财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理——纳税大户议价能力的视角
发布时间：2018-08-24 16:37
【摘要】：2016年中央环保督察取得了较大进展,垂直式环境管理体制改革也已开始试点,环境管理体制改革向前迈进了一步。为了论证这一转变的必要性,本文从纳税大户的角度出发,揭示了财政激励在已有的"块块式"环境管理体制中的重要作用。由于财源的建设和维护是地方政府财政激励的基本体现,其中纳税大户是重要保护对象,这些纳税大户可能在地方环境治理中拥有着强大的议价能力。实证结果表明,地区污染密集型企业中纳税大户占比越大,地区污染增长越快。路径分析结果发现,纳税大户能够减弱环境规制的效果,意味着纳税大户能够一定程度地豁免于环境规制;同时,地方政府没有给予这些纳税大户直接财政补贴,而是通过税收征管上的优惠给予其一定的隐性补贴。根据增值税、营业税分成的分样本和环保模范城市的分样本回归发现,在财政激励较弱和环境偏好较强的地区,纳税大户的污染效应明显减弱。因此,未来环境治理应加快推进深化环保垂直管理体制改革,完善中央环保督察制度,前者的目的是弱化地方财政激励对环保职能的正常履行的影响,后者的目的是强化地方政府环境质量偏好。
[Abstract]:In 2016, the Central Environmental Protection Inspector has made great progress, the vertical environmental management system reform has also begun to pilot, the environmental management system reform has taken a step forward. In order to demonstrate the necessity of this change, this paper reveals the important role of fiscal incentives in the existing "block" environmental management system from the point of view of large tax payers. Since the construction and maintenance of financial resources is the basic embodiment of local government financial incentives, the tax payer is an important object of protection, these tax payers may have a strong bargaining power in the local environmental governance. The empirical results show that the larger the proportion of tax payers in regional pollution-intensive enterprises, the faster the growth of regional pollution. The result of path analysis shows that taxpayers can weaken the effect of environmental regulation, which means that tax payers can be exempted from environmental regulation to a certain extent. At the same time, local governments do not give direct financial subsidies to these tax payers. But through tax collection and administration of preferential treatment to give it a certain implicit subsidies. According to VAT, sample of business tax division and sample regression of environmental protection model city, it is found that the pollution effect of tax payer is obviously weakened in areas with weak fiscal incentive and strong environmental preference. Therefore, in the future, environmental governance should accelerate the deepening of the reform of the vertical environmental protection management system and the improvement of the central environmental protection supervision system. The former aims to weaken the impact of local financial incentives on the normal performance of environmental protection functions. The latter aim is to strengthen the local government environmental quality preference.
【作者单位】： 中国社会科学院财经战略研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“交通设施的空间网络特征及其异质性产业集聚效应研究”(批准号71573218);国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国式政府间环境事权划分研究”(批准号71673229);国家自然科学基金青年项目“最低工资与城镇减贫:影响机制与实际效果的微观检验”(批准号71403289)
【分类号】：F812.42;X321
，
本文编号：2201394
[Abstract]:In 2016, the Central Environmental Protection Inspector has made great progress, the vertical environmental management system reform has also begun to pilot, the environmental management system reform has taken a step forward. In order to demonstrate the necessity of this change, this paper reveals the important role of fiscal incentives in the existing "block" environmental management system from the point of view of large tax payers. Since the construction and maintenance of financial resources is the basic embodiment of local government financial incentives, the tax payer is an important object of protection, these tax payers may have a strong bargaining power in the local environmental governance. The empirical results show that the larger the proportion of tax payers in regional pollution-intensive enterprises, the faster the growth of regional pollution. The result of path analysis shows that taxpayers can weaken the effect of environmental regulation, which means that tax payers can be exempted from environmental regulation to a certain extent. At the same time, local governments do not give direct financial subsidies to these tax payers. But through tax collection and administration of preferential treatment to give it a certain implicit subsidies. According to VAT, sample of business tax division and sample regression of environmental protection model city, it is found that the pollution effect of tax payer is obviously weakened in areas with weak fiscal incentive and strong environmental preference. Therefore, in the future, environmental governance should accelerate the deepening of the reform of the vertical environmental protection management system and the improvement of the central environmental protection supervision system. The former aims to weaken the impact of local financial incentives on the normal performance of environmental protection functions. The latter aim is to strengthen the local government environmental quality preference.
【作者单位】： 中国社会科学院财经战略研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“交通设施的空间网络特征及其异质性产业集聚效应研究”(批准号71573218);国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国式政府间环境事权划分研究”(批准号71673229);国家自然科学基金青年项目“最低工资与城镇减贫:影响机制与实际效果的微观检验”(批准号71403289)
【分类号】：F812.42;X321
，
本文编号：2201394
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