The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firms’ Performance and
发布时间：2021-04-02 16:00
本文旨在探讨公司治理对中国企业绩效和盈余管理的影响。本人将确定影响经营决策和会计选择的最重要的公司治理机制,调查管理者用来提高工业企业收益和业绩的工具,最后确定哪种应计模型更适合于中国工业企业的收益管理检测。铝公司。此前,公司治理机制被认为是评估和监测财务报告有效性的最重要因素（Brown、Pottb及W?mpenerb,2014年）,也是一般控制的基石。高级管理人员实施了内部和外部公司治理,以提高运营效率,减少会计系统中的错误或操纵发生率（Lee,2006年）。盈余管理被认为是与财务报告有关的最重要问题之一,特别是在安然和世通丑闻之后。盈余管理行为也与企业社会责任水平较低有关,这两个方面的改善都有望提高公司治理的质量。以印度为例,以往的研究表明,由于独立董事的监督作用不佳,董事会独立并不能保证公司业绩的提高。关于美国、英国、新西兰或韩国的调查结果并非一致同意。随着中国正在成为一个蓬勃发展的商业国家。我们应该问“推动这种成功的核心价值观是什么?与其他国家有什么不同吗?“为了研究这些问题,我们将利用2008年至2014年的更新数据,对2098家中国上市公司进行实证研究。公司的业绩是通过股...
【文章来源】：对外经济贸易大学北京市 211工程院校 教育部直属院校
【文章页数】：133 页
【学位级别】：博士
【文章目录】：
摘要
ABSTRACT
LISTE OF ABBREVIATION
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Study background
1.2 Context,earning management and corporate governance initiatives in China
1.3 Research objectives
1.4 Research question
1.5 Contributions and significance of the research
1.6 Research methodology
1.7 Study organization
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 China general background
2.2 China stock exchanges
2.2.1 Shanghai Stock Exchange
2.2.2 Shenzhen Stock Exchange
2.3 China Securities Regulatory Commission
2.3.1 The role of CSRC
2.3.2 Experience from the West
2.4 Background of listed firms in China
2.4.1 Ownership structure
2.4.2 Share market reforms
2.4.3 SOEs in China
2.4.4 Two-tier board
2.5 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Definition of corporate governance
3.1.1 Corporate governance models
3.1.2 Corporate governance in China
3.2 Agency theory-General
3.2.1 Agency theory’s application in China
3.2.2 Agency theory issues in China
3.2.3 Summation
3.3 Institutional theory-General
3.3.1 Institutional theory’s application in China
3.3.2 Summation
3.4 Earning Management
3.4.1 Board independence and earning management
3.4.2 Board Size and Earning Management
3.4.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
3.5 Firm performance
3.5.1 Board independence and Firm Performance
3.5.2 Board Size and Firm Performance
3.5.3 CEO duality and Firm Performance
3.6 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHSES DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Corporate Governance and Earning Management
4.1.1 Board independence and earning management
4.1.2 Board Size and earning management
4.1.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
4.2 Corporate governance and firm performance
4.3.1 Board independence and firm performance
4.3.2 Board Size and firm performance
4.3.3 CEO duality and firm performance
4.3 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 Sample profile and data collection
5.2 Corporate governance on firm’s performance: variables measurement and modelsspecification
5.2.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
5.2.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
5.2.3 Specification model between firm performance and mechanismscorporate governance
5.3 Corporate governance on earnings management: variables measurement and modelsspecification
5.3.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
5.3.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
5.3.3 Specification model between earning management and mechanisms corporategovernance
5.4 Research hypotheses
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
6.1 Regression Results
6.2 Results on the corporate governance and firm performance
6.2.1. Board size on firms’ performance
6.2.2 Board independence on firms’ performance
6.2.3 CEO duality on firms’ performance
6.3 Results on the corporate governance and earning management
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
7.1 Conclusions
7.2 Future research directions
7.3 Policy Recommendation
RFFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Personal resume,academic papers published at school and research results
【参考文献】：
期刊论文
[1]董事会结构、公司治理与绩效——基于动态内生性视角的经验证据[J]. 郝云宏,周翼翔. 中国工业经济. 2010(05)
[2]上市公司董事会特征与违规行为[J]. 高雷,罗洋. 广东金融学院学报. 2008(03)
[3]公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深交所的经验证据[J]. 王斌,梁欣欣. 会计研究. 2008(02)
[4]董事会治理对公司绩效累积效应的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的数据[J]. 李维安,孙文. 中国工业经济. 2007(12)
[5]上市公司董事会与盈余管理关系研究[J]. 唐敏,徐文聪. 财会通讯(学术版). 2007(05)
本文编号：3115541
【文章来源】：对外经济贸易大学北京市 211工程院校 教育部直属院校
【文章页数】：133 页
【学位级别】：博士
【文章目录】：
摘要
ABSTRACT
LISTE OF ABBREVIATION
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Study background
1.2 Context,earning management and corporate governance initiatives in China
1.3 Research objectives
1.4 Research question
1.5 Contributions and significance of the research
1.6 Research methodology
1.7 Study organization
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 China general background
2.2 China stock exchanges
2.2.1 Shanghai Stock Exchange
2.2.2 Shenzhen Stock Exchange
2.3 China Securities Regulatory Commission
2.3.1 The role of CSRC
2.3.2 Experience from the West
2.4 Background of listed firms in China
2.4.1 Ownership structure
2.4.2 Share market reforms
2.4.3 SOEs in China
2.4.4 Two-tier board
2.5 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Definition of corporate governance
3.1.1 Corporate governance models
3.1.2 Corporate governance in China
3.2 Agency theory-General
3.2.1 Agency theory’s application in China
3.2.2 Agency theory issues in China
3.2.3 Summation
3.3 Institutional theory-General
3.3.1 Institutional theory’s application in China
3.3.2 Summation
3.4 Earning Management
3.4.1 Board independence and earning management
3.4.2 Board Size and Earning Management
3.4.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
3.5 Firm performance
3.5.1 Board independence and Firm Performance
3.5.2 Board Size and Firm Performance
3.5.3 CEO duality and Firm Performance
3.6 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHSES DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Corporate Governance and Earning Management
4.1.1 Board independence and earning management
4.1.2 Board Size and earning management
4.1.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
4.2 Corporate governance and firm performance
4.3.1 Board independence and firm performance
4.3.2 Board Size and firm performance
4.3.3 CEO duality and firm performance
4.3 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 Sample profile and data collection
5.2 Corporate governance on firm’s performance: variables measurement and modelsspecification
5.2.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
5.2.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
5.2.3 Specification model between firm performance and mechanismscorporate governance
5.3 Corporate governance on earnings management: variables measurement and modelsspecification
5.3.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
5.3.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
5.3.3 Specification model between earning management and mechanisms corporategovernance
5.4 Research hypotheses
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
6.1 Regression Results
6.2 Results on the corporate governance and firm performance
6.2.1. Board size on firms’ performance
6.2.2 Board independence on firms’ performance
6.2.3 CEO duality on firms’ performance
6.3 Results on the corporate governance and earning management
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
7.1 Conclusions
7.2 Future research directions
7.3 Policy Recommendation
RFFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Personal resume,academic papers published at school and research results
【参考文献】：
期刊论文
[1]董事会结构、公司治理与绩效——基于动态内生性视角的经验证据[J]. 郝云宏,周翼翔. 中国工业经济. 2010(05)
[2]上市公司董事会特征与违规行为[J]. 高雷,罗洋. 广东金融学院学报. 2008(03)
[3]公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深交所的经验证据[J]. 王斌,梁欣欣. 会计研究. 2008(02)
[4]董事会治理对公司绩效累积效应的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的数据[J]. 李维安,孙文. 中国工业经济. 2007(12)
[5]上市公司董事会与盈余管理关系研究[J]. 唐敏,徐文聪. 财会通讯(学术版). 2007(05)
本文编号：3115541
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