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意欲现象学的开端与发展——普凡德尔与胡塞尔的共同尝试

发布时间:2018-10-26 19:23
【摘要】:亚历山大·普凡德尔(A.Pf?nder)和舍勒一样,都可以主张自己是现象学运动的共同发起人。如果在胡塞尔那里得到展开的主要是认知现象学或知性现象学,那么舍勒所思考的就主要是情感现象学或感受现象学,而普凡德尔则从一开始所指向的就是意欲现象学或意志现象学。意欲现象学研究的一个重要特点在于:在意欲分析中蕴涵着对意识的结构研究和发生研究两方面的可能性,而且因此也进一步蕴涵着对从理论意向性到实践意向性,或者也可以说,从实践意向性到理论意向性的意识发生研究的双重可能性。因而可以说,意欲现象学在此意义上构成整个意识现象学研究的多重意义上的起点。
[Abstract]:Like Scheler, A.Pf?nder could claim to be a co-founder of the phenomenological movement. If what is developed in Husserl is mainly cognitive phenomenology or cognitive phenomenology, then what Shiller thinks about is mainly affective phenomenology or sensational phenomenology. From the beginning, he pointed to the phenomenology of intention or the phenomenology of will. An important characteristic of phenomenological study of intentionality lies in the possibility of studying the structure and occurrence of consciousness in the analysis of intension, and thus further implying the intentionality from theory to practice. Or it can be said, from the practical intentionality to the theoretical intentionality of consciousness occurrence research dual possibility. So it can be said that phenomenology of intention constitutes the starting point of the study of phenomenology of consciousness in this sense.
【作者单位】: 中山大学哲学系、现象学研究所;
【分类号】:B089


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