基于过程专业性的业主被套牢问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 23:23

本文关键词：基于过程专业性的业主被套牢问题研究　出处：《西南交通大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,各类型建设项目拔地而起,建筑行业呈蓬勃发展之势,目前其已成为国民经济不可或缺的部分。业主与承包商作为建筑活动的核心利益相关者,在以利益最大化为前提的建筑市场,多处于利益对立的博弈状态。虽然业主希望通过缔结各种合同达到平衡,但天然的信息不对称使得承包商可以更好地利用自身优势和不完全合同采取机会主义行为侵占业主准租,获取额外收益,套牢问题由此产生。本文从过程专用性入手,研究建设项目业主与承包商间的套牢问题。由于已有的文献对建设项目资产专用性的研究仍有不足,Chang于2006年提出过程专用性,对已有的资产专用性进行延伸和拓展。过程专用性属于特殊类型的资产专用性,专门用于描述建设项目业主与承包商间的相互依赖关系,反映其资产专用性的特性；本文运用此观点从新的角度去探讨建设项目中套牢问题发生的根本原因。人类的有限理性、信息不对称以及经济、社会环境不确定性强等原因导致合同不完全,并且业主为建设项目投资的资产专用性强,产生的可占用准租多,另外合同签订后,业主与承包商谈判地位发生转变,承包商更具优势。承包商为追求利益最大化,具有很强的投机动力,其实施机会主义行为侵占业主准租获得额外收益的客观条件和主观倾向同时具备,因此建设项目中套牢现象屡见不鲜。针对建设项目中业主被承包商套牢问题,本文首先分析了建设项目特点及其特点下业主可能面临的套牢风险,以及建设项目特殊的资产专用性即过程专用性,并从套牢问题产生的四要素解释了业主与承包商之间套牢关系产生的原因。然后建立套牢模型分析,运用博弈论求得建设项目业主与承包商策略均衡解,此外讨论了业主与承包商的策略选择对各自期望收益产生的影响,得出结论：业主的期望收益与承包商选择套牢行为的概率负相关、与自身维持原合同的概率正相关；承包商的期望收益与业主维持原合同的概率正相关,且与自身被更换时的沉没成本、剩余工程收益及套牢收益相关,当承包商套牢业主的收益大于剩余工程的收益及沉没成本两者之和与被业主更换概率的乘积时,其期望收益与采取机会主义行为的概率呈正相关,反之则为负相关；并且建设项目中业主与承包商的博弈存在子博弈完美纳什均衡,即(套牢,维持原合同)。最后,本文针对业主被承包商套牢的问题提出了相应的治理措施,经典的长期合同机制、声誉机制,建设项目特色的担保机制引入以及外部宏观环境改善机制等,以期缓解此类套牢现象,最终实现业主和承包商的双赢。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, various types of construction projects have emerged, and the construction industry is booming. At present, it has become an indispensable part of the national economy. Owners and contractors as the core stakeholders of construction activities. In the construction market with the premise of maximization of interests, most of them are in the state of competing interests, although the owners hope to achieve balance through the conclusion of various contracts. But the natural information asymmetry enables the contractor to make better use of its own advantages and incomplete contract to take advantage of opportunism behavior encroach on the owner's quasi-rent to obtain additional income. This paper starts with the process specificity, studies the construction project between the owner and the contractor, because of the existing literature on the construction project asset specificity research is still insufficient. In 2006, Chang proposed process specificity, which extends and extends the existing asset specificity. Process specificity belongs to a special type of asset specificity. It is specially used to describe the interdependence between the owner and the contractor of the construction project and to reflect the characteristics of the specificity of its assets; This paper uses this viewpoint to probe into the root causes of the problem of hold-up in construction projects. The reasons of limited rationality of human beings, asymmetric information and strong uncertainty of economy and social environment lead to incomplete contracts. And the owner investment for the construction project has strong specificity of assets, resulting in a large number of potential occupancy, in addition, after the signing of the contract, the negotiation position between the owner and the contractor has changed. The contractor has more advantages. In order to pursue the maximization of interests, the contractor has a strong speculative motivation, and the objective conditions and subjective tendencies of taking advantage of the opportunistic behavior of encroaching on the owner's quasi-rent to obtain additional income are simultaneously possessed. In view of the problem of the owner being locked up by the contractor in the construction project, this paper first analyzes the characteristics of the construction project and the risk that the owner may face under the characteristics of the construction project. And the special asset specificity of the construction project, that is, process specificity, and explain the reasons of the relationship between the owner and the contractor from the four elements of the hold-up problem. The game theory is used to obtain the strategic equilibrium solution between the owner and the contractor of the construction project. In addition, the influence of the choice of the strategy between the owner and the contractor on the expected income is discussed. It is concluded that the expected income of the employer is negatively correlated with the probability of the contractor's choice of the entrapment behavior, and is positively correlated with the probability of maintaining the original contract. The expected profit of the contractor is positively related to the probability of the owner maintaining the original contract, and is related to the sunk cost, the residual project income and the lock income when the contractor is replaced. When the contractor holds the owner's income greater than the sum of the remaining works' income and sunk cost and the product of the replacement probability by the owner, the expected income is positively correlated with the probability of adopting opportunistic behavior. Vice versa; And in the construction project, the game between the owner and the contractor has the perfect Nash equilibrium of sub-game, that is (hold up, maintain the original contract). Finally, this paper puts forward the corresponding measures to deal with the problem of the owner being locked up by the contractor. The classic long-term contract mechanism, reputation mechanism, construction project characteristic guarantee mechanism and external macro environment improvement mechanism are introduced in order to alleviate this kind of entrapment phenomenon and finally realize the win-win situation between the owner and the contractor.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F426.92

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