国防工业协同创新系统研究

发布时间：2018-02-06 01:23

  本文关键词： 国防工业 协同创新 产业链 军民融合 产学研 博弈理论　出处：《天津大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：国防工业作为我国重要的战略性支柱产业,是高新技术产生与发展的核心领域。然而,在全球化时代背景下,由于社会分工的细化、国际竞争的加剧和现代科技的快速发展,单靠一个军工企业的力量往往不足以承担科技研发的全部成本和风险,也不可能具备创新所需的全部知识和技术,协同创新成为我国国防工业科技创新的必然选择。本文以国防工业协同创新系统为研究对象,围绕统筹国防建设与经济建设协同发展这一核心理念,从国防产业链协同创新机制、军民融合式协同创新体系、国防产学研协同创新行为以及国防工业协同创新保障框架四个方面对军工企业参与协同创新的问题进行了深入探讨。研究结论揭示了国防工业协同创新系统的行为机理和策略选择,剖析了军工企业协同创新行为的制约因素和决策机制;在此基础上,结合我国实际情况,本文进一步提出了促进我国国防工业协同创新发展的对策建议。本文创新之处如下:(1)构建了由核心企业和配套企业组成的国防产业链协同创新机制微分对策模型,通过对无成本分担的分散式决策、成本分担下的分散式决策以及协同合作中的集中式决策三种决策模式下均衡策略的数值模拟和比较分析,考察了成本分担的作用效果,研究了Pareto最优的决策模式。(2)构建了军民融合协同创新演化博弈模型,分析了军工企业和民用企业协同创新行为的动态演化过程,探寻了影响军工企业和民用企业协同创新行为的关键因素及作用机理,并通过政府激励与契约惩处情景的设定,给出了确保军民融合协同创新实现的奖惩机制。(3)针对军民融合协同创新体系中军工企业和民用企业的技术共享问题,构建了微分博弈模型,分别考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈、协同合作博弈三种博弈情形下双方的最优策略及最优收益,给出了实现双方技术共享行为协调的分配机制。(4)构建了政府-军工企业-学研机构为主体的三方博弈模型,分析了国防领域产学研联盟协同创新的条件,研究了三者之间的相互作用机制,揭示了国防工业产学研协同创新的过程规律,引导政府通过调整自身职能来改变军工企业和高校、科研院所的行为取向。
[Abstract]:As an important strategic pillar industry of our country, national defense industry is the core field of high-tech production and development. However, under the background of globalization, due to the refinement of social division of labor, the intensification of international competition and the rapid development of modern science and technology, The strength of a military enterprise alone is often insufficient to bear the full costs and risks of scientific and technological research and development, nor is it possible to possess all the knowledge and technology needed for innovation. Collaborative innovation has become the inevitable choice of science and technology innovation in national defense industry. This paper takes the cooperative innovation system of national defense industry as the research object and revolves around the core idea of coordinated development between national defense construction and economic construction. From the cooperative innovation mechanism of the national defense industry chain, the military-civilian integration collaborative innovation system, In this paper, the cooperative innovation behavior of national defense industry, college and research, and the guarantee framework of cooperative innovation in defense industry are discussed in detail. The research results reveal the operation of cooperative innovation system in national defense industry. For mechanisms and strategies, This paper analyzes the restricting factors and decision-making mechanism of the cooperative innovation behavior of the military enterprises, on the basis of which, combined with the actual situation of our country, This paper further puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the cooperative innovation development of national defense industry in China. The innovations in this paper are as follows: 1) the differential game model of cooperative innovation mechanism of defense industry chain is constructed, which is composed of core enterprises and supporting enterprises. Through the numerical simulation and comparative analysis of the equilibrium strategy in the three decision-making modes of the decentralized decision without cost sharing, the decentralized decision under the cost sharing and the centralized decision in the cooperative cooperation, the effect of cost sharing is investigated. In this paper, the optimal decision model of Pareto is studied. The game model of military and civil fusion collaborative innovation evolution is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process of cooperative innovation behavior between military and civil enterprises is analyzed. This paper explores the key factors and mechanism that affect the cooperative innovation behavior between military and civil enterprises, and sets the situation of government incentive and contract punishment. This paper presents a reward and punishment mechanism to ensure the realization of cooperative innovation between military and civilian. Aiming at the problem of technology sharing between military enterprises and civil enterprises in the system of military and civil integration, a differential game model is constructed. In this paper, we investigate the Nash non-cooperative game Stackelberg game, the cooperative game, the optimal strategy and the optimal return. In this paper, the distribution mechanism of coordination of technology sharing behavior between the two sides is given. (4) A three-party game model with the main body of government, military industry enterprise and scientific research institution is constructed, and the conditions for cooperative innovation of industry, university and research alliance in national defense field are analyzed. This paper studies the interaction mechanism between the three, reveals the law of the process of collaborative innovation of industry, university and research in defense industry, and guides the government to change the behavior orientation of military enterprises, universities and scientific research institutes by adjusting its own functions.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F426.48;F273.1
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本文编号：1493241