基于可交易电子路票的交通管理建模与分析
发布时间:2018-03-21 10:52
本文选题:道路收费 切入点:可交易电子路票 出处:《北京交通大学》2017年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:在制定交通管理措施以及对其进行效率预估和评价时,需要充分了解出行者对于这些措施的心理反应和潜在的出行行为变化。面对不同的交通管理措施,出行者的态度和相应的出行选择行为有着显著的不同。特别是考虑到人们决策中的非完全理性心理和行为时,尤其如此。本文从行为经济学角度出发,研究道路收费和可交易电子路票环境下出行者的非完全理性行为对其路径选择的影响,并探讨了可交易电子路票在调节节假日游客出发时刻和公私合作修建公共道路等问题中的应用,为交通缓堵措施的制定和应用提供了理论依据。本论文的主要工作如下:1.基于出行心理预算的道路收费网络均衡分析。假设每个出行者均会设置一个出行心理账户来控制自己的出行支出。根据心理账户理论,不同心理账户之间的预算是不能相互转换和替代的。在道路收费中,如果收费数额超过了出行者的预算,超出部分对出行者造成的心理影响要远大于预算内部分的影响。据此建立模型,研究出行预算对出行者路径选择的影响,并分析了高收费道路使用率被高估的原因。研究发现,超预算支出导致的过高的心理感知成本使得心理预算处于中低水平的出行者避免选择高收费道路出行是造成高收费道路使用率低于预期的重要原因之一。2.基于损失规避的可交易电子路票网络均衡分析。根据行为经济学理论,人们对于损失和收益的敏感程度是不同的,等量的损失所带来的痛苦要远大于等量的收益带来的快乐。给定可交易电子路票方案,研究了考虑出行者损失规避心理的出行者路径选择问题。文章定义了一个路票成本函数以刻画出行者的损失规避心理,并给出了相应的用户均衡和市场均衡条件,建立了等价的变分不等式模型。分析表明在考虑出行者损失规避的情况下,并不总是存在可以达到系统最优的可交易电子路票方案,并给出了其存在的充分条件。3.基于框架效应的可交易电子路票网络均衡分析。在上一章的基础上,进一步研究了可交易电子路票方案中出行者对于免费获得的路票的"专款专用"心理对于其出行选择的影响。由于在可交易电子路票方案中,政府会免费发放给出行者一定数量的路票。这部分免费路票对于出行者而言是不劳而获的意外之财,是一种特殊的交通补贴。给定电子路票方案,出行者这种心理会使得更多人选择收取较高数量路票的路径出行。根据心理账户理论,对收入的不同描述和归类方式会严重影响人们的决策行为。根据出行者对于电子路票的不同态度和心理,将出行者分为三类,研究了出行者对于电子路票的不同描述和归类方式对于其路径选择的影响。4.基于可交易电子路票的节假日瓶颈模型研究。大量游客过于集中的出行时间是造成节假日期间交通拥堵的主要原因,而旨在"让利于民"的节假日高速免费政策使得交通拥堵状况进一步恶化。因此研究了节假日期间由城区到景区的交通拥堵问题,主要研究问题包括:(1)游客在节假日期间的旅游出发时刻选择问题,即游客如何权衡早/晚出发成本、交通拥堵排队成本、景区拥堵成本;(2)节假日高速免费政策对于游客出发时刻选择的影响;(3)可交易电子路票在调节节假日出行问题中的潜在应用。5.基于可交易电子路票的私营融资和交通管理。根据可交易电子路票的特点,提出一种新的公私合作修建公共道路的模式(BEC),将交通管理与公私合作建设道路相结合。该模式一方面保证了政府拥有道路的运营权和决策权,另一方面避免了政府财政预算不足的问题。同时,私人公司可以在避免公众抵制的情况下获取建设利润。另外,通过针对整个路网的整体管理措施,由全体出行者分担道路建设和维护成本,可以兼顾效率和公平。针对这一模式建立了双层规划模型,并分别以社会福利最大化和公司利润最大化为目标分析了相应的BEC模型的性质。
[Abstract]:In the development of traffic management measures and prediction and evaluation of its efficiency, it is necessary to fully understand the traveler psychological reaction to these measures and potential changes in travel behavior. In the face of different traffic management measures, the traveler's attitude and the corresponding travel choice behavior is significantly different. Especially considering people decision in the non rational psychology and behavior. This paper, from the perspective of behavioral economics, effects of road pricing and trading of electronic road ticket under the environment of the traveler's non rational behavior of the path selection, and discusses the application of electronic trading in the regulation of Road Ticket tourists holidays departure time and public-private partnerships to build public roads problems, provide a theoretical basis for the development and application of traffic congestion measures. The main work of this paper are as follows: 1. budget based road travel psychology Analysis of charging network equilibrium. Assuming that each traveler will set up a travel psychological account to control their travel expenses. According to the mental accounting theory, between different mental accounts of the budget is not mutual conversion and substitution. In the road toll charges, if the amount exceeds the traveler's budget, beyond the psychological impact on some the travelers are far greater than the influence in the budget. Based on the model, the research budget of traveler's route choice behavior, and analyzes the high toll road use rate is overvalued. The study found that over budget spending leads to high cost makes the psychological perception of mental budgeting in the low level of travelers to avoid high toll road trip is caused by the high toll road use rate is lower than the.2. one of the important reasons of expected loss aversion can be traded road network equilibrium based on electronic ticket Analysis. According to the theory of behavioral economics, it is different for the sensitive degree of losses and gains, caused by the amounts of the pain of loss is much greater than that of equal income can bring happiness. A given road ticket scheme of electronic trading, the travel path selection problem considering the travelers' loss aversion. This paper presents the definition of a road ticket cost function to describe traveler's loss aversion, and the corresponding user equilibrium and the market equilibrium condition is given, an equivalent variational inequality model. Analysis shows that in consideration of their loss aversion situation does not always exist in electronic trading Road Ticket scheme can achieve the optimal system, and gives the analysis the sufficient conditions for the existence of the.3. framework can effect Road Ticket Network Equilibrium Based on electronic transaction. On the basis of the previous chapter, further study the electronic trading scheme in a road ticket The traveler to get free tickets to the road "earmarking" psychological impact on the travel choice. Due to the transaction of Electronic Road Ticket scheme, the government will give a certain number of free travel tickets. This part of the free road road ticket is unearned windfall for travelers, is a kind of special traffic the electronic ticket subsidies. A given road plan, this will make the traveler psychological more people choose the route to charge higher number of road ticket. According to the theory of mental accounting, will seriously affect the decision-making behavior of people of different income and classified description. According to the travelers for Electronic Road Ticket different attitude and psychology, travelers are divided three kinds of different description for the electronic ticket and Walker road classified impact on the path selection of.4. based on bottleneck model transaction electronic holidays road ticket. A large number of visitors Centralized travel time is caused by traffic congestion during the holidays to the main reason, and to help the people of the high-speed free holiday policy makes the traffic congestion worse. Therefore the study during the holidays by the city to the problem of traffic congestion in scenic area, the main research questions include: (1) tourists during the holidays of tourism time selection problem, namely how to weigh the tourists early / late starting cost, traffic congestion, queuing cost, congestion cost; (2) the influence of the time of high-speed free holiday policy choice for tourists; (3) can be traded electronic ticket private financing and road traffic management based on the potential application of.5. in electronic trading Road Ticket regulation holiday travel in. According to the characteristics of electronic ticket transaction way, put forward a new public-private partnership to build a public road model (BEC), the traffic management and construction of public-private cooperation A road combined. The model on the one hand to ensure the decision-making power and the right to operate government owned road, on the other hand to avoid government budget problems. At the same time, the Private Companies can obtain profits in the construction to avoid public boycott cases. In addition, the overall management measures for the entire road network, by all the travelers share the road construction and maintenance costs, can take into account the efficiency and fairness. The bi level programming model is established for this model, and to maximize the social welfare maximization and corporate profits as the goal to analyze the nature of the BEC model.
【学位授予单位】:北京交通大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:U491
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