environmental regulation policy enforcement directly affect the effects of pollution control and regulation of the effectiveness of local government environment can better explain the current environmental governance performance is low. This paper based on the theoretical analysis, using the SE-SBM model considering undesirable outputs to evaluate the governance efficiency of every area of our country in recent years, the pollution of the environment, reveal China's regional differences in environmental governance efficiency and dynamic characteristics in recent years; at the same time, using the entropy value method to calculate the various provinces and cities of the industrial pollution In order to study the index, industrial pollution intensity and governance effect. Then analyzes the environmental pollution control how the impact on the enterprise, on the basis of this, the provincial level data on the effects of environmental factors such as pollution control on the efficiency and effectiveness of the empirical study. Secondly, this paper makes theoretical and Empirical Analysis on the environment control the behavior of local government, and the public participation into the research framework, explores the influence of non governmental power on environmental control behavior of the local government. From the perspective of game theory, the relationship between the behavior involved in industrial pollution control in stakeholders are analyzed. The study found that (1) in all regions of China pollution control efficiency is not balanced, showing a "East High and west low" state, pollution control efficiency is generally low, and there is obvious spatial agglomeration, but in Compared with the South and West, the eastern region agglomeration is weak. (2) the area of industrial pollution emissions have significant dynamic continuous features, a period of industrial pollution has an important influence on the stage; the collection of sewage charges accounted for the existence of "U" type characteristics between the ratio of GDP and industrial pollution control and efficiency. Environmental regulation and legislation failed to significantly improve the pollution control efficiency, law enforcement in the eastern region than the central and western regions can play good effect; its environmental regulation in the industrial pollution control effect is not obvious, no significant improvement in the degree of pollution industry. There are some inverted "U" type relationship between per capita GDP and pollution the control efficiency and the industrial pollution index, the higher the proportion of the total industrial output value of industrial pollution is more serious, governance efficiency is low, in the state-owned enterprises has promoted effect on pollution control efficiency, Urbanization brings the industrial pollutant emissions increase, also has some negative effects on the pollution control efficiency, and trade openness can make the eastern region improve the efficiency of pollution treatment technology for environmental friendly production technology, but the opening of the Midwest trade has inhibitory effect on the pollution control efficiency. (3) local government environment control legislation, enforcement and supervision of law enforcement behavior in addition to be affected by the adjacent local government behavior, but also is affected by its past actions. Public participation could significantly promote the implementation of local government environmental regulation and supervision of law enforcement. In fourth, the central government cost verification and found the probability of collusion, the probability of verification of the central government, both sides of the conspiracy revenue, penalties for collusion, is the main factor affecting the conspiracy between the local government and enterprise. Based on this, the paper made the following suggestions: (1) the central government To further strengthen the supervision of local governments, environmental performance evaluation system into the government, promote local officials' promotion system to green and diversified development. (2) the local government should further strengthen the scientific environmental legislation, and improve the effectiveness of law enforcement, increase the punishment for illegal enterprises (3) perfect. The charging system, the capital structure optimization of industrial pollution control. The government can improve the pollution charges, in accordance with the "polluter pays" principle, appropriate to increase the proportion of self financing enterprises. (4) the optimization of the mechanism of public participation, strengthen social supervision, improve the environmental supervision and punishment mechanism, to avoid collusion.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X32

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