产品质量信息的政府供给：模型与政策

发布时间：2018-03-22 04:03

  本文选题：政府信息供给　切入点：消费者搜寻　出处：《华东师范大学》2017年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：十一届三中全会以来,我国经济取得了举世瞩目的成绩,以制造业为代表的第二产业获得了极大的进步,中国成为名副其实的制造业大国。令人遗憾的是,我国的产品质量水平与制造业大国形象不符,粗制滥造的商品为消费者所诟病。特别是近年发生的大量产品质量和食品安全事件,将我国的质量问题推上了风口浪尖。面对一系列的质量危机事件,政府各个监管部门出台了大量的法律法规和政策文件。虽然运动式的执法对不法生产者起到了一定的震慑作用,但是,产品质量问题却没有得到有效解决。面对质量危机和监管难题,我们应该重新审视和更新我们的质量规制思路。按照经济学的逻辑,产品质量问题的产生源于买卖双方的信息不对称——信息不对称激励生产者进行质量欺诈——严重的信息不对称甚至导致阿克洛夫式的市场"崩溃",因此,缓解市场上的信息不对称成为政府质量规制的重要思路的之一。缓解市场上的信息不对称,除了依靠生产者发送信号和消费者搜寻信息,政府这只"有形之手",也承担着为市场特别是消费者供给信息的责任。基于这一思路,本文将政府供给产品质量信息做为研究对象,进行相关的理论探讨。首先,做为逻辑起点,本文利用数理研究着重分析政府信息供给是如何影响市场的,即探讨政府信息供给条件下,消费者、生产者的福利变化和市场均衡;其次,根据前一研究结论,讨论政府信息供给策略的决策条件和影响因素;再次,针对信息供给主体的"委托人"属性,研究信息供给的激励问题,即讨论信息不对称条件下,中央政府如何设计最优合约激励地方政府。对这三个问题的讨论主要是基于委托代理理论,并结合生产者理论、演化博弈理论、公共品供给理论、组织激励理论进行各个角度的研究。根据不同的研究目标,本文将政府这一研究对象的属性进行了三次转换:自然人→理性人(有限理性的委托人)→代理人,也就是从外生变量到内生变量的转换。在理论研究的基础上,本文还研究了西方发达国家政府信息供给的政策、特点、过程和启示,以及我国政府信息供给的现状和问题,期望为我国政府信息供给和质量规制等政策的制定和优化,提供有益的借鉴。本文由三大部分组成,共计八章:第一部分包括绪论与文献综述两章,第二部分包括第三章、第四章、第五章,是本文的核心部分,重点在于理论研究和数理推导。第三部分包括第六章、第七章、第八章,主要是根据理论研究的结论来分析西方发达国家政府信息供给的政策,探讨我国的现状和问题,同时,结合本文研究结论和我国实际提出完善我国政府信息供给的对策建议。通过理论分析和数理研究,得到的研究结论如下:(1)政府信息供给对市场的影响以及两类信息之间的比较本文将政府信息供给分为两类:门槛类信息和搜寻类信息。在考虑消费者搜寻成本的基础上,利用纵向产品差异化模型研究了政府信息供给对市场的影响,我们发现:政府信息供给有助于改善市场的产品质量状况,但两类信息对市场主体的影响是不一样的。门槛类信息将造成生产者之间的不"公平"和消费者之间的不"公平",而搜寻类信息有助于市场福利水平的提高。此研究结论实际上为解决我国的产品质量危机提供了一个思路——政府应该关注信息供给特别是搜寻类信息的供给,通过降低消费者的搜寻成本来驱动生产者提高产品质量,改善市场状况。(2)政府信息供给的影响因素和策略选择将政府看做是外生的"自然人"存在不足,有必要将政府内生为信息供给系统的受影响变量。通过建立"政府——消费者"、"政府——生产者"两个演化博弈系统并分析其稳定状态,我们发现:做为"理性人"的政府,其信息供给策略主要受到信息供给成本、行政补贴、市场质量状况等因素的影响。具体来说,第一,当市场质量状况良好时,中央的行政补贴并不是地方政府信息供给的"必需品",当市场质量状况不好时,只要确保政府信息供给能够为消费者带来福利改善,政府仍然会选择信息策略;第二,当信息成本较高时,政府将受到高额罚金收入的激励而放弃信息供给策略,如果此时政府惩罚力度较小,市场最终将被低质量产品占领。(3)政府信息供给的激励研究政府信息供给中面临道德风险问题,本文通过激励机制中的单任务委托代理模型和多任务委托代理模型研究政府信息供给的最优契约设计问题,我们发现:第一,监督一奖惩机制能够降低中央政府的代理成本,当"奖惩与共享"相结合的时候,可以有效激励地方政府;第二,通过引入任务的相对重要性,中央政府可以对公共品生产任务和经济发展任务设计对抗性激励;当公共品生产任务与经济发展任务存在不完全替代关系时,中央政府应该对地方政府进行互补性激励,以防地方政府在经济发展任务上套利。在明确政府信息供给的市场机制、影响因素、激励机制的基础上,借鉴国外政府的信息供给经验,本文提出了改善我国质量监管和信息供给的对策建议。主要包括:理顺信息供给体制、建立信息专项基金;加强政府信息供给的法律和法规建设,确保法律授权;强化政府部门的信息化建设,并重视消费者的作用;增强信息采集能力,提高风险分析和评估能力。
[Abstract]:Since the third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, China's economy has achieved remarkable results, in the manufacturing industry as the representative of the second industry achieved great progress, China become the manufacturing country worthy of the name. Unfortunately, the level of product quality and manufacturing industry of our country power image does not match, the commodity crudely made criticized for consumers. Especially a lot the product quality and food safety incidents occurred in recent years, the quality problem of our country in the teeth of the storm. Faced with a series of quality crisis, various government regulators issued a large number of laws and regulations and policy documents. Although the movement law enforcement deterrent, some of the illegal producers play but the quality of the products the problem has not been solved. In the face of quality crisis and regulatory problems, we should review and update our ideas of quality regulation. According to economics The logic of product quality problems caused by information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of information asymmetry incentive producer quality fraud -- serious information asymmetry and even lead to Akedof's market "crash", therefore, alleviate the information asymmetry on the market becomes one of the important thought of government quality regulation. To alleviate the information asymmetry on the market. In addition to relying on the transmitted signal and the producer consumer search information, the government only the "visible hand", also bear the market especially the consumer information supply responsibility. Based on this idea, this paper will supply product quality information of government as the research object, discusses the related theory. First of all, as the logical starting point, mathematical research focuses on the analysis of the supply of government information is how to influence the market in this paper, which discusses the consumer government information supply conditions, producer welfare And the market equilibrium; secondly, based on the previous research conclusions, discussing the factors of government information supply decision conditions and influence; thirdly, according to the information the main supply of the "client" attribute, the research on the incentive of the supply of information, which is discussed under the conditions of asymmetric information, the central government to design the optimal incentive contracts for local government to discuss. The three problem is mainly based on the principal-agent theory, and combining with the producer theory, evolutionary game theory, theory of public goods supply, research aspects of organizational incentive theory. According to different research objectives, this paper carried out three conversion attribute as the research object of Government: the natural person, the rational person (Co. rational principal), agent, conversion is from exogenous to endogenous variables. On the basis of theoretical research, this paper also studies the western developed country government information supply administration Strategy, characteristics, process and inspiration, as well as our country government information supply situation and problems, expectations for the development and optimization of China's supply of government information and quality regulation policies, provide a useful reference. This paper consists of three parts, a total of eight chapters: the first part includes the introduction and Literature review of two chapters, including second parts the third chapter, the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter is the core part of this paper, focuses on the theoretical study and mathematical derivation. The third part includes sixth chapters, the seventh chapter, the eighth chapter, mainly analyzes the western developed countries government information supply policies according to the research results, to explore the current situation and problems of our country, at the same time, according to the research conclusion and the reality of our country to put forward some suggestions to improve our government information supply. Through theoretical analysis and mathematical research, the conclusions are as follows: (1) the supply of government information and the impact on the market The comparison between the two types of information will be supplied to the government information is divided into two categories: threshold information and search information. Considering the cost of consumer search on the effect of supply of government information on the market differentiation model based on the longitudinal products we found: product quality status of government information to help improve market supply the influence of two kinds of information, but the main body of the market is not the same. The threshold information will cause between between the producers and consumers are not "fair" is not "fair", and the search for information is helpful to improve the welfare level of the market. This conclusion is actually to solve product quality crisis in China provides a new government should pay attention to the supply of information especially the search information supply, by reducing consumer search costs to drive the producers to improve product quality, improve the market condition. (2) the government. Information supply factors and strategies will be exogenous government as a "natural person" problems, it is necessary for the government will be affected by the endogenous variable information supply system. Through the establishment of government -- consumer "," government - producer "two evolutionary game system and analysis of its steady state, we found that: as a" rational person "of the government, the strategy of information supply is mainly affected by the supply of information cost, administrative subsidy, factors affecting the quality of market conditions. Specifically, first, when the market is good in quality, the central and local government administrative subsidy is not the supply of information" necessities ", when the market is not in good quality. Just make sure that the supply of government information can bring benefits for the improvement of the consumer, the government would still choose the information strategy; second, when information cost is high, the government will be subject to fines and give information for incentive income To the strategy, if at this time the government punishment is small, the market will eventually be low quality products to capture. (3) facing the problem of moral hazard incentive of government information supply of government information in this paper, we found through the incentive mechanism in the single task principal-agent model and multi task principal agent problem of optimal contract design, the supply of government information model: first, the supervision of an incentive mechanism can reduce agency cost of the central government, when the "rewards and sharing" combination, can effective incentives of local government; second, through the introduction of the relative importance of tasks, the central government can incentive on public goods production task and the task of economic development design antagonism; when public goods the production task and the task of economic development are not perfect substitutes, the central government should be complementary to local government incentives, with one party government in economic development Show tasks. The influence factors of arbitrage in the market mechanism, a clear government information supply, based on incentive mechanism, from the experience of foreign government information supply, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve China's quality supervision and information supply. Mainly includes: to straighten out the information supply system, the establishment of a special fund of information; to strengthen the construction of government supply the information of the laws and regulations, to ensure the legal authority; strengthen the information construction of government departments, and the importance of the role of the consumer; to enhance the ability of information collection, improve risk analysis and assessment capabilities.

【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F203
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本文编号：1646952