整体上市的作用机理及经济后果研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 14:23

本文关键词：整体上市的作用机理及经济后果研究　出处：《北京交通大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：金字塔股权结构下,控制权与现金流权相分离的现象普遍存在,加剧了大股东和中小股东之间的代理问题。由于历史原因,我国大部分国有上市公司都处于集团金字塔结构中的一环,终极控股股东除了实质控制上市公司外,还控制大量非上市公司,有动机和能力借助复杂的关联交易将上市公司资源转移至其他关联主体,攫取中小股东的合法利益。如何有效抑制金字塔股权结构带来的公司治理问题,并在"专业化整合、资本化运作、产业化发展"思路指引下深化国有企业改革成为理论界和实务界需要深入思考的重要课题。以市场化、盈利化,股权再分布化为导向的整体上市为解决和转化国有企业原有体制问题提供了可能,但关于整体上市的既有研究视角主要集中在整体上市的模式、交易环节存在的弊端以及交易后的市场效应等方面,尚未对整体上市的作用机理以及可能造成的经济后果进行深入研究。随着整体上市模式逐渐被监管层确立为深化国企改革的战略工具,理性、客观、全面地探究整体上市的作用机理及其经济后果具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。本文以2006-2012年间我国发生整体上市行为的国有控股上市公司为研究对象,深入探究整体上市的作用机理及产生的经济后果,围绕价值创造和价值增值的初衷,试图解答以下三个相互关联的问题:(1)整体上市是否能够缓解企业的关联交易行为,进而影响企业的经营绩效;(2)企业信息透明度以及经营绩效的变化是否进一步影响机构投资者持股比例,改善公司治理水平;(3)整体上市是否有助于缓解公司融资约束,提高公司融资能力。首先,本文理论分析并实证检验了整体上市对关联交易的影响,并探究关联交易行为的变化如何进一步影响公司经营绩效。研究结果表明:(1)整体上市后企业的关联交易金额显著下降,整体上市有助于提高公司信息透明度,缓解代理问题;(2)关联交易金额(关联交易金额变化/营业收入)每降低一个单位,经行业调整的总资产收益率增加0.363个单位。说明整体上市能够降低控股股东与上市公司之间的关联交易行为,进而提升上市公司的盈利水平。这是由于控股股东与上市公司之间关联交易的定价往往是非公允的,可能存在利益输送的情形。整体上市重新构建了集团的股权关系,实现了控股股东与中小股东的利益协同,在很大程度上能够减少控股股东利用关联交易掏空上市公司资源的动机和渠道。其次,关于整体上市对公司治理水平的影响。本文理论分析表明,整体上市后,利益攫取动机的降低以及盈利能力的提升能得到机构投资者的认同,进而有助于提升机构投资者的持股比例。对整体上市、盈利能力与机构投资者三者之间关系的实证检验表明,整体上市导致的信息透明度以及盈利能力的提升确实会增加机构投资者持股比例,且该种效应在基金类机构投资者中表现的更为明显。进一步研究表明,盈利能力对机构持股比例的作用效应并非是单一的线性关系,盈利能力对机构投资者持股比例的正向作用会随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而有所降低。充分说明整体上市后关联交易的减少有助于提升公司的盈利能力,进而有助于吸引以资本回报为最终目的的机构投资者,从而相应地提升公司治理水平。再次,关于整体上市对公司融资约束产生的影响。本文理论及实证研究表明,整体上市前,公司投资水平与内部现金流之间存在显著正相关关系,即内部产生现金流越多,公司投资水平越高,这表明公司投资依赖于内部现金流。而整体上市后,两者虽然为正向关系,但统计上并不显著。一定程度说明整体上市后,公司融资约束得到显著缓解。最后,为考察实务中整体上市的动机及经济后果,本文选取上汽集团整体上市案例,通过案例分析方法进一步剖析整体上市的经济后果。研究发现:整体上市降低了上海汽车与控股股东的关联交易规模。进一步的研究表明,关联交易的降低很大程度上来源于关联交易总额中非市场定价的部分,这表明整体上市有助于降低控股股东利用协议定价掏空上市公司的可能性,维护了上市公司及中小股东的合法权益;此外,整体上市还进一步提升了上海汽车的盈利能力、机构投资者持股数量及持股比例,且在一定程度上增强了企业的偿债能力,提高了公司治理水平及融资能力。综上,本文发现整体上市有助于减少上市公司与控股股东的关联交易,缓解实际控制人利用关联交易"掏空"上市公司的代理问题,有利于保护中小投资者利益;整体上市完成后,上市公司业绩得到显著提升,并且得到机构投资者的认可,有助于完善公司治理水平;进一步研究发现,对于既定的金融发展水平,整体上市还可以缓解公司融资约束程度,提升公司融资能力。整体上市对公司盈利性、公司治理以及融资能力的积极作用为相关监管机构大力推进整体上市深化国企改革提供了理论支撑和经验证据。
[Abstract]:The Pyramid ownership structure, common control rights and cash flow rights separation phenomenon, exacerbated by the agency problem between large shareholders and small shareholders. Due to historical reasons, most of China's state-owned listed companies are in a ring group in Pyramid structure, ultimate controlling shareholders of Listed Companies in addition to substantial control, also control a large number of non-listed company, the motivation and the ability to use complex transactions of listed companies will be transferred to other related subject resources, seize the legitimate interests of minority shareholders. How to suppress the corporate governance problems of Pyramid ownership structure effectively, and in the "professional integration, capital operation, industry development ideas under the guidance of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises has become an important issue in theory and practice need to think deeply. In the market, profit, equity distribution of the overall transformation to solve the country listed and oriented The enterprise original system possible, but on the overall market is mainly concentrated in the perspective of the overall market, trading process defects and transaction market effect, yet mechanism of the overall market and may cause the economic consequences of the in-depth study. With the overall market mode is gradually regulators for the establishment of strategic tools to deepen the reform of the state-owned enterprises rational, objective, and comprehensive research on the overall market mechanism and economic consequence has important theoretical significance and practical value. This paper takes 2006-2012 years China's overall listing behavior of state-owned listed companies as the research object, in-depth study of the mechanism of the overall market and economic consequences the focus on Value Creation and value increment of the mind, trying to answer the following three related issues: (1) the overall market is It can alleviate the transaction behavior of enterprises, thereby affecting the performance of the enterprise; (2) enterprise information transparency and the changes in operating performance whether further affect the proportion of institutional investors, improve the level of corporate governance; (3) the overall listing will help alleviate the financing constraints, improve the company's financing capacity. Firstly, the theoretical analysis and examines the overall market impact on the transactions, and to explore the changes of related transactions to further affect the company's performance. The results show that: (1) the amount of related party transactions of listed companies after the overall decline significantly, the overall market helps to improve information transparency, ease the agency problem; (2) the amount of related party transactions (related transaction amount change / revenue) by one unit, the total assets industry adjustment rate increased 0.363 units. It can reduce the overall market Related transactions between low controlling shareholders and the listed company, and thus enhance the profitability of listed companies. This is because the transactions between the controlling shareholders and the listed company's pricing is often unfair, there may be a transfer of benefits. The overall market to construct the group's equity relationship, the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders the interests of the cooperative, can reduce the controlling shareholders use related transactions to tunnel listed companies the motivation and channel resources to a great extent. Secondly, on the overall market impact on the level of corporate governance. The theoretical analysis shows that the overall market, reduce expropriation motivation and enhance the profitability of institutional investors can get approval, ownership it is helpful to improve the institutional investors. The overall market, the relationship between profitability and institutional investors of the three empirical test shows that, The overall market leads to the transparency of information and profitability will indeed increase the proportion of institutional investors, and the effect of institutional investors in the fund is more obvious. Further research shows that the effect is not the profitability of the proportion of institutional ownership is linear relation, the positive effect of the profitability of the shareholding of institutional investors will increase with the proportion of the first shareholder decreased. Full description helps to enhance the profitability of the company to reduce the overall listing of the transactions, which helps to attract capital for the ultimate goal of institutional investors, and thus enhance the level of corporate governance. Thirdly, about the influence of overall listing of the company financing constraints. The theory and the empirical results show that the overall market, between the level of investment and internal cash flow in Significant positive correlation between the internal cash flow more, the higher the level of corporate investment, which indicates that the company investment depends on the internal cash flow. And the overall market, though for a positive relationship, but not statistically significant. Explain to some extent after the overall listing, corporate financing constraints was significantly reduced. Finally, for the overall market the motivation and economic consequences in practice, this paper selects the case of SAIC Group listed as a whole, through the case analysis method to further analyze the overall listing of the economic consequences. The study found that: the overall market is reduced and the controlling shareholder of Shanghai Automobile Association transaction scale. Further studies show that the related transactions decreased largely from transactions total non market pricing, which indicates that the overall market will help reduce the controlling shareholders use agreement pricing of listed companies emptied the possibility of maintenance The company and the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders; in addition, the overall market also further enhance the Shanghai automobile profitability, institutional investors shareholding and shareholding ratio, and to a certain extent, enhance the solvency of enterprises, improve the level of corporate governance and financing ability. To sum up, this paper found that the overall listing helps to reduce the related transactions the listed company and the controlling shareholder, actual controller to alleviate the agency problem through related transactions of listed companies "tunneling", is conducive to the protection of the interests of small investors; after the completion of the overall market, performance of listed companies has been significantly improved, and has been recognized by investors, will help improve the level of corporate governance; further study found that, for the level of financial the development of the established, the overall market can also alleviate the financing constraints, enhance the company's financing capacity. The overall listing on corporate profitability, the company The positive role of governance and financing capacity provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for the relevant regulatory agencies to push forward the overall listing and deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.

【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F832.51

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