论他心问题—一项概念澄清工作

发布时间：2018-04-21 17:16

本文选题：他心 + 认识他心　；参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：他心问题是当代心灵哲学中一个被广为讨论的问题。一般地,它至少需要回答两个问题,即他心是否存在,以及如何认识他心;在这两个问题背后另一个问题是——他心是什么或者说心灵是什么。本文将这三类问题分别称之为"存在问题","认识问题",以及"本质问题"。通过对他心问题进行一个历史的回顾,本文意图表明现今这样的"他心问题"是如何在哲学史中一步一步形成的。在古希腊怀疑论中这只是一个感觉的相对性问题;在奥古斯丁时期这是关涉于知识与意见——对其他心灵的认识——的问题;在笛卡尔以怀疑论开始的近代哲学中,"其他心灵的存在"成了一个可以被质疑的问题,虽然这类质疑被近代大多数哲学家所有意无视,但是在后来却成为了他心问题的焦点;20世纪的哲学家,一面驳斥唯我论,一面尝试给出认识其他心灵的方案,但这些方案往往彼此排斥,使得目前的他心问题难以得到回答。在理清他心问题的历史脉络之后,本文逐次处理其中的三个问题。首先"他心是否存在",与其纠缠的是唯我论问题(包括怀疑论)。按照对"他心"质疑的不同程度和方面,可分为存在论的唯我论,认识论的唯我论和方法论的唯我论。在对各种不同唯我论的观点进行分析澄清后,本文认为他心是否存在的问题一部分表现为无根据的形而上学唯我论(即存在论的),一部分表现为自相矛盾的认识论唯我论,而剩下的一部分又可以被转化为他心如何认识的问题。对于第二个问题——"如何认识他心",本文比较了当代以来各种试图解释如何认识他心的不同方式,维特根斯坦式的直接展现、胡塞尔式的同感理论和密尔以来的类比推理传统,以及大众心理学的理论理论(TT)和模仿理论(ST,包括具身模仿EST),这些解决方案彼此驳斥,因此被认为是不相容的和矛盾的。但通过从以下三个方面——认识他心的可能性,认识他心的方法,对他心的认识属于何种知识——对这些争论进行分析,结果表明它们的不同并不是相互矛盾,相反,他们之间具有内在联系,并且各自具有一定的合理性。原因有两个:其一是这些争论并不在同一个层面上;其二是心灵内容本身是多样的——如感觉经验、认知概念、意愿等等。维特根斯坦式的直接展现论尝试为认识他心的可能性提出理由,以此拒绝怀疑论,而不是想提供一种认识他心的方法。类比推理论证和TT对于认识他人心灵的认知概念比ST或EST更具解释力;同感理论和ST或EST在解释感觉类心灵状态(如体验)时,比类比推理和TT更合理。而对其他心灵的认识既可以是直接的也可以是间接的,这也与心灵的不同内容有关。最后针对"心灵是什么"这个问题,当代心灵哲学中各种心灵理论对心灵的解释归结起来有两种倾向——还原论和主观论,即或者将心灵还原为行为或物质运动,或者将心灵理解为主体特有的内在经验,前者是消除了心灵,后者则是神秘化了心灵。从心灵这一概念在哲学史上的使用来看,造成当代心灵理论的原因在于将心灵纯粹视为活动。在近代之前,心灵包括两层意思:严格上仅仅指具有理智思维的东西;广义上指包括感知、思维、欲望、意志等一系列活动的东西。而近代哲学之后,心灵的意义从一个包含活动的主体变成了活动本身,即心灵指感觉活动或理智活动。就他心问题的背景而言,还原论和主观论都是需要避免的,也即是说对"心灵"概念适当的理解应该是包含理智和感觉等活动的东西,而不能被还原为活动本身。
[Abstract]:His heart problem is a widely discussed question in contemporary philosophy of mind. Generally, it needs to answer at least two questions, that is, whether his heart exists, and how to understand his heart; the other question behind the two questions is what his heart is or what the mind is. This article calls these three kinds of questions as "the problem of existence" respectively. Through a historical review of his heart problem, this article is intended to show how the "problem of his heart" is formed step by step in the history of philosophy. In the ancient Greek Skepticism, it was only a feeling of relativity; in the Augustin period it was related to knowledge and opinion - The question of the understanding of other souls; in Descartes's modern philosophy that began with scepticism, "the existence of other souls" became a question that could be questioned, although this kind of doubt was ignored by most modern philosophers, but later became the focus of his heart problem; the philosopher in twentieth Century refutes the only one. On the other hand, I try to give a solution to the understanding of other minds, but these schemes often exclude each other, making his current heart problem difficult to answer. After clarifying the historical context of his heart problem, this article deals with three of them one by one. First, "whether his heart exists or not" is a matter of our theory (including skepticism). According to the different degrees and aspects of the question of "his heart", it can be divided into the existentialism, the ontological theory and the methodology of the epistemology. After the analysis and clarification of various standpoints of different theories, this article holds that the question of whether his heart exists is a metaphysical theory of Metaphysics (that is, existentialism), a part of the theory of the existence of his heart. It shows a paradoxical Epistemological Rationalism, and the remaining part can be transformed into the question of how his heart knows. For the second question, "how to know his heart", this article compares the different ways of trying to explain how to understand his heart, the direct display of Wittgenstein's style, and the Husserl sense of the same sense. The theory of analogical reasoning and the theory of mass psychology (TT) and the theory of imitation (ST, including the imitation of EST), which are dismiscible and contradictory to each other, are considered incompatible and contradictory. But through the following three aspects: the possibility of understanding his heart, the method of understanding his heart, and the understanding of his heart What kind of knowledge - the analysis of these arguments shows that their differences are not conflicting. On the contrary, they have internal relations and have certain reasonableness. There are two reasons: one is that these arguments are not at the same level, and the other is the diversity of the spiritual content itself, such as sensory classics. Wittgenstein's theory of direct representation attempts to make a reason for the possibility of understanding his heart, so as to refuse scepticism, rather than to provide a way of understanding his heart. Analogical reasoning and TT are more explanatory to the cognitive concept of understanding others' minds than ST or EST; and the theory of sympathies and the solution of ST or EST in the solution. The mental state of the senses (like experience) is more reasonable than analogical reasoning and TT. The understanding of other minds can be both direct and indirect, which is also related to the different contents of the mind. Finally, there are two kinds of mental theories in the philosophy of the mind that come down to the question of "what is the mind". To the theory of reductionism and subjectivism, that is, to restore the mind to behavior or physical movement, or to understand the mind as the intrinsic experience of the subject, the former is the elimination of the mind, the latter is the mystery of the mind. From the use of the concept of the mind in the history of philosophy, the reason for the creation of contemporary psychic theory lies in the pure view of the mind. Before modern times, the mind includes two layers of meaning: it is strictly only something with rational thinking; in a broad sense it refers to a series of activities, such as perception, thinking, desire, and will. After modern philosophy, the meaning of the mind becomes the activity itself from the subject containing the activity, that is, the activity of the mind and the activity of reason. As far as the background of his heart problem is concerned, both reductionism and subjectivism need to be avoided, that is to say that the proper understanding of the concept of "mind" should be something that includes activities such as sense and sense, and can not be reduced to activity itself.

【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B017

【参考文献】