基于公众参与的企业排污治理演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-08-09 07:12

【摘要】：企业排污治理是涉及不同主体利益的博弈问题,从公众参与的角度出发,构建以地方政府、排污企业与公众为主体的企业排污治理演化博弈模型,分析影响各博弈主体策略选择与演化的因素,并经求解确立各方行为趋于稳定状态的条件。以江苏常隆农化有限公司等环境污染案为例进行变量关系设定,并就变量对参与主体策略行为的影响做出分析,结果表明:降低地方政府严格监督的成本并加大对地方政府不严格监督的问责、建立公众参与监督的有效途径且做好受损公众的赔偿裁定、降低企业达标排污的成本并加大对排污企业的监督强度和非法排污惩罚力度是推进三方互动,实现企业排污有效治理的关键。
[Abstract]:Enterprise sewage management is a game problem involving the interests of different subjects. From the angle of public participation, the evolutionary game model of enterprise sewage management is constructed, which takes local government, pollutant enterprise and public as the main body. The factors that influence the selection and evolution of game agents' strategies are analyzed, and the conditions under which the behaviors of all parties tend to be stable are solved. Taking the case of environmental pollution such as Changlong Agricultural Chemical Co., Ltd. Jiangsu as an example, the variable relationship is set up, and the influence of variables on the main body's strategic behavior is analyzed. The results show that the cost of strict supervision of local government is reduced and the accountability of local government is increased, the effective way of public participation in supervision is established, and the compensation ruling of damaged public is made well. It is the key to promote the interaction of three parties and to realize the effective management of pollutant discharge by reducing the cost of discharging pollutants up to standard and increasing the intensity of supervision and punishment of illegal emission.
【作者单位】：江苏大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71503104) 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2016M591793) 江苏大学高级技术人才项目(14JDG108)
【分类号】：X322

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