基于模糊博弈行为的京津冀跨域大气污染联合治理机制研究
发布时间：2019-04-20 13:28
【摘要】：本文针对京津冀如何形成有效的跨域污染联合治理机制展开研究。首先构建了跨域合作污染治理的特征函数及模糊合作博弈的参与度函数。其次结合京津冀实际环境数据,利用模糊博弈Shapley值法获得合作省市成本分摊方案。最后分析了年平均浓度,年空气质量未达标天数及环境污染治理力对成本分摊值的影响关系。研究结果表明各省市在评价期内用于污染治理的资金预算越大,计算的模糊博弈参与度越小,且平均浓度及污染天数与成本分摊值成正比例关系,环境污染治理力与成本分摊值成反比例关系。同时应鼓励合作省市前期治污的有效投资,在前期投资越大治污效果越好,且后期成本分摊值就越小。据此本文建立的联合治污经济利益协调机制能对参与者起到有效激励的作用,促使跨域联合治污有效实施。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on how to form an effective cross-regional pollution control mechanism in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Firstly, the characteristic function of cross-domain cooperative pollution control and the participation function of fuzzy cooperative game are constructed. Secondly, combined with the actual environmental data of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, the cost-sharing scheme of cooperative provinces and cities is obtained by using the fuzzy game Shapley method. Finally, the relationship between the annual average concentration, the days when the annual air quality is not up to the standard and the environmental pollution control capacity on the cost assessment are analyzed. The results show that the larger the capital budget for pollution control in the evaluation period, the smaller the calculated fuzzy game participation, and that the average concentration and pollution days have a positive proportional relationship with the cost-sharing value. The environmental pollution control ability is inversely proportional to the cost-sharing value. At the same time, we should encourage the effective investment in the early stage of pollution control in the cooperative provinces and cities. The larger the investment in the earlier stage, the better the pollution control effect, and the smaller the cost-sharing value in the later period. Therefore, the coordination mechanism of economic benefits of joint pollution control established in this paper can play an effective incentive role to participants and promote the effective implementation of cross-domain joint treatment of pollution.
【作者单位】： 上海理工大学管理学院;上海商学院商务经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171134) 上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK) 上海市高原学科(管理科学与工程) 沪江基金资助项目(A14006)
【分类号】：X51
本文编号：2461647
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on how to form an effective cross-regional pollution control mechanism in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Firstly, the characteristic function of cross-domain cooperative pollution control and the participation function of fuzzy cooperative game are constructed. Secondly, combined with the actual environmental data of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, the cost-sharing scheme of cooperative provinces and cities is obtained by using the fuzzy game Shapley method. Finally, the relationship between the annual average concentration, the days when the annual air quality is not up to the standard and the environmental pollution control capacity on the cost assessment are analyzed. The results show that the larger the capital budget for pollution control in the evaluation period, the smaller the calculated fuzzy game participation, and that the average concentration and pollution days have a positive proportional relationship with the cost-sharing value. The environmental pollution control ability is inversely proportional to the cost-sharing value. At the same time, we should encourage the effective investment in the early stage of pollution control in the cooperative provinces and cities. The larger the investment in the earlier stage, the better the pollution control effect, and the smaller the cost-sharing value in the later period. Therefore, the coordination mechanism of economic benefits of joint pollution control established in this paper can play an effective incentive role to participants and promote the effective implementation of cross-domain joint treatment of pollution.
【作者单位】： 上海理工大学管理学院;上海商学院商务经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171134) 上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK) 上海市高原学科(管理科学与工程) 沪江基金资助项目(A14006)
【分类号】：X51
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