环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-02-11 04:55

本文关键词： 环境税委托代理模型演化博弈　出处：《管理评论》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在环境税制背景下,从微观主体的收益函数出发,本文构建了中央政府与地方政府的委托代理模型、政府与污染企业的演化博弈模型,并对三者的利益互动博弈关系进行了仿真模拟和深入分析,从中探究合理的环境税征收的设计机制。研究结果表明:(1)在环境税的监管机制下,当政府补贴大于企业减排成本时,政府与污染企业的博弈稳定策略实现了帕累托最优。(2)随着中央政府对地方政府税收共享比例的提高,地方政府对污染企业的监管力度也会加大,因此制定合理的环境税共享比例有助于调动地方政府积极性,从而实现污染企业节能减排。(3)加大监管力度和提高环境税率将会促进污染企业减少排放,但是一旦监管力度下降,即使提高环境税率,污染企业不会全部采取减排策略。污染企业将出现两极分化,一部分企业选择不减排策略,另一部分企业选择减排策略。因此制定严格的环境污染监督机制势必将推动污染企业积极减排、促进经济绿色发展。
[Abstract]:Under the background of environmental tax system, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of central government and local government, and the evolutionary game model of government and polluting enterprise. Simulation and in-depth analysis of the relationship between the three benefits are carried out to explore the design mechanism of reasonable environmental tax collection. The research results show that under the supervision mechanism of environmental tax, when the government subsidy is larger than the cost of enterprise emission reduction, when the government subsidy is larger than the cost of enterprise emission reduction, The game stabilization strategy between the government and the polluting enterprises has realized the Pareto optimal. 2) as the central government increases the share of tax revenue to the local government, the local government will also strengthen the supervision of the polluting enterprises. Therefore, setting a reasonable share ratio of environmental tax will help to arouse the enthusiasm of local governments, thus realizing the energy saving and emission reduction of polluting enterprises.) strengthening the supervision and raising the environmental tax rate will promote the pollution enterprises to reduce their emissions, but once the supervision intensity drops, Even if the environmental tax rate is raised, polluting enterprises will not all adopt emission reduction strategies. Polluting enterprises will become polarized, and some enterprises will choose not to reduce emissions. The other part of the enterprises choose emission reduction strategies. Therefore, the establishment of strict environmental pollution monitoring mechanism will certainly promote the pollution enterprises to actively reduce emissions and promote the green development of the economy.
【作者单位】：河南财经政法大学经济学院/中原经济区"三化"协调发展河南省协同创新中心;北京物资学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA072) 本文系河南省哲学社会科学规划项目阶段性成果(2016BJJ070) 河南省科技厅软科学项目(172400410099) 河南财经政法大学重点学科建设项目
【分类号】：F224.32;F812.45;X196

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