双边平台增值服务的投资和定价策略研究

发布时间：2018-04-30 03:05

本文选题：双边平台 + 增值服务投资　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：现代社会中,信息技术的进步不断推动着经济发展的浪潮,给经济带来日新月异的变化,尤其是互联网技术的飞速发展,促使平台经济逐渐成为当今经济发展的重要形式之一。例如,阿里巴巴、京东、苏宁等电子商务平台2015年的交易额达到了18.2万亿元,同比增长15%以上。然而,经济的不断发展同时又会带来平台企业之间的不断竞争。如何在日趋激烈的竞争中保持优势或者不断增强自身实力,使企业立于不败之地,是每个平台企业必须要面临的问题。现实中,平台企业会采取多种多样的方法来吸引顾客或者增加用户粘性,以扩大或保持自身的市场规模,很多双边平台会通过在其他平台或者社交媒体上做广告来扩大自己的知名度。例如：天猫通过优酷视频网站或者微博等为自己做广告宣传。与此同时,双边平台为了扩大自己对用户的吸引力,还会选择通过增加投入向其双边用户推出一系列增值服务。例如：微软向用户提供云存储服务；天猫等电子商务平台向用户提供店面装修服务,或者根据用户的浏览记录向用户推送特定的产品：微信向用户提供滴滴出行或者订阅号服务等等。本文立足于双边平台开发的增值服务,探讨双边平台通过投资为用户提供增值服务的投资决策和对双边用户的收费决策。具体而言,本文以现实背景为依托,针对现实中平台企业为用户提供的增值服务种类的不同,以及进入平台的双边用户所具有的特点,分别探讨了只增加单边用户效用的增值服务投资决策和相应的定价策略；同时增加双边用户效用的增值服务投资决策和定价策略：用户群体内部存在负向网络外部性时的增值服务投资和定价策略；以及双边用户按先后不同的顺序进入平台时的增值服务投资和定价决策,并在此基础上探讨增值服务的开发对双边平台运作策略的一系列影响,以及投资成本等因素在不同情形下对平台最优收费策略的影响。本文的主要内容安排如下：第一章阐述了本文的研究背景,研究内容以及研究的意义,并回顾了关于双边平台的价格策略以及平台服务提升等相关方面的研究。第二章和第三章分别探讨了对于直接提升单边用户效用和同时增加双边用户效用的增值服务,平台的最优投资决策和对双边用户的最优收费决策。并根据最优策略探讨平台对双边用户补贴或收费的条件；投资增值服务前后平台对用户收费策略的变化；以及平台对双边用户最优收费决策关于投资成本等影响因素的变化关系。第四章在考虑双边平台卖方用户群体内部可能会存在负向网络外部性的前提下,研究平台企业如何通过投资来为卖方用户开发增值服务,从而削弱或降低负向的网络外部性为用户造成的效用损失。探讨平台企业应当如何利用资源进行增值服务的投资,并且如何对双边用户制定最优的收费策略。第五章考虑了对于卖方用户群体内部存在负向网络外部性的双边平台,如果卖方用户先进入平台而买方用户后进入平台,那么平台企业应当如何通过投资为卖方用户提供增值服务,平台对双边用户的收费会发生哪些变化。第六章对本文的研究做出总结,归纳本文的主要结论和创新点,指出所做研究的局限性并据此对未来进一步研究做出展望。本文的研究结果表明,在双边平台中,双边用户的交叉网络外部性强度衡量了双边用户的相对重要性程度。对平台来说更为重要的一方用户,平台需减少对该类用户的收费,从而有效地促使平台通过扩大总体用户规模并获取更高的利润。当增值服务仅增加单边用户的效用时,平台在增值服务投资之后增加对得到投资的用户的收费；而可能增加也可能减少对未得到服务投资的用户的收费。当平台投资的增值服务同时增加双边用户的效用时,如果双边用户的交叉网络外部性强度之间的差距较大,那么投资效应将不影响平台收费策略的制定。反之,用户的边际投资效用或者增值服务的边际投资成本都可能成为平台最优收费决策的主导因素。此外,单个用户群体内部负向的网络外部性强度的增加会促使平台降低增值服务投资水平,其对平台的收费策略既可产生正向的影响,也可产生负向的影响。双边用户先后进入平台时,平台在增值服务投资之后增加对后进入平台的用户的收费,而可能增加也可能降低对先进入平台的用户的收费。
[Abstract]:In modern society, the progress of information technology is constantly pushing the tide of economic development, bringing about the changes in the economy, especially the rapid development of Internet technology, which has made the platform economy become one of the most important forms of economic development. For example, the trading volume of the e-commerce platform of the Alibaba, Jingdong, Suning and other electronic commerce platforms in 2015 is reached. Up to 18 trillion and 200 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of over 15%. However, the continuous development of the economy will bring about the continuous competition between the platform enterprises. How to keep an invincible position in the increasingly fierce competition and make the enterprise invincible is the problem that every platform enterprise must face. In reality, the platform enterprise will In a variety of ways to attract customers or increase the stickiness of users to expand or maintain their own market size, many bilateral platforms will expand their popularity by advertising on other platforms or social media. For example, Tmall is advertising for itself through Youku video website or micro-blog, at the same time, In order to expand its attractiveness to users, the bilateral platform will also choose to launch a series of value-added services to its bilateral users by increasing investment. For example, Microsoft provides users with cloud storage services; Tmall and other e-commerce platforms provide customers with shop decoration services or push specific production to users according to user's browsing records. WeChat provides users with drop trip or subscription service, etc. This article is based on the value-added services developed on the bilateral platform, and discusses the investment decision making for the value-added services provided by the bilateral platform and the fees for the bilateral users through investment. The different types of value-added services provided by the households and the characteristics of the bilateral users entering the platform, respectively, discuss the investment decision and the corresponding pricing strategy which only increase the utility of the single side users, and increase the investment decision and pricing strategy of the value-added service of bilateral users: there is a negative network within the user group. The value added service investment and pricing strategy of externality, as well as the value added service investment and pricing decision of the bilateral users entering the platform in different sequence, and on this basis, discuss a series of effects of the development of value-added services on the operation strategy of the bilateral platform, and the optimal income of the investment in different circumstances. The main contents of this paper are as follows: the first chapter describes the research background, the research content and the significance of the research, and reviews the research on the price strategy of the bilateral platform and the promotion of platform service. The second chapter and the third chapter respectively discuss the direct promotion of the utility of single side users. At the same time, the value-added services of bilateral users are increased, the optimal investment decision of the platform and the optimal charge for bilateral users are made. The conditions for the bilateral users' subsidies or fees are discussed according to the optimal strategy, the changes in the pricing strategy of the platform before and after the investment value-added service, and the decision of the platform to the optimal charge for bilateral users are also discussed. In the fourth chapter, on the premise that the negative network externality may exist within the bilateral platform of the seller's user group, the research on how to develop value-added services for the seller's users through investment, thus weakening or reducing the loss of negative network externality to the user. This paper discusses how platform enterprises should use resources to invest in value-added services and how to formulate the optimal pricing strategy for bilateral users. The fifth chapter considers the bilateral platform for negative network externalities within the seller's user group. If the seller enters the platform and the buyer enters the platform after the buyer's user, then the platform enterprise How to provide value-added services for seller users through investment, what changes will happen to the fees of bilateral users by the platform. The sixth chapter summarizes the research in this paper, summarizes the main conclusions and innovation points of this paper, points out the limitations of the research and makes a prospect for further research in the future. The results of this paper show that On the bilateral platform, the cross network externality strength of bilateral users measure the relative importance of bilateral users. For the more important user of the platform, the platform needs to reduce the fees for such users, thus effectively promoting the platform to increase the overall user size and gain higher profits. When value-added services only increase the single side With the utility of the user, the platform increases the fee for the users who are invested after the value of the value-added services; and may also increase the possibility of reducing the fees for the users who have not received the service. When the value-added services of the platform investment increase the utility of the bilateral users, the gap between the external intensity of the cross network of the bilateral users is a gap. On the other hand, the investment effect will not affect the formulation of platform pricing strategy. On the contrary, the marginal investment utility of users or the marginal investment cost of value-added services may become the dominant factor in the optimal pricing of platform. In addition, the increase of negative network externality in individual user groups will cause the platform to reduce the value-added service investment. The cost of the platform has a positive impact on the platform and also has a negative impact. When bilateral users enter the platform successively, the platform increases the fees for the users who enter the platform after the investment in value-added services, and may also increase the fees for the users who first enter the platform.

【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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