先验意识主体的具身化——胡塞尔先验现象学视野下的身体问题

发布时间：2018-05-24 04:45

  本文选题：先验意识 + 构成　； 参考：《哲学动态》2017年06期

【摘要】：在胡塞尔那里,身体问题分为相互关联的两个方面:身身关系和身心关系。身身区分即主观身体与客观身体之分,它源自对身体的双重性经验,典型地体现在触觉的可逆性中,是重新思考身心、主客、意识与自然这三对二元关系的重要契机。身心关系问题讨论的核心为"先验自我是可以不依赖经验自我而独存还是必然具身化"。就对身体现象学的贡献而言,胡塞尔"主客观身体"这一细致区分更具开创意义;就先验现象学本身而言,身心关系又较之身身关系更为根本。
[Abstract]:The distinction between body and body is the distinction between subjective body and objective body, which originates from the dual experience of body, and is typically reflected in the reversibility of touch. It is an important opportunity for rethinking the dualistic relationship between body and mind, subject and object, consciousness and nature. The core of the discussion of the relationship between body and mind is whether the transcendental self can exist independently of the experiential self or must have the body. In terms of his contribution to the phenomenology of body, Husserl's careful distinction of "subjective and objective body" is of more pioneering significance; in terms of transcendental phenomenology itself, the relationship between body and mind is more fundamental than that of body.
【作者单位】： 重庆理工大学马克思主义学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“胡塞尔伦理现象学研究”(16CZX0427)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：B516.52
，

本文编号：1927731