辩驳与羞耻

发布时间：2018-01-20 14:42

本文关键词： 苏格拉底式辩驳羞耻感辩证对话的德性情感与理性　出处：《世界哲学》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文主要关心所谓苏格拉底式辩驳与羞耻感的关系。一种传统的解释认为,苏格拉底常常采取欺骗和反讽的手段来反驳其对手,使其产生一种负面和无益的羞耻感。本文希望重新解释苏格拉底式辩驳与羞耻感的关系。本文一方面尝试证明,柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底式辩驳作为对真理的共同探讨,是智者式辩驳的对立面;另一方面试图论证,苏格拉底式辩驳所关涉的是一种好的羞耻感,它应有助于人们对于真理的追求。
[Abstract]:This paper is mainly concerned with the relationship between Socrates' argument and shame. One traditional explanation is that Socrates often uses deception and irony to refute his opponent. This paper hopes to reinterpret the relationship between Socrates' argument and shame. On the one hand, this paper tries to prove it. Plato's Socrates' argument, as a common discussion of truth, is the opposite of the Wise's argument. On the other hand, Socrates argument is concerned with a good sense of shame, which should be helpful to the pursuit of truth.
【作者单位】：北京大学历史学系西方古典学中心;
【基金】：国家留学基金委(CSC)资助
【分类号】：B502.231
【正文快照】： *本文系作者博士论文《理性的助手——柏拉图论羞耻感及相关情感》(Die Helfer der Vernunft—Schamund verwandte Emotionen bei Platon,München,2016)第一章的缩略版。T.布赫海姆(Thomas Buchheim)、M.埃勒尔(Michael Erler)、J.穆勒(J9rn Müller)、程炜等诸师友曾对本文

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