概念论与非概念论之争下的康德直观理论研究
发布时间：2018-07-23 08:51
【摘要】：康德在《纯粹理性批判》中有一个著名的命题“思想无内容则空,直观无概念则盲”,这个命题引起当前分析哲学家的关注,尤其是以塞拉斯、麦克道尔等为代表的“匹兹堡学派”的关注。他们尤其强调“直观无概念则盲”,并以这个命题作为自己的理论基础,来支撑自己的概念化经验的主张。比如,罗蒂就指出,贯穿在塞拉斯的《经验论与心灵哲学》一书中的主要思想是康德的“直观无概念则盲”,而麦克道尔的《心灵与世界》也以这个命题为基础来支撑自己的概念化经验的主张。因此,有学者指出,康德的‘思想无内容则空,直观无概念则盲’这个命题概括了概念论的学说。也正是基于这一点,塞拉斯和麦克道尔都力图以此来对抗非概念论者的挑战,并对康德做强概念论解读。这样一来,康德就被引入分析哲学的语境中来,尤其是参与到当前分析哲学的核心话题,即知觉经验的内容是否是概念性的这个讨论之中。与此同时,麦克道尔对康德的强概念论解读引起了学界关于“康德是否是概念论者”的讨论,尤其是以罗伯特·汉那、露西·艾莱斯、汉娜·金斯博格等为代表的康德学者的理论回响。他们也把目光转向这个命题,并立足于康德的立场做出不同的解读。双方争论的焦点集中在如何理解康德的“直观无概念则盲”,即康德是否承认存在有“盲”的直观?如果有的话,这种“盲”的直观如何具有认知意义?这就引向了康德的直观理论,而来自双方的理论互动为重新反思康德的直观理论提供了新的语境和可能。因此,在分析哲学的语境下回到康德的直观理论不仅能够推动康德学界的深入发展,而且对康德直观理论的重新反思也有利于推动分析哲学的发展。论文第一章主要介绍了康德直观理论讨论的分析哲学背景,澄清分析哲学家对康德哲学的关注源于其自身的理论关切。在这里需要注意区分两个层次：第一个层次是在分析哲学内部的概念论与非概念论之争。围绕着“知觉经验的内容是否是概念性的”这个争论,在分析哲学内部出现了概念论与非概念论两大相对独立的阵营。简要地说,概念论认为知觉经验的内容是概念性的,麦克道尔是概念论主张最重要的代表。非概念论认为我们要想拥有经验无须拥有全部或部分概念,双方争论的焦点是知觉经验的内容是否是由我们的概念性能力塑造的；第二个层次是对康德的概念论与非概念论两种解读,麦克道尔对康德的强概念论解读引发了康德学界对康德做出不同解读。在麦克道尔看来,如果康德把他在认识论上的科学见解坚持到底,他本应否认“盲”的直观的存在,因为“直观无概念则盲”就表明直观与概念是密不可分的,而作为未被组织的感觉杂多的“盲”直观最终会不可避免地陷入“所予神话”。汉那和艾莱斯也承认直观与概念要密切结合,但他们认为,这种密切结合只适用于“作客观有效的判断”或“认识”,除此之外,是存在有“盲”的直观的。汉那认为这种“盲”的直观指的“客观有效的非概念性直观”,是直观中存在的那些在语义学结构和心理学功能上不同于概念性内容的知觉内容。艾莱斯则紧紧围绕着康德对直观的定义、地位和作用进行论述,指出直观的作用就在于独立于概念为我们知觉地显现具体之物。他们认为麦克道尔之所以把“盲”的直观与“所予神话”等同起来,事实上是混淆了康德的直观与感觉,对康德的直观做了感觉主义的理解。这就是第二章的主要内容。对康德的两种解读其争论的焦点最终集中在知觉对象时是否需要概念。以康德的先验演绎为理论依据,麦克道尔指出,直观内容就是概念化塑造的内容,判断的内容与直观的内容是一致的。没有概念,对象就不能知觉地显现给我们。而非概念论解读则认为对象向意识的显现是独立于概念的,因为空间(时间)的先天直观表象在其中起了作用,非概念论解读的理论依据是先验感性论。两种解读各有优点,也各种局限性。非概念论解读强调知觉的在先性,这与我们的常识相符合,但它无法说明知觉对象如何具有认知意义,无法解释康德知识论的根本立场；概念论解读与康德的知识论立场一致,但忽视了知觉经验的在先性。由此可见,争论双方在新的语境下突显并拉大了康德知识论的核心困境。为了缓解这种张力,就要说明直观与概念应当如何结合在一起,这需要重新反思康德的综合理论与想象力。立足于这个困境,金斯博格提出一条可能的出路。她对上述两种解读进行扬弃,强调知觉经验的逻辑在先性,认为是先前的经验和当下的经验共同构成了一个视域,借助这个视域对象被带入概念之下,而这是由意识的规范性决定的。这是第三章要论述的中心。论文的最后一章是探讨当前的两种解读能否与康德的形而上学融贯起来。尽管麦克道尔把康德看作是一条可能的出路,但他遗憾地发现康德哲学还包括先验观念论,正是由于这个观念论使得康德最终陷入“所予神话”。因此,麦克道尔力图把先验观念论与康德在知识论上的科学见解分离开来,并力图用第二自然的自然主义来代替康德的先验观念论。非概念论解读则坚持直接知觉实在论立场,对康德的先验观念论做形而上学的解读。事实上,要想给康德的直观理论提供一个融贯的解释是非常困难的,康德直观理论的困境靠康德自身是不可能解决的。当前的讨论把我们引向一种新的可能。麦克道尔力图用黑格尔来改造康德,其方式是把世界经验化,把经验概念化,把概念的来源归因于人类的社会实践,让世界借助语言向我们敞开。这样一来,麦克道尔就把人与世界的关系从康德式的静态的认识论关系变成动态的存在论关系。但由于麦克道尔完全否认知觉经验的逻辑在先性,使得他的理论不能融贯起来。而在金斯博格的方案中所体现出来的现象学精神成为解决康德直观理论的一条可能出路。
[Abstract]:In the critique of pure reason, Kant has a famous proposition, "thought no content is empty, visual no concept is blind." this proposition causes the attention of current analytical philosophers, especially the "Pittsburgh school", represented by Sellars, Mcdowell and so on. They especially emphasize "visual non concept blindness", and take this proposition as a proposition. As the basis of his theory to support his own conceptual experience, Lottie, for example, points out that the main idea that runs through Sellars's theory of empiricism and philosophy is Kant's "visual inconceptual blindness", and Mcdowell's "mind and the world" support his own conceptualization based on this proposition. As a result, some scholars point out that the proposition that Kant's "thought without content and empty, intuitionistic and blind," generalizes the theory of conceptualization. It is based on this point that Sellars and Mcdowelturi Tu fight against the challenges of the non conceptualists and make a strong conceptual interpretation of Kant. In this way Kant is introduced. The analysis of the context of philosophy, especially the core topic involved in the current analytical philosophy, is the discussion of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. At the same time, Mcdowell's interpretation of Kant's strong concept theory has caused a discussion on "whether Kant is a conceptuist or not", especially Robert Hanna, Lucy Ailes, Hannah Ginsburg and other Kantian scholars repercussions. They also turn their eyes to this proposition and make a different interpretation based on Kant's position. The focus of the dispute is on how to understand Kant's "visual non concept blindness", that is, Kant's recognition of the existence of "blind" intuition? If there is a sense of "blind" How does this "blind" intuition have cognitive meaning? This leads to Kant's theory of intuition, and the theoretical interaction from both sides provides a new context and possibility for rethinking of Kant's intuitive theory. Therefore, returning to Kant's visual theory in the context of analytic philosophy can not only promote the deep development of Kant's academic circles, And the rethinking of Kant's theory of intuitionism also helps to promote the development of analytic philosophy. The first chapter of the thesis mainly introduces the philosophical background of the discussion of Kant's intuitionistic theory, and clarifies that the analytical philosophers' attention to Kant's philosophy originates from his own theoretical concerns. Here we need to distinguish between two levels: the first level is in The contention between the concept theory and the non concept theory inside philosophy. Around the argument of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, there are two relatively independent camps of conceptualization and non conceptualization in the analysis of philosophy. Briefly, conceptualization holds that the inner capacity of perceptual experience is conceptual, and Mcdowell is a concept theory. The most important representative. The non concept theory holds that we need to have experience without having all or part of the concept. The focus of the debate is whether the content of perceptual experience is shaped by our conceptual ability; the second level is two interpretations of Kant's conceptualization and non concept theory, and Mcdowell's strong conceptual interpretation of Kant Kant makes a different interpretation of Kant. In Mcdowell's view, if Kant insists on his epistemological scientific views to the end, he should deny the intuitive existence of "blindness", because "visual inconceptional blindness" indicates that intuition and concept are inseparable, and "blind" as unorganized. In the end, intuition inevitably falls into the "given myth". Hana and Ali admits that intuition and concept are closely integrated, but they think that this close combination applies only to "objective and effective judgment" or "understanding". In addition, there is a direct view of "blindness". The objective and effective non conceptual intuition is the perceptual content that is different from the conceptual content in the semantic structure and the psychological function of the intuition. Elis is closely related to Kant's definition, status and function of intuition, pointing out that the function of intuition lies in the independence of concept to our perception. They think that Mcdowell equates the intuition of "blindness" with "myths". In fact, it confuses Kant's intuition and feeling and makes a sense of sense of Kant's intuition. This is the main content of the second chapter. The focus of the two interpretations of Kant's argument on the subject of perception is at the time of the perceptual object. In the theoretical basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Mcdowell points out that visual content is the content created by conceptualization. The content of judgment is consistent with the intuitive content. Without concept, the object can not appear to us perceptively, while the unconceptual interpretation thinks that the appearance of the image to the consciousness is independent of the concept, because emptiness is empty. The innate visual representation of inter (time) plays a role in which the theoretical basis of the unconceptual interpretation is the transcendental perceptual theory. The two interpretations have both advantages and limitations. The unconceptual interpretation emphasizes the first of perception, which is consistent with our common sense, but it can not explain how the perceptual objects have cognitive meaning and can not explain Kant. The fundamental position of the theory of knowledge is consistent with the standpoint of Kant's theory of knowledge, but ignores the first of the perceptual experience. Thus, the two sides of the debate highlight and widen the core predicament of Kant's theory of knowledge in the new context. In order to alleviate this tension, it is necessary to explain how the intuition and concept should be combined together, which needs to be weighed. A new reflection on Kant's comprehensive theory and imagination. Based on this dilemma, kins Berg puts forward a possible way out. She discarded the above two interpretations, emphasized the logic of the perceptual experience, and thought that the previous experience and the present experience together constituted a field of view, which was brought to the concept with the aid of the object of view. This is determined by the normalization of consciousness. This is the center of the third chapter. The last chapter of the thesis is to explore whether the current two interpretations can be combined with Kant's metaphysics. Although Mcdowell regards Kant as a possible outlet, he regrets that Kang Dezhe studies also include the transcendental concept, which is precisely because of this Idealism makes Kant finally fall into the "myth". Therefore, Mcdowell tries to separate the theory of transcendental ideas from Kant's scientific views on the theory of knowledge, and tries to use second natural naturalism to replace Kant's transcendental concept theory. The unconceptualistic interpretation insists on the position of direct perception realism and the transcendental concept of Kant. A metaphysical interpretation. In fact, it is very difficult to provide a coherent explanation of Kant's theory of intuition. Kant's intuition is difficult to solve by Kant itself. The current discussion leads us to a new possibility. Mcdowell tries to transform Kant with Hagel. The way is to take the world through. As a result, Mcdowell has transformed the relationship between man and the world from the static epistemological relationship of Kantian to the dynamic existentialism. But because Mcdowell completely denied the logic of the perceptual experience, Mcdowell completely denied the relationship between man and the world. His theory can not be intersected, and the phenomenological spirit embodied in Berg's plan becomes a possible way to solve Kant's theory of intuition.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B516.31
本文编号：2138867
[Abstract]:In the critique of pure reason, Kant has a famous proposition, "thought no content is empty, visual no concept is blind." this proposition causes the attention of current analytical philosophers, especially the "Pittsburgh school", represented by Sellars, Mcdowell and so on. They especially emphasize "visual non concept blindness", and take this proposition as a proposition. As the basis of his theory to support his own conceptual experience, Lottie, for example, points out that the main idea that runs through Sellars's theory of empiricism and philosophy is Kant's "visual inconceptual blindness", and Mcdowell's "mind and the world" support his own conceptualization based on this proposition. As a result, some scholars point out that the proposition that Kant's "thought without content and empty, intuitionistic and blind," generalizes the theory of conceptualization. It is based on this point that Sellars and Mcdowelturi Tu fight against the challenges of the non conceptualists and make a strong conceptual interpretation of Kant. In this way Kant is introduced. The analysis of the context of philosophy, especially the core topic involved in the current analytical philosophy, is the discussion of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. At the same time, Mcdowell's interpretation of Kant's strong concept theory has caused a discussion on "whether Kant is a conceptuist or not", especially Robert Hanna, Lucy Ailes, Hannah Ginsburg and other Kantian scholars repercussions. They also turn their eyes to this proposition and make a different interpretation based on Kant's position. The focus of the dispute is on how to understand Kant's "visual non concept blindness", that is, Kant's recognition of the existence of "blind" intuition? If there is a sense of "blind" How does this "blind" intuition have cognitive meaning? This leads to Kant's theory of intuition, and the theoretical interaction from both sides provides a new context and possibility for rethinking of Kant's intuitive theory. Therefore, returning to Kant's visual theory in the context of analytic philosophy can not only promote the deep development of Kant's academic circles, And the rethinking of Kant's theory of intuitionism also helps to promote the development of analytic philosophy. The first chapter of the thesis mainly introduces the philosophical background of the discussion of Kant's intuitionistic theory, and clarifies that the analytical philosophers' attention to Kant's philosophy originates from his own theoretical concerns. Here we need to distinguish between two levels: the first level is in The contention between the concept theory and the non concept theory inside philosophy. Around the argument of whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual, there are two relatively independent camps of conceptualization and non conceptualization in the analysis of philosophy. Briefly, conceptualization holds that the inner capacity of perceptual experience is conceptual, and Mcdowell is a concept theory. The most important representative. The non concept theory holds that we need to have experience without having all or part of the concept. The focus of the debate is whether the content of perceptual experience is shaped by our conceptual ability; the second level is two interpretations of Kant's conceptualization and non concept theory, and Mcdowell's strong conceptual interpretation of Kant Kant makes a different interpretation of Kant. In Mcdowell's view, if Kant insists on his epistemological scientific views to the end, he should deny the intuitive existence of "blindness", because "visual inconceptional blindness" indicates that intuition and concept are inseparable, and "blind" as unorganized. In the end, intuition inevitably falls into the "given myth". Hana and Ali admits that intuition and concept are closely integrated, but they think that this close combination applies only to "objective and effective judgment" or "understanding". In addition, there is a direct view of "blindness". The objective and effective non conceptual intuition is the perceptual content that is different from the conceptual content in the semantic structure and the psychological function of the intuition. Elis is closely related to Kant's definition, status and function of intuition, pointing out that the function of intuition lies in the independence of concept to our perception. They think that Mcdowell equates the intuition of "blindness" with "myths". In fact, it confuses Kant's intuition and feeling and makes a sense of sense of Kant's intuition. This is the main content of the second chapter. The focus of the two interpretations of Kant's argument on the subject of perception is at the time of the perceptual object. In the theoretical basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Mcdowell points out that visual content is the content created by conceptualization. The content of judgment is consistent with the intuitive content. Without concept, the object can not appear to us perceptively, while the unconceptual interpretation thinks that the appearance of the image to the consciousness is independent of the concept, because emptiness is empty. The innate visual representation of inter (time) plays a role in which the theoretical basis of the unconceptual interpretation is the transcendental perceptual theory. The two interpretations have both advantages and limitations. The unconceptual interpretation emphasizes the first of perception, which is consistent with our common sense, but it can not explain how the perceptual objects have cognitive meaning and can not explain Kant. The fundamental position of the theory of knowledge is consistent with the standpoint of Kant's theory of knowledge, but ignores the first of the perceptual experience. Thus, the two sides of the debate highlight and widen the core predicament of Kant's theory of knowledge in the new context. In order to alleviate this tension, it is necessary to explain how the intuition and concept should be combined together, which needs to be weighed. A new reflection on Kant's comprehensive theory and imagination. Based on this dilemma, kins Berg puts forward a possible way out. She discarded the above two interpretations, emphasized the logic of the perceptual experience, and thought that the previous experience and the present experience together constituted a field of view, which was brought to the concept with the aid of the object of view. This is determined by the normalization of consciousness. This is the center of the third chapter. The last chapter of the thesis is to explore whether the current two interpretations can be combined with Kant's metaphysics. Although Mcdowell regards Kant as a possible outlet, he regrets that Kang Dezhe studies also include the transcendental concept, which is precisely because of this Idealism makes Kant finally fall into the "myth". Therefore, Mcdowell tries to separate the theory of transcendental ideas from Kant's scientific views on the theory of knowledge, and tries to use second natural naturalism to replace Kant's transcendental concept theory. The unconceptualistic interpretation insists on the position of direct perception realism and the transcendental concept of Kant. A metaphysical interpretation. In fact, it is very difficult to provide a coherent explanation of Kant's theory of intuition. Kant's intuition is difficult to solve by Kant itself. The current discussion leads us to a new possibility. Mcdowell tries to transform Kant with Hagel. The way is to take the world through. As a result, Mcdowell has transformed the relationship between man and the world from the static epistemological relationship of Kantian to the dynamic existentialism. But because Mcdowell completely denied the logic of the perceptual experience, Mcdowell completely denied the relationship between man and the world. His theory can not be intersected, and the phenomenological spirit embodied in Berg's plan becomes a possible way to solve Kant's theory of intuition.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B516.31
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前2条
1 张荣;“感性与知性的共同根”之辨——《纯粹理性批判》导言的一个微观考察[J];南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学版);2004年04期
2 段丽真;;“概念论者”还是“非概念论者”——对康德知识论的两种解读[J];哲学动态;2015年01期
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