售电放开政策下电力交易多方主体利益分析模型研究

发布时间：2019-03-09 19:57

【摘要】：深化电力体制改革将在进一步完善政企分开、厂网分开、主辅分开的基础上,按照管住中间、放开两头的体制架构,有序放开输配以外的竞争性环节电价,有序向社会资本开放配售电业务,有序放开公益性和调节性以外的发用电计划。售电市场因其自然垄断性较弱,改革的阻力相对较小,成为政府部门、专家学者和社会公众的关注聚焦点。售电侧放开市场机制下的电力交易模式是对电力改革顶端设计方案的具体承接和实际执行,是建设统一开放、竞争有序的市场体系的重要组成部分。以售电放开政策为出发点,本文围绕电力体制改革历史进程,对新形势下的电力市场运营机制,各交易主体的准入和评价,电网企业、发电商、售电商的经济行为等相关问题展开研究。以电改相关政策为研究背景,从原则层次、竞争性市场、售电侧三维空间、一般性思路以及阶段划分等方面对售电侧放开的涵义进行界定和剖析。根据电力交易模式进行分类,对电力双边交易、电力集中交易两种模式进行对比分析。给出我国电力市场运营机制框架,从两个维度对合同市场进行划分；其次,从月度竞价市场、日前市场、实时平衡市场、辅助服务市场等4个层面对电力现货市场和辅助市场进行了划分；再次,对零售市场运行、交易、电价制定等模块进行分析。售电放开政策下的电力市场准入机制,是电力体制改革的基本环节。本文结合相关政策,利用综合评价方法以发电侧和用户侧2个角度对电力交易各主体的准入条件进行界定。采用层次分析法和熵权法对各指标进行赋权,建立综合评价模型,对发电商、大用户和售电商3类主体的准入进行评价与排序。根据电力市场实际情况以及市场容量,按照排序结果选择合适的企业参与电力交易。售电侧的放开使电网企业的赢利模式发生改变,电网企业角色转变为对电力交易收取输配电费的服务性企业。一方面,电网企业作为输配电公司保有输配收益,根据核定原则对电网企业输配电成本进行核算,建立输配电价水平测算模型,模拟改革前后电网企业利益变动情况。另一方面,电网企业可成立售电商参与售电市场竞争,根据电网企业保底服务建立电网企业售电业务利益模型,探讨保底居民类用户电力下的输配电价补贴问题。售电侧改革后的发电商交易模式转变为面向售电商的直接交易。对不同情景下发电商利益进行模拟分析,设定情景包含单一发电商与单一售电商交易、多发电商与单一售电商交易2类。在探讨“一对一”模式时,以中长期合同交易为背景,研究发售双方交易时的电价谈判问题,根据Zeuthen决策建立贝叶斯学习模型,提出一个发电商与售电商之间逐步估算对方底限的电价谈判策略。对于“多对一”模式,发电商之间存在竞争现象,根据平均对手法与静态贝叶斯纳什均衡理论建立报价策略模型,探讨发电商的报价策略。售电侧的放开将带来一个新角色-售电商,售电商作为电力终端用户与发电商之间的中介,其经济行为及购售电模式对上下游电力企业来说至关重要。在购电方面,研究作为中长期合约之一的差价合约下的售电商的购电策略。利用Stackelberg模型分析售电商之间存在联盟时,对电力交易市场价格的影响,借助夏普利值法建立售电商联盟合作利益均衡模型,研究联盟内各售电商的利益分配策略。在售电方面,用户负荷预测的准确度对售电商收益有较大影响。当市场出现多家售电商博弈时,测算由于负荷预测不准确带来的额外成本,模拟不同情景下电力现货市场交易电价情况,对售电商的利润变动情况进行分析。
[Abstract]:"The deepening of the reform of the electric power system will further improve the separation of the government and the enterprise, the separation of the plant and the separation of the main and secondary, and the system structure of the two ends shall be released according to the middle of the management, and the price of the competitive link other than the distribution and distribution shall be opened orderly, and the electric service shall be opened to the social capital in an orderly manner," In order to release the electricity utilization plan other than the public welfare and the regulation. Because of its weak natural monopoly, the resistance of the reform is relatively small, which has become the focus of attention of government departments, scholars and the public. The power transaction mode under the market mechanism of the power-selling side is the concrete undertaking and the practical implementation of the design of the top end of the power reform, which is an important part of the market system which is open and orderly. Starting from the policy of opening and opening the electric power system, this paper studies the operation mechanism of the power market, the access and the evaluation of the main body, the power grid enterprise, the power generator and the economic behavior of the e-commerce in the new situation. The paper defines and analyzes the meaning of the release of the power supply side from the aspects of the principle level, the competitive market, the three-dimensional space of the power selling side, the general thinking and the stage division. According to the power transaction mode, the two modes of the electric power bilateral transaction and the power centralized transaction are compared and analyzed. The framework of the operation mechanism of China's electric power market is given, and the contract market is divided from two dimensions; secondly, the power spot market and the auxiliary market are divided from four aspects of the monthly bidding market, the prior market, the real-time balance market and the auxiliary service market; and again, The analysis is made on the operation, trading and electricity price of the retail market. The mechanism of power market access under the power-off policy is the basic link of the reform of the power system. In this paper, a comprehensive evaluation method is used to define the quasi-entry conditions of the main body of the power transaction at the power generation side and the user side by means of the comprehensive evaluation method. By using the analytic hierarchy process and the entropy method, the indexes are weighted, and the comprehensive evaluation model is established to evaluate and sort the access of the power generator, the big users and the e-commerce 3-class subjects. According to the actual situation of the electric power market and the market capacity, the appropriate enterprises are selected to participate in the electric power transaction according to the ranking result. The release of the power supply side makes the profit model of the power grid enterprise change, and the power grid enterprise's role is transformed into a service enterprise which charges the power transmission and distribution fee to the electric power transaction. On the one hand, the power grid enterprise, as the power transmission and distribution company, reserves the transmission and distribution income, and the power transmission and distribution cost of the power grid enterprise is accounted according to the approved principle, and the distribution price level measurement model is established, and the change of the power grid enterprise's interests before and after the reform is simulated. On the other hand, the power grid enterprise can be established to sell e-commerce to participate in the electric sale market competition. According to the power grid enterprise service-keeping service, the power grid enterprise electricity selling business benefit model is established, and the problem of the power transmission and distribution price subsidy under the power of the base-base residents is discussed. The power generation business transaction mode after the power selling side is changed into a direct transaction for the sale of e-commerce. The simulation and analysis of the power generation quotient's benefits under different scenarios includes the single power generation business and the single-sale e-commerce transaction, the multi-power generation business and the single-sale e-commerce transaction class 2. In this paper, on the basis of medium-and long-term contract transaction, the problem of the price negotiation between the two parties is studied, and a Bayesian learning model is set up according to Zethen's decision. For the "Multi-to-one" mode, there is a competitive phenomenon among the power generation companies, and the bidding strategy model is set up according to the average comparison method and the static Bayesian Nash equilibrium theory, and the bidding strategy of the power generator is discussed. The release of the electricity-selling side will bring a new role-the sale of e-commerce and the sale of e-commerce as the intermediary between the end-user and the power generation, and its economic behavior and the power-buying mode are of great importance to the upstream and downstream electric power enterprises. In the aspect of power-purchase, the paper deals with the purchase strategy of e-commerce under the post contract of one of the medium-and long-term contracts. When using the Stackelberg model to analyze the existence of the alliance among the e-commerce, the influence of the price of the electric market on the electric power market is established, and the cooperative interest equilibrium model of the e-commerce alliance is established by means of the summer-pley value method, and the benefit distribution strategy of the e-commerce in the alliance is studied. In the aspect of electricity sale, the accuracy of the user load forecast has a great effect on the e-commerce income. When there are a number of e-commerce games in the market, this paper calculates the additional cost due to the inaccurate load forecast, and simulates the power price of the power spot market under different scenarios and analyzes the change of the profit of the e-commerce.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学(北京)
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F426.61

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