考虑多重参与者行为的双渠道供应链演化博弈模型研究

发布时间：2017-12-26 15:59

本文关键词：考虑多重参与者行为的双渠道供应链演化博弈模型研究　出处：《天津大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电子商务的崛起使得供应链中双渠道销售变得日益普遍。双渠道供应链中,包含不同渠道间的水平竞争及参与者间的垂直竞争。此外,决策者行为,消费者行为等等也都会对供应链产生各种影响。本文正是基于这一问题,利用经济学和非线性动力学等相关知识建立了多渠道供应链的价格博弈模型,研究了长期价格博弈的一个动态演变过程。文章主要结论和创新如下:1、利用非线性动力学知识理论研究分析了一类双渠道供应链的定价问题。根据现实中不同的竞争情况,构建博弈模型。证明了动态博弈时的边界均衡解的不稳定性。利用二维分岔图分析了系统进入混沌的不同方式,价格调整速度过快时,系统会从稳定域通过倍周期分岔或直接由Neimark-Sacker分岔进入混沌。同时,利用奇异吸引子等指标分析了该类模型长期博弈演化过程中表现出来的动力学特性,分析了混沌现象对系统在定价利润方面的影响。此外,当系统出现混沌现象时,文章研究了不同控制方法对系统的控制,以便市场能够有序稳定的竞争。2、本文对开辟双渠道的制造商与零售商的博弈方式进行了多种探讨,不同情境下对博弈主导者分别是制造商和零售商的情形分别建立了模型,同时还考虑了地位相同时的Nash博弈,并对不同模型进行了比较分析。论文证明了Stackelberg博弈和Nash博弈均衡解的存在性并给出了解析解。博弈结果表明,博弈主导者在竞争稳定时比较有利,但是一旦系统离开稳定域,进入博弈激烈阶段,跟随者往往能获得较大利润。3、针对制造商开辟直销渠道销售的情形,文章分别考虑了零售商具有公平关切行为,自营销售行为,以及需求市场有参考价格影响的闭环供应链定价博弈模型,并对制造商主导博弈的情形下进行了对比分析。结果表明,参与者行为会影响系统稳定域,价格调整过快以及市场对各种行为敏感时,系统容易失稳。零售商的公平关切心理使自己劣势得到一定程度改善,但过度关切利润并非一直增加。零售商引入自营行为会带来更低的直销价和零售价,有利于消费者。而且引入竞争会增大系统稳定域,也会为自己带来更多利润,从而降低制造商开辟直销渠道带来的影响。在有参考价格影响的多渠道闭环供应链中,制造商回收行为能有效增加供应链整体利润。在稳定域,零售商的利润会随着参考价格系数的增加而增加,而到了分岔及混沌域,随参考价格系数的增加主导者利润都会降低。
[Abstract]:The rise of e-commerce has made the sale of dual channel in the supply chain more and more common. The dual channel supply chain includes the horizontal competition between different channels and the vertical competition among the participants. In addition, the behavior of decision-makers, consumer behavior and so on will have a variety of impact on the supply chain. Based on this problem, this paper establishes a price game model of multi-channel supply chain based on knowledge related to economics and nonlinear dynamics, and studies a dynamic evolution process of long-term price game. The main conclusions and innovations of this paper are as follows: 1. The pricing of a kind of dual channel supply chain is analyzed by using the theory of nonlinear dynamics knowledge. According to the different competitive situation in reality, a game model is built. The instability of the boundary equilibrium solution for dynamic game is proved. Two dimensional bifurcation diagram is used to analyze the different ways of the system entering chaos. When the price adjustment speed is too fast, the system will bifurcate from the stable domain to the chaos by Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. At the same time, we use singular attractors and other indicators to analyze the dynamic characteristics of the long-term game evolution, and analyze the impact of chaos on the pricing profit of the system. In addition, when the system is chaotic, the paper studies the control of the system by different control methods so that the market can compete in an orderly and stable way. 2, the game of manufacturer and retailer opened two channels of various discussion, different situations of game are leading manufacturers and retailers were established model, but also consider the Nash game at the same position, and the different models were compared and analyzed. In this paper, the existence of the Stackelberg game and the equilibrium solution of Nash game is proved and the analytical solution is given. The game results show that the game leader is more favorable when the competition is stable, but once the system moves away from the stable domain and enters the intense stage of the game, the follower often gains large profits. 3, according to the manufacturer opens the direct sales channels, this paper respectively consider the retailer has the behavior of fairness concerns, self marketing behavior, and market demand chain pricing game model of closed loop supply reference price effect, and leading manufacturers game on the situation were compared. The results show that the actor's behavior affects the system stability domain, the price adjustment is too fast and the market is sensitive to various behavior, the system is easy to lose stability. The fair concern of the retailer has improved its weakness to a certain extent, but the excessive concern for profit is not increasing. The introduction of self-management by retailers will bring lower price and retail price, which is beneficial to consumers. And the introduction of competition will increase the stability of the system, and will also bring more profits to themselves, thus reducing the impact of manufacturers opening direct channels. In a multi channel closed loop supply chain with the influence of reference price, the manufacturer's recovery behavior can effectively increase the overall profit of the supply chain. In the stable domain, the profit of retailers will increase with the increase of reference price coefficient, and to the bifurcation and chaos domain, the profit will decrease with the increase of reference price coefficient.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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