从“我”到“我们”:霍耐特社会自由观的历史叙事

发布时间：2018-03-19 19:30

本文选题：霍耐特　切入点：承认　出处：《哲学研究》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：霍耐特新著《自由的权利》沿袭承认理论,以黑格尔《法哲学原理》为蓝本,试图进一步向黑格尔主义复归,以此来克服现代政治哲学脱离社会分析而只关注纯粹规范原则的缺陷。霍耐特通过理论溯源和历史梳理,依次论述了消极自由和反思自由的来源、本质和界限,指出两种基于"我"的个体主义的自由观只具有规范性意义上的可能性,而非经验性意义上的现实性无法以此为基础构建社会正义秩序;只有黑格尔的基于相互承认关系并因此强调"我们"的社会自由观才真正具有现实性。霍耐特正是以此为起点在"个人关系""市场经济"和"民主决策"三个机制性领域上进行规范性的重构。但从全书论证来看,霍耐特未能充分地给现存社会机制提供一种合理性论证和规范一致性论证。
[Abstract]:Honet's new book, the right to Freedom, follows the theory of recognition and attempts to return to Hegel's Doctrine of philosophy of Law, based on Hegel's philosophy of Law. In order to overcome the defects of modern political philosophy from social analysis and focus only on the principle of pure norms, Honet, through theoretical traceability and historical combing, discusses the source, essence and boundary of negative freedom and introspection freedom in turn. It is pointed out that the two individualistic views of freedom based on "I" only have the possibility in the normative sense, but not the reality in the empirical sense, which cannot be used as the basis to construct the order of social justice. Only Hegel's view of social freedom based on mutual recognition and thus emphasizing "us" is truly realistic. It is from this point of view that Honet begins with "personal relationship", "market economy" and "democratic decision-making". The normative reconstruction is carried out in the field of system. But from the point of view of the whole book of argumentation, Honet failed to provide a reasonable argument and a normative consistency argument for the existing social mechanism.
【作者单位】：厦门大学马克思主义学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“全球视野下中国话语体系建构与中国话语权提升研究”(编号16BKS093);国家社会科学基金重大项目“当前主要社会思潮的最新发展动态及其批判研究”(编号16ZDA101)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：B516.59

【相似文献】