不完全契约理论视角下的农户信用行为研究

发布时间：2018-01-01 06:08

本文关键词：不完全契约理论视角下的农户信用行为研究　出处：《西北大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：农村金融肩负着为“三农”发展提供金融服务的重要使命,但是受到农民财产权利不完全的束缚,农村信贷制度存在着供需匹配错位问题,制约着农民收入增长和农业产业化发展。在2016年中央一号文件中提出“加快构建多层次、广覆盖、可持续的农村金融服务体系,发展农村普惠金融,降低融资成本,全面激活农村金融服务链条”。普惠金融的“机会平等”体现在农户的贷款申请权利和贷款内容上,普惠金融“商业上的可持续性”需要控制债务人违约行为,但是由于缺少可抵押财产,农户的违约机会成本低,债权人对农户违约行为控制困难。通过对已有农户信用行为研究文献的分析,文献研究多从信用行为的影响因素进行分析,缺乏从农户债务契约的角度分析农户信用行为。契约治理机制的研究文献集中在某一种机制的研究,没有对契约治理机制与行为进行系统性研究；自我履约机制和再谈判机制在农村经济研究中多集中在农业合作组织和农产品销售行为领域,在农户信用行为的研究中应用较少,上述机制在农户缺少可抵押财产时有助于实现契约的事后效率。由于契约初始阶段存在着不可证实信息,不可能缔结完全契约,本文基于不完全契约理论的视角,将农户的信用行为分为农户的缔约行为和农户的履约行为两阶段,构建了一个农户信用行为的理论分析框架,通过委托代理模型,分别探讨农户信用行为的影响因素及其对契约治理机制的行为反应,并基于农户调研数据和案例进行实证检验。为解决农业产业化的金融支持问题,以及保障普惠金融的落实提供理论上的决策依据。本文的主要研究结论有：1.受到财富约束影响的农户的实际债务契约融资成本高于预期水平,虽然长期债务契约关系有利于农户和债权人,但是受到劳动力转移的影响,债务契约关系的短期化加剧农户的融资成本的增加；2.农户的借款决策和借款能力与农户家庭人口数量正相关,农户经济作物的土地面积、社会资本与农户的借款决策正相关,但是影响程度低于家庭人口数量,农户的借款金额与农户债务关系持续期正相关,农户在借款渠道上仍以正规金融机构为主,农资赊购行为虽然普遍存在,但是在回归分析中没有发现对农户借款决策有影响;3.在自我履约机制中,声誉资本由于受到外生金融制度和社会保障制度供给不足的限制,影响到自我履约机制的效率,有抵押物的惩罚对互惠行为有效,但是在农户联保小组内的互惠行为效力有限,信贷员工资激励制度对自我履约机制起到辅助激励的作用；4.不同融资渠道的债务契约弹性不同,农户与债权人在再谈判机制中受到谈判力、对谈判破裂担心的程度的影响,达成的谈判结果不同,契约弹性越大,农户越容易采取侵害债权人利益的行为,但是自身利益也不能得到保障。
[Abstract]:Rural finance shoulders the important mission of providing financial services for the development of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. However, due to the imperfection of the farmers' property rights, the rural credit system has the problem of mismatch between supply and demand. In the first document of the Central Committee in 2016, "accelerating the construction of a multi-level, broad-based and sustainable rural financial service system, and developing rural inclusive finance" is a constraint on the growth of farmers' income and the development of agricultural industrialization. Reduce the financing cost, activate the rural financial service chain in an all-round way. The "equal opportunity" of inclusive finance is embodied in the farmers' right to apply for loans and the content of loans. Inclusive finance's "commercial sustainability" requires controlling debtors' default, but farmers' opportunity costs for default are low due to a lack of mortgaged property. It is difficult for creditors to control the farmers' breach of contract. Through the analysis of the existing research literature on the credit behavior of farmers, the literature research mostly analyzes the influencing factors of the credit behavior. The research literature of contract governance mechanism focuses on one kind of mechanism, and there is no systematic research on contract governance mechanism and behavior. Self-implementation mechanism and renegotiation mechanism in rural economic research focus on agricultural cooperation organizations and agricultural products sales behavior field, but in the research of farmers' credit behavior, the application is less. The above mechanism is helpful to realize the post-contract efficiency when farmers lack mortgaged property. Due to the existence of unverifiable information in the initial stage of the contract, it is impossible to conclude a complete contract. Based on the perspective of incomplete contract theory, this paper divides the credit behavior of farmers into two stages: the contracting behavior of farmers and the performance behavior of farmers, and constructs a theoretical analysis framework of farmers' credit behavior. Through the principal-agent model, this paper discusses the influencing factors of farmers' credit behavior and their behavior response to the mechanism of contract governance. And based on the survey data and cases of farmers to carry out empirical tests to solve the problem of financial support for agricultural industrialization. And guarantee the implementation of inclusive finance to provide a theoretical basis for decision-making. The main conclusions of this paper are: 1. The actual cost of debt contract financing of farmers affected by wealth constraints is higher than expected. Although long-term debt contract relationship is beneficial to farmers and creditors, but affected by labor transfer, the short-term debt contract relationship intensifies the increase of farmers' financing cost. 2.The borrowing decision and borrowing ability of farmers are positively related to the number of household population, the land area of cash crops and social capital are positively related to the decision-making of borrowing, but the influence degree is lower than the number of household population. The amount of loans of farmers is positively related to the duration of the relationship between farmers' debt. Farmers still rely on formal financial institutions to borrow money, although the behavior of credit purchase of agricultural materials is widespread. But in the regression analysis, there is no influence on the farmers' loan decision; 3. In the self-compliance mechanism, reputation capital is restricted by the insufficient supply of exogenous financial system and social security system, which affects the efficiency of self-implementation mechanism, and the punishment of collateral is effective for reciprocal behavior. However, the effectiveness of reciprocal behavior in the farmers' protection group is limited, and the credit officer's salary incentive system plays an auxiliary role in the self-implementation mechanism. 4. The debt contract elasticity of different financing channels is different. Farmers and creditors are affected by negotiating power in the renegotiation mechanism, and the degree of worry about the breakdown of the negotiations is affected by the different negotiation results, the greater the contractual flexibility is. Farmers are more likely to act against creditors' interests, but their own interests can not be protected.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F323.6;F832.43

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