减排窘境与官员晋升——来自中国省级地方政府的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-23 05:13

  本文选题：节能减排　切入点：官员晋升　出处：《产业经济研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在中国财政分权体制、"晋升锦标赛"以及环境约谈、问责等多重约束下,地方政府官员可能面临着"减"或"不减"的"减排窘境"。在构建中国地方政府节能减排政治经济学分析框架的基础上,基于2000—2014年中国分省区的面板数据,通过采用非线性面板计量模型,实证分析了节能减排对地方政府官员晋升的影响效应。研究发现,考察期内,CO2排放强度对地方政府官员晋升的影响效应显著为负,这为地方政府官员为了自身政治前途而开展"节能锦标赛"提供了较好的经验证据,基于增长率指标的稳健性检验和内生性处理结果均支持了这一结论。进一步地,节能减排对省长晋升的影响效应是不显著的,对省委书记晋升则具有显著的促进作用。研究结论为优化中国地方政府治理、促进经济发展方式的转型升级提供了重要启示。
[Abstract]:Under the constraints of China's fiscal decentralization system, "promotion championships" and environmental interviews and accountability, Local government officials may face a "reduction" or "no reduction" dilemma. Based on a political economic analysis framework for energy conservation and emission reduction by local governments in China, panel data are available from 2000 to 2014 in China's provinces and regions. By using nonlinear panel measurement model, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of energy saving and emission reduction on the promotion of local government officials. The results show that the effect of CO2 emission intensity on the promotion of local government officials is significantly negative during the investigation period. This provides good empirical evidence for local government officials to launch the "Energy Saving Championship" for their own political future. Both the robustness test based on the growth rate index and the results of endogenous treatment support this conclusion. The effect of energy saving and emission reduction on the promotion of provincial governors is not significant, but it can promote the promotion of provincial party secretaries. The research conclusions provide important enlightenment for optimizing the governance of local governments in China and promoting the transformation and upgrading of economic development mode.
【作者单位】： 东南大学经济管理学院;南京师范大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(17AGL005)
【分类号】：D630.3;X321
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本文编号：1652037