中国煤矿安全监察监管系统演化博弈分析与控制情景研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 20:43

  本文选题：煤矿安全 + 国家监察　； 参考：《中国矿业大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：在目前“国家监察、地方监管、企业负责”的煤矿安全监察监管工作格局下,存在中央政府、地方政府和煤矿企业间的多方博弈,且在这种多方博弈格局中,不同主体地位和谈判能力,导致各主体间利益冲突趋于隐性化,影响煤矿安全监察监管的效果,在一定程度上导致煤矿重大事故频频发生。论文针对煤矿安全监察监管过程中各方利益冲突趋于隐性化且监察监管过程具有复杂动态博弈和多方参与的特点,以风险理论、信息不对称理论、外部性与内部性理论、委托代理理论、利益相关理论、政府规制理论和博弈理论等为指导,采取理论分析与情景模拟相结合、定性与定量方法相结合的模式探讨中国煤矿安全监察监管演化博弈与控制情景问题。主要贡献体现在以下几个方面:(1)中国煤矿安全监察监管的形成和发展,将建国66年来的煤矿安全政府监察监管历程划分为六个历史阶段:建国初的煤矿安全生产初创期、“大跃进”及调整时期、“文化大革命”时期、改革开放时期、开始建立社会主义市场经济时期和新体制形成时期(国家监察模式时期),并分析各个阶段煤矿安全监察监管机构的变迁过程。然后,分析当前煤矿安全监察监管的现状和特征,并对其有效性进行分析,结果表明:2000年开始逐步建立的新的煤矿安全监察监管机构,从短期来看对于全国煤矿安全记录的改善具有负面作用,其中乡镇煤矿的负面作用程度最大,国有重点煤矿的负面作用程度最小;但从长远看来对全国煤矿安全记录的改善具有显著性的正面作用,其中乡镇煤矿的改善效果最明显,国有重点煤矿的改善效果最小;而后从1998年末关闭非法乡镇小煤矿政策和现行煤矿安全监察监管机构的不足两方面对回归结果进行分析。(2)针对煤矿安全监察监管机构存在的不足和国内外对煤矿安全监察监管相关研究的缺陷,从煤矿安全监察监管演化博弈视角进行分析,将中国煤矿安全监察监管的演化博弈划分为单种群演化博弈、两种群演化博弈和系统演化博弈。具体而言,单种群演化博弈包括:国家监察机构之间监察行为的演化博弈、地方监管机构之间监管行为的演化博弈以及煤矿企业之间安全生产行为的演化博弈;两种群演化博弈包括:国家监察机构与地方监管机构之间的演化博弈、国家监察机构和煤矿企业之间的演化博弈以及地方监管机构与煤矿企业之间的演化博弈;系统演化博弈则是指国家监察机构、地方监管机构和煤矿企业三个种群之间的系统性演化博弈。然后对上述煤矿安全监察监管的单种群演化博弈模型、两种群演化博弈模型和系统演化博弈模型进行分析。结果表明:对于煤矿安全监察监管的单种群演化博弈模型和双种群演化博弈模型,可以通过分析均衡点时系统的雅可比矩阵的行列式值和迹值的符号,判断其均衡点的稳定性;但是对于煤矿安全监察监管的系统演化博弈模型,通过此方法理论上是可以做到的,但是计算量巨大繁琐,且系统演化博弈过程具有复杂动态性,对各局中人的策略也难以合理制定。因此,采用系统动力学(SD)来研究煤矿安全监察监管系统演化博弈的反馈结构,分析其系统演化博弈均衡点的稳定性。从而构建煤矿安全监察监管的系统演化博弈SD模型,并对系统演化博弈的均衡点进行仿真以分析其稳定性,主要包括:纯策略均衡解稳定性分析、混合策略均衡解稳定性分析和一般策略演化博弈稳定性分析,结果发现:中国煤矿安全监察监管的系统演化博弈过程出现反复波动、震荡发展的趋势,即演化博弈过程不存在演化稳定策略均衡,这从一定程度上提供了解释中国重大煤矿事故多年处于频发态势的一个主要客观原因。(3)以提高煤矿安全监察监管效果、降低煤矿企业违法行为为目标,针对上述不存在演化稳定策略均衡的煤矿安全监察监管系统演化博弈问题进行有效稳定性控制情景研究,提出可以有效抑制系统演化博弈过程波动性的控制情景,即动态惩罚稳定性控制情景,并对该情景下的系统演化博弈稳定性进行仿真分析与仿真结果理论证明。结果表明:在动态惩罚稳定性控制情景下系统演化博弈过程的波动性得到有效控制,存在演化稳定策略均衡,但是在此演化稳定策略均衡状态下,煤矿企业仍存在一定比率的选择违法行为。因此,有必要对动态惩罚稳定性控制情景下演化稳定策略的影响变量进行分析与控制优化,从而提出优化动态惩罚-激励稳定性控制情景,并对该情景下的系统演化博弈有效稳定性进行仿真分析与仿真结果理论证明。结果表明:优化动态惩罚-激励稳定性控制情景不仅能够有效抑制系统演化博弈过程的波动性,使系统演化博弈存在演化稳定策略均衡,且在此演化稳定均衡策略状态下煤矿企业违法行为得到有效控制。最后,在上述对中国煤矿安全监察监管的系统演化博弈分析与有效稳定性控制情景研究的基础上,提出中国煤矿安全监察监管机构的改善对策。
[Abstract]:Under the current pattern of coal mine safety supervision and supervision of "state supervision, local supervision and enterprise responsibility", there is a multi-party game between the central government, local government and coal mining enterprises. In this multi-party game, the different main body status and negotiation ability lead to the recessive conflict of interests among the owners, and affect the safety supervision of the coal mine. The effect of supervision, to a certain extent, leads to the frequent occurrence of major accidents in coal mines. The thesis aims at the recessive interests conflict of all parties in the process of supervision and supervision of coal mine safety supervision and the characteristics of complex dynamic game and multi party participation in supervision and supervision process, with the theory of risk, information mismatch theory, externality and internality theory, principal-agent The theory, the interest related theory, the government regulation theory and the game theory are guided by the combination of theoretical analysis and scenario simulation and the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to discuss the evolutionary game and control situation of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision. The main contributions are as follows: (1) supervision and supervision of coal mine safety in China The formation and development of the supervision and supervision of the coal mine safety government in the past 66 years were divided into six historical stages: the initial period of coal mine safety production at the beginning of the founding of the people's Republic, the period of "great leap forward" and the period of adjustment, the period of "Cultural Revolution", the period of reform and opening up, and the establishment of the period of social main meaning market economy and the period of the formation of the new system. The change process of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions in each stage is analyzed. Then, the present situation and characteristics of the current coal mine safety supervision and supervision are analyzed and its effectiveness is analyzed. The results show that the new coal mine safety supervision and supervision institution has been gradually established in 2000. The improvement of the record has the negative effect, among which the negative effect of the township coal mine is the biggest and the negative effect of the state key coal mine is the least; but in the long run, it has a significant positive effect on the improvement of the national coal mine safety record, among which the improvement effect of the township coal mine is the most obvious, the improvement effect of the state key coal mine is the least; and then the state key coal mine has the least improvement effect. From the end of 1998 to close the illegal Township small coal mine policy and the existing coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions in two aspects of the results of the regression analysis. (2) in view of the shortcomings of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision institutions and the related research on coal mine safety supervision and supervision in and outside the country, from the perspective of the evolution game of coal mine safety supervision and supervision The evolutionary game of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision is divided into single population evolutionary game, two population evolution game and system evolution game. The evolutionary game of the two population evolution game includes the evolutionary game between the state supervisory organization and the local regulatory agency, the evolutionary game between the state supervision organization and the coal mine enterprises, and the evolutionary game between the local supervision institutions and the coal enterprises; the system playing game refers to the national supervisory organization and the local regulatory machine. The systematic evolutionary game between three groups of coal mine enterprises. Then the single population evolution game model, two population evolution game model and the system evolution game model are analyzed. The results show that the single group evolutionary game model and the double population evolution game model for the coal mine safety supervision and supervision. The stability of the equilibrium point can be judged by analyzing the determinant value of the Jacobi matrix and the mark of trace value of the Jacobi matrix in the equilibrium point. However, the system evolution game model of coal mine safety supervision and supervision can be done theoretically by this method, but the amount of calculation is complicated and the process of system evolution game is complicated. Therefore, the system dynamics (SD) is used to study the feedback structure of the evolutionary game of the coal mine safety supervision and supervision system, and the stability of the equilibrium point of the system evolution game is analyzed. Thus, the system evolution game SD model of coal mine safety supervision and supervision is constructed, and the system evolution game is played. The equilibrium point is simulated to analyze its stability, mainly including the stability analysis of the pure strategy equilibrium solution, the stability analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium solution and the stability analysis of the general strategy evolution game. The results show that the evolutionary game of the system evolution game of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision has repeated fluctuations, the trend of the oscillation development, that is, the evolutionary game. There is no evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, which, to a certain extent, provides a major objective reason to explain the frequent occurrence of major coal mine accidents in China for many years. (3) in order to improve the effect of coal mine safety supervision and supervision, reduce the illegal behavior of coal mine enterprises as the target, the coal mine safety supervision, which does not exist in the equilibrium of the evolutionary stable strategy, is not existed. The evolution game of the supervisory system is carried out to study the effective stability control scenario, and the control scenario which can effectively suppress the volatility of the system evolution game is proposed, that is, the dynamic punishment stability control scenario, and the simulation analysis and simulation results are given to the stability of the system evolution game under this scenario. The results show that the dynamic punishment is punished by the dynamic punishment. Under the penalty stability control scenario, the volatility of the evolutionary game process is effectively controlled, and there is an evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium. However, under the equilibrium state of the evolutionary stable strategy, the coal mining enterprises still have a certain ratio of illegal behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to change the influence of the evolutionary stability strategy under the dynamic penalty stability control scenario. The dynamic penalty incentive stability control scenario is optimized and the dynamic stability of the system evolution game is analyzed and the simulation results are proved by the simulation results. The results show that the optimization of dynamic penalty and incentive stability control scenario can not only effectively suppress the evolutionary game process of the system. The volatility of the system evolution game has an evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the illegal behavior of coal mine enterprises is effectively controlled under the state of the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy. Finally, on the basis of the system evolution game analysis and the effective stability control scenario study of China's coal mine safety supervision and supervision, the coal mine safety is proposed. To monitor the improvement of the regulatory agency.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：TD79;F426.21
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本文编号：1902797