碳市场交易价格与履约监管博弈和计量分析

发布时间：2018-02-09 12:54

本文关键词： 碳交易市场演化博弈向量自回归模型　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：开展碳排放权交易不仅顺应国家深化经济体制改革总体要求,也是我国实现温室气体排放总量控制和峰值目标的主要手段。在对我国目前的试点交易情况进行系统分析的基础上,本文发现我国碳市场存在市场活跃度不高、履约率仍有提升空间,以及交易价格普遍较低、波动较大的问题。一方面,完善的履约监管机制有利于提高碳交易履约率,增强碳市场活跃度,有效发挥市场机制的价格形成功能,从而使碳交易价格维持于一个较为合理而稳定的水平;另一方面,碳交易价格的平稳,将降低碳排放权交易的风险,有利于提高企业交易参与度,从而提高履约率。所以,本文将碳交易履约监管机制与价格机制结合起来研究,通过分析提出相应改善建议,具有理论与现实意义。本文主要围绕以下内容展开:第一,通过对相应数据的收集与处理,对2016年度我国各碳试点的交易情况进行系统分析,从中发现我国碳市场存在履约率不高、履约期交易集中、价格较为低迷且波动较大的问题,并且履约与价格两方面相互关联、相互影响。第二,本文对碳市场进行履约监管演化博弈分析,针对我国碳市场未达到完全履约、监管机制不完善的问题,通过建立复制动态方程进行分析,可得知若加大对控排企业违约行为的惩罚,与此同时增大其履约所收获的福利补贴,并加大对交易所监管不力的惩罚,在长期的演化中,最终将得到履约率提高、履约机制向完善的稳定状态演化的均衡结果。第三,本文建立向量自回归模型用于探讨碳市场价格机制的问题,对我国碳交易价格的影响因素进行计量分析。以深圳碳试点为例,探讨我国碳交易价格与国外碳交易价格、国内外经济形势等因素之间的关系,分析这些因素对我国碳交易价格的影响过程及程度,得出我国碳交易价格与欧盟碳市场的联系相对紧密但尚未与之接轨的结论。最后,本文对我国碳市场现存问题提出相应的政策建议,力求为建立全国统一碳市场起到一定借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:The development of carbon emissions trading not only conforms to the overall requirements of deepening the economic system reform of the country, It is also the main means to achieve the goal of total greenhouse gas emission control and peak value in China. Based on the systematic analysis of the current pilot trading situation in China, this paper finds that there is a low market activity in China's carbon market. There is still room for improvement in compliance rates, as well as the problem of generally low and volatile transaction prices. On the one hand, a sound performance supervision mechanism is conducive to increasing the compliance rate of carbon trading and increasing the activity of the carbon market. To give full play to the price-forming function of the market mechanism, so that the price of carbon trading can be maintained at a more reasonable and stable level; on the other hand, the stable price of carbon trading will reduce the risk of carbon emissions trading. Therefore, this paper studies the mechanism of carbon trading performance supervision and price mechanism, and puts forward corresponding improvement suggestions through analysis. This paper mainly focuses on the following contents: first, through the collection and processing of the corresponding data, the trading situation of each carbon pilot in China in 2016 is analyzed systematically. It is found that in our country's carbon market, the performance rate is not high, the transaction period is concentrated, the price is low and fluctuating, and the two aspects of performance and price are interrelated and influence each other. Second, In this paper, the evolution game analysis of carbon market performance supervision is carried out. Aiming at the problem that China's carbon market is not in full compliance and the regulatory mechanism is not perfect, the dynamic equation of reproduction is established to analyze the problem. It can be seen that if the penalty for breaching the contract is increased, at the same time increasing the welfare subsidy for the performance of the enterprise, and increasing the penalty for the lack of supervision of the exchange, the compliance rate will eventually increase in the long run. Third, this paper establishes a vector autoregressive model to discuss the price mechanism of the carbon market. This paper makes an econometric analysis on the influencing factors of carbon trading price in China. Taking the carbon experiment in Shenzhen as an example, the paper discusses the relationship between the carbon trading price in China and the foreign carbon trading price, the economic situation at home and abroad, and so on. By analyzing the influence process and degree of these factors on the carbon trading price of our country, the conclusion is drawn that the carbon trading price of our country is relatively close to the carbon market of the European Union but has not yet been connected with it. This paper puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions to the existing problems of China's carbon market, and tries to play a certain reference for the establishment of the national unified carbon market.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X196;F832.5

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