我国农地金融制度中的政策性担保机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-22 13:48

本文选题：农地金融制度 + 政策性担保　；参考：《山东大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：随着我国城镇化程度的不断提高和农村经济的发展,农业生产经营方式正在由家庭经营向规模经营转变,迫切需要与之相适应的农村金融体系。现行农地金融制度在满足规模经营主体的融资需求方面,受到诸多条件的制约。近年来多地对利用政策性担保措施促进农地经营权抵押贷款进行了探索,2015年农业政策性信贷体系更被国家层面作为破解三农发展中“融资难”问题的措施而提出。既有的相关研究对政策性担保生效的具体机制研究尚不够充分,本文重点研究了在我国特殊的农地金融制度约束下政策性担保机制如何生效这一问题,因此具有较强的现实意义和一定的理论价值。本文分析的理论基础是融资能力理论。该理论的核心观点是担保合约通过影响信贷合约中借款人的激励相容条件和贷款人的参与约束以提高借款人的融资能力。该能力通过担保合约达成时借款人需要满足的最低担保品要求来衡量。文章以最低担保品决定的“金融机构-企业”两部门分析框架为基础开展理论分析。本文分析的现实基础是我国特殊的农地金融制度。文章归纳出政策性担保机制面临的三个主要约束：担保品价值约束、交易成本约束和政府干预约束。在此基础上,本文重点分析了农地金融制度中的政策性担保增信激励机制和风险分担机制。理论分析层面,以两部门模型为基础,引入政策性担保机构,创新性地构建了包含“金融机构-企业-政府”的最低担保品决定三部门模型。同时结合现实基础,将担保品处置成本作为假设条件纳入模型框架。实证检验层面,选取国内较为典型的山东枣庄农地金融改革案例进行了案例分析和实证检验,以期与理论分析结论互相验证。具体内容包括：政策性担保增信激励机制的分析。该机制是指政策性担保机构通过补充借款人担保品价值和降低贷款人担保品处置成本途径来实现增信目标。研究发现,政策性担保可以降低贷款人参与约束进而提高借款人融资能力。担保品处置成本越高(变现率越低),政策性担保的增信效果越强,而借款人意愿接受的担保费率越低。政策性担保风险分担机制的分析。该机制是指政策性担保机构通过分担借贷双方的项目失败风险和担保品处置风险来实现其政策目标。研究发现,政策性担保可以提高贷款人在项目失败时的收入并降低其担保品处置风险,从而降低贷款人在信贷活动中的风险分担,激励其发放贷款。但是借款人和政策性担保机构的总风险分担较附加政策性担保合约前有所增加。同时,政策性担保机构的经营目标选择对风险分担机制效果起到直接的影响。枣庄市农地金融改革案例的分析。该案例是以政策性担保机制促进农地经营权抵押贷款发放的典型案例。案例分析发现,政策性担保措施是增加农地抵押贷款供给的一个重要途径,可使获得担保的借款人融资能力得到显著提高,贷款人的贷款意愿也因风险分担程度降低而提高。以枣庄市230家申请政策性担保的农地规模经营合作社为样本,进行Logit检验的结果亦支持了理论分析的结论。在上述研究的基础上,得出全文结论：在我国农地金融制度框架内,政策性担保机制确有存在和发展的必要；政策性担保机制从多个途径影响政策性目标的实现,应综合考虑其政策效果；政策性担保机构的经营目标对于政策性目标的实现起着重要的作用。据此提出了积极发挥政策性担保的增信激励作用、合理确定政策性担保在农地金融活动中的风险分担、科学设定政策性担保机构经营目标等政策建议。本文创新性地构建了政策性担保的“金融机构-企业-政府”三部门分析框架,结合我国特殊国情系统分析了政策性担保的增信激励和风险分担机制的作用途径,有助于更深入理解不同条件下政策性担保的有效性及作用机制,从而为优化政策性担保支农政策提供借鉴。受限于知识和资料的不足,分析对象局限于1984年确立农地国家和集体所有制之后,未能从更远的历史角度进行分析；受限于农地金融改革的区域分割现象,实证研究仅采用东部地级市枣庄市的案例及数据,未能以多个试点区域资料相互印证。后续的研究工作中将尝试对上述问题进行深入的探讨。
[Abstract]:With the continuous improvement of urbanization and the development of rural economy in China, the mode of agricultural production and management is changing from family management to scale management. It is urgently needed to adapt to the rural financial system. The current agricultural land financial system has been restricted by many conditions in meeting the financing needs of the main body of scale management. This paper probes into the use of policy guarantee measures to promote the mortgage of farmland management rights. In 2015, the agricultural policy credit system was put forward by the national level as a measure to solve the "financing difficulty" in the development of the three rural areas. The research on the specific mechanism of the effective policy guarantee is not sufficient. It is of great practical significance and a certain theoretical value that the policy guarantee mechanism is effective under the restriction of the special agricultural land financial system in China. Therefore, the theoretical basis of this paper is the theory of financing ability. The core point of this theory is that the guarantee contract can affect the incentive compatibility conditions of the borrowers in the credit contract. And the borrower's participation constraints to improve the borrower's financing capacity. This ability is measured by the minimum guarantee requirements that the borrower needs to meet when the guarantee contract is reached. The article is based on the theoretical analysis based on the "financial institutions - enterprise" two sector analysis framework determined by the minimum collateral. There are three main constraints in the policy guarantee mechanism: the value constraint of the guaranty, the transaction cost constraint and the government intervention. On this basis, this paper focuses on the analysis of the incentive mechanism and risk sharing mechanism of policy guarantee in the agricultural land financial system. The theoretical analysis level is two parts. On the basis of the door model, the policy guarantee institution is introduced, and the three sector model of the minimum guarantee, which includes "financial institutions - the government", is innovatively constructed. At the same time, combining the realistic basis, the cost of the guarantee is taken as a hypothesis to be incorporated into the model framework. The empirical test layer is used to select the typical Shandong Zaozhuang agricultural land gold. The case analysis and empirical test are carried out in order to verify each other with the theoretical analysis. The specific content includes: the analysis of the incentive mechanism of policy guarantee. This mechanism refers to the goal of increasing credit by the policy guarantee institution by supplementing the value of the borrower's guarantee and reducing the cost way of the lender's guarantee. It is found that the policy guarantee can reduce the loan ginseng and the constraint to improve the borrower's financing ability. The higher the cost of the guarantee (the lower the rate of cash), the stronger the effect of the policy guarantee, the lower the guarantee rate accepted by the borrower. The analysis of the risk sharing mechanism of the policy guarantee. This mechanism refers to the policy guarantee institution. It is found that policy guarantee can improve the borrower's income in the event of failure and reduce the risk of disposing of its collateral, thus reducing the lender's risk sharing in the credit activities and encouraging the loan. The total risk sharing of the policy guarantee institution has increased before the additional policy guarantee contract. At the same time, the choice of the operating target of the policy guarantee institution has a direct effect on the effect of the risk sharing mechanism. The case of the rural land financial reform in Zaozhuang. The case analysis shows that the policy guarantee measures are an important way to increase the supply of rural land mortgage loans, which can improve the financing ability of the borrowers who are secured, and the lender's loan intention is also improved because of the reduction of the risk sharing degree. The scale management of the farmland in Zaozhuang is 230 applications for policy guarantee. As a sample, the results of the Logit test also support the conclusion of the theoretical analysis. On the basis of the above study, the conclusion is drawn: in the framework of the agricultural land financial system in China, the policy guarantee mechanism does exist and develop, and the policy guarantee mechanism should take a comprehensive examination of the realization of the policy target from many ways. Considering the effect of its policy, the management target of the policy guarantee institution plays an important role in the realization of the policy goal. Accordingly, it puts forward the incentive effect of increasing the credit of policy guarantee, rationally determining the risk sharing of the policy guarantee in the agricultural and financial activities, and setting up the policy of the policy oriented guarantee institution to establish the policy. This paper constructs the three sector analysis framework of "financial institutions - the government - government" of policy guarantee, and analyzes the ways of the incentive and risk sharing mechanism of policy guarantee in combination with China's special national conditions system, which will help to understand the effectiveness and mechanism of the policy guarantee under different conditions, so as to further understand the effectiveness and mechanism of the policy guarantee under different conditions. In order to optimize the policy of policy guarantee supporting agriculture, it is limited to the shortage of knowledge and information. The analysis object is limited to the establishment of land state and collective ownership in 1984, and can not be analyzed from a further historical point of view. Limited to the regional segmentation phenomenon of agricultural and land financial reform, the empirical study only adopts the case of Zaozhuang in the eastern prefecture level city. Examples and data failed to confirm each other in multiple pilot areas. Further studies will be conducted to explore these issues.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F832.4

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