理性的“理论活动”高于“实践活动”——论亚里士多德伦理学的“幸福观”

发布时间：2018-01-09 06:00

本文关键词：理性的“理论活动”高于“实践活动”——论亚里士多德伦理学的“幸福观”　出处：《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：作为最高之善,幸福就是灵魂合乎德性(美德)的生活。这是亚里士多德幸福观的一个基本观点,但并不是其幸福观的独特之处。其灵魂学说,特别是其中关于"理性"划分为"理性本身"与"在欲求力里的理性"或"被欲求力分有的理性",不仅构成了亚里士多德幸福理论的基础,而且也构成了其幸福学说的特别之处。通过这个区分,亚里士多德找到了成就"伦理德性"的基础,同时也确定了理性本身的活动也即"纯粹理论活动"之所以高于理性的"实践活动"的理由。因而,虽然合乎伦理德性的生活是幸福的,但却只是"次级的幸福",只有合乎理智德性的生活才是真正最高的幸福。这种生活一方面是合乎神性的生活,另一方面又是成就每个人真正自己的生活。这意味着,在亚里士多德那里,幸福并非只关乎人性,亦关乎神性。
[Abstract]:Happiness, as the highest good, is the life of the soul in conformity with virtue. This is a basic view of Aristotle's view of happiness, but it is not the uniqueness of his view of happiness. In particular, the division of "rationality" into "reason itself" and "reason in the desire force" or "the reason divided by the desire force" not only constitutes the basis of Aristotle's happiness theory. Through this distinction, Aristotle found the basis for his achievement of "ethical virtue". At the same time, it also determines the reason why the activities of reason itself, that is, "pure theoretical activities", are higher than "practical activities" of reason. But it is only "secondary happiness", and only a life of rational virtue is truly the highest happiness. On the one hand, this life is a life of divinity. This means that in Aristotle happiness is not only about humanity, but also about divinity.
【作者单位】：清华大学;
【分类号】：B502.233
【正文快照】： (1)亚里士多德,《尼各马可伦理学》1097b,邓安庆译注,人民出版社,2010年版,第53页(以下简称“邓安庆译注本”);苗力田译,中国社会科学出版社,1990年版,第11页(以下简称“苗力田译本”)。译文参考了两个德译本:Aristoteles Werke Bannd6,Nikomachische Ethik,由Franz Dirlmeier

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