博弈视角下养老PPP项目风险分担研究
发布时间：2018-07-18 14:36
【摘要】：我国自1999年开始进入老龄化社会,在过去“十二五”时期我国人口老龄化趋势愈加严峻,随着老龄人口的增加,给我国带来了巨大的养老压力。为缓解我国养老问题,我国基本确立了构建“以居家养老为基础、社区养老为依托、机构养老为补充”的社会养老服务体系,目前居家养老的基础作用并不明显,社区养老正在推广普及阶段,这就使得机构养老的作用越来越重要,对机构养老的需求也日益增加。由于养老服务设施及服务的公共性,仅依靠政府财政资金投资建设养老机构是远远不够的,这为积极探索私人部门参与养老机构发展,在养老领域推广PPP模式,助推养老机构供给侧改革提供了新机遇。PPP(Public-Private-Partnership)模式即公私合作伙伴关系,作为一种新模式参与养老机构的建设运营,得到了关注与重视。在PPP模式引入养老服务领域后,其风险管理成为重中之重,而有效的风险分担是风险管理以及项目成功的关键因素。本文选取养老服务领域的机构养老PPP项目作为研究对象,对其风险分担进行深入研究,以其为合理分担风险提供了决策依据,保障项目顺利实施,促进社会养老服务事业发展,形成与我国老龄化趋势相适应的养老体系,促进和谐社会的发展。本文首先介绍了选题的背景及意义,然后对PPP模式、PPP项目风险分担、博弈论等理论基础进行阐述,为后文研究奠定基础。为更详细研究养老PPP项目风险分担问题,本文在第三章将养老PPP项目的风险分担主体界定为公共部门与私人部门,从宏观、中观、微观三个层面对养老PPP项目的风险客体进行分析,接下来分析风险分担的影响因素及方式,将风险分担方式分为共担风险与非共担风险。本文在第四章结合项目参与方的地位非对称性及公共部门与私人部门出价顺序构建了共担风险讨价还价博弈模型,得出了模型的纳什均衡解,即各参与方在共担风险时其所应该承担的具体比例,通过博弈分析发现某一方先出价时承担的风险比例比后出价要少,即具备先发优势,公私部门地位的非对称性及谈判损耗系数影响风险的具体承担比例。基于以上分析,本文最后提出优化养老PPP项目风险分担提出建议,即明确双方地位对称性、加强公共部门与私人部门沟通、建立和完善统一的PPP法律法规及加强行业指导、分享风险收益、构建激励制度。
[Abstract]:Our country has entered the aging society since 1999. In the past "12th Five-Year Plan" period, the aging trend of China's population has become increasingly severe. With the increase of the aging population, it has brought great pressure to our country to provide for the aged. In order to alleviate the problem of providing for the aged in our country, we have basically established the social old-age service system, which is based on the old-age support at home, supported by the community pension and supplemented by the institutional old-age support. At present, the basic function of the old-age care at home is not obvious. Community pension is popularizing, which makes the role of institutional pension more and more important, and the demand for institutional pension is increasing day by day. Because of the public nature of pension service facilities and services, it is far from enough to rely on government financial funds to invest in the construction of pension institutions. This is to actively explore the participation of the private sector in the development of pension institutions, and promote the PPP model in the field of old-age care. Promoting the supply-side reform of pension institutions provides a new opportunity. PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) mode, as a new model to participate in the construction and operation of pension institutions, has received attention and attention. After the introduction of PPP model into the field of pension service, its risk management becomes the most important, and effective risk sharing is the key factor of risk management and project success. This paper selects the institutional pension PPP project in the field of old-age service as the research object, carries on the thorough research to its risk sharing, provides the decision basis for the reasonable risk sharing, guarantees the project to carry out smoothly, promotes the social old-age service enterprise development. To form a pension system in accordance with the trend of aging in China and promote the development of a harmonious society. This paper first introduces the background and significance of the topic, then describes the PPP model PPP project risk sharing, game theory and other theoretical basis, for later studies laid a foundation. In order to study the risk sharing of pension PPP project in detail, this paper defines the main body of risk sharing of pension PPP project as public sector and private sector in the third chapter. This paper analyzes the risk object of the pension PPP project from three microcosmic levels, and then analyzes the influencing factors and ways of risk sharing, and divides the risk sharing method into shared risk and non-co-shared risk. In the fourth chapter, considering the asymmetric status of the project participants and the bidding order of the public and private sectors, the paper constructs a game model of shared risk bargaining, and obtains the Nash equilibrium solution of the model. That is, the specific proportion that each participant should bear when they share the risk, through the game analysis, it is found that the proportion of risk taken by one party in the first bid is less than that in the later bid, that is, it has the advantage of first-mover. Asymmetric status of the public and private sector and negotiation loss coefficient affect the specific proportion of the risk. Based on the above analysis, this paper finally puts forward some suggestions to optimize the risk sharing of old-age PPP projects, that is, to clarify the status symmetry of both sides, to strengthen the communication between the public and private sectors, to establish and improve the unified laws and regulations of PPP and to strengthen the industry guidance. Share risk gains and construct incentive system.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283;D669.6;F224.32
本文编号：2132212
[Abstract]:Our country has entered the aging society since 1999. In the past "12th Five-Year Plan" period, the aging trend of China's population has become increasingly severe. With the increase of the aging population, it has brought great pressure to our country to provide for the aged. In order to alleviate the problem of providing for the aged in our country, we have basically established the social old-age service system, which is based on the old-age support at home, supported by the community pension and supplemented by the institutional old-age support. At present, the basic function of the old-age care at home is not obvious. Community pension is popularizing, which makes the role of institutional pension more and more important, and the demand for institutional pension is increasing day by day. Because of the public nature of pension service facilities and services, it is far from enough to rely on government financial funds to invest in the construction of pension institutions. This is to actively explore the participation of the private sector in the development of pension institutions, and promote the PPP model in the field of old-age care. Promoting the supply-side reform of pension institutions provides a new opportunity. PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) mode, as a new model to participate in the construction and operation of pension institutions, has received attention and attention. After the introduction of PPP model into the field of pension service, its risk management becomes the most important, and effective risk sharing is the key factor of risk management and project success. This paper selects the institutional pension PPP project in the field of old-age service as the research object, carries on the thorough research to its risk sharing, provides the decision basis for the reasonable risk sharing, guarantees the project to carry out smoothly, promotes the social old-age service enterprise development. To form a pension system in accordance with the trend of aging in China and promote the development of a harmonious society. This paper first introduces the background and significance of the topic, then describes the PPP model PPP project risk sharing, game theory and other theoretical basis, for later studies laid a foundation. In order to study the risk sharing of pension PPP project in detail, this paper defines the main body of risk sharing of pension PPP project as public sector and private sector in the third chapter. This paper analyzes the risk object of the pension PPP project from three microcosmic levels, and then analyzes the influencing factors and ways of risk sharing, and divides the risk sharing method into shared risk and non-co-shared risk. In the fourth chapter, considering the asymmetric status of the project participants and the bidding order of the public and private sectors, the paper constructs a game model of shared risk bargaining, and obtains the Nash equilibrium solution of the model. That is, the specific proportion that each participant should bear when they share the risk, through the game analysis, it is found that the proportion of risk taken by one party in the first bid is less than that in the later bid, that is, it has the advantage of first-mover. Asymmetric status of the public and private sector and negotiation loss coefficient affect the specific proportion of the risk. Based on the above analysis, this paper finally puts forward some suggestions to optimize the risk sharing of old-age PPP projects, that is, to clarify the status symmetry of both sides, to strengthen the communication between the public and private sectors, to establish and improve the unified laws and regulations of PPP and to strengthen the industry guidance. Share risk gains and construct incentive system.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F283;D669.6;F224.32
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 冯雪东;郑生钦;;养老地产PPP项目投资风险评价研究[J];工程管理学报;2016年03期
2 卞志村;杨源源;;结构性财政调控与新常态下财政工具选择[J];经济研究;2016年03期
3 孟春;郭上;;加快完善PPP风险分配机制[J];发展研究;2016年02期
4 彭军龙;谭珊;;基于讨价还价理论的PPP项目融资风险分担研究[J];工程经济;2016年02期
5 付诚;韩佳均;;我国养老服务产业化发展的现实困境与改进策略[J];经济纵横;2015年12期
6 原毅军;郭钰;;煤电产业纵向联盟定价研究——基于讨价还价博弈模型[J];经济问题;2015年11期
7 段洪波;杨竹晴;;PPP模式与河北省养老服务业相对接的SWOT分析及建议[J];经济研究参考;2015年63期
8 辜胜阻;方浪;曹冬梅;;发展养老服务业应对人口老龄化的战略思考[J];经济纵横;2015年09期
9 刘晓凯;张明;;全球视角下的PPP:内涵、模式、实践与问题[J];国际经济评论;2015年04期
10 王经绫;华龙;;PPP机制应用于我国养老机构建设的必要性研究[J];经济研究参考;2014年52期
，本文编号：2132212
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/shoufeilunwen/shuoshibiyelunwen/2132212.html
