康德道德哲学中双重世界的区分

发布时间：2019-03-06 20:43

【摘要】：在《道德底形上学之基础》第三章中,为了实践目的,康德提出感性世界与理知世界的区分。根据《道德底形上学之基础》(以下简称GMS),感性世界和理知世界既可以是两个世界,也可以是人看待自身的两种方式。康德的理论哲学与实践哲学都对感性世界和理知世界做出区分。在理论哲学中,除了解决二律背反外,这一区分最重要的作用是为实践哲学腾出位置。通过感性世界和理知世界的区分,康德解决了道德律与自由之间的循环论证问题,并通过这一区分试图论证道德律作为先天综合命题的可能性。尽管最终康德断言我们对理知世界一无所知,因而也对自由一无所知,所以道德律作为一项令式的可理解性仍然是一个问题,但至少在消极的意义上遏制了道德虚无主义的威胁。
[Abstract]:In Chapter 3, the basis of moral metaphysics, for practical purposes, Kant puts forward the distinction between the perceptual world and the rational world. According to "the foundation of moral metaphysics" (hereinafter referred to as "GMS), perceptual world" and "rational world") can be both two worlds, but also can be two ways of people to view themselves. Kant's theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy distinguish the perceptual world from the rational world. In theoretical philosophy, apart from solving the antinomy, the most important role of this distinction is to make room for practical philosophy. Through the distinction between the perceptual world and the rational world, Kant solved the problem of circular argumentation between moral law and freedom, and tried to prove the possibility of moral law as a innate comprehensive proposition through this distinction. Although Kant eventually asserted that we knew nothing about the world of understanding and therefore freedom, the comprehensibility of moral law as a decree was still a problem. But at least in a negative sense, it curbs the threat of moral nihilism.
【作者单位】：中山大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B516.31

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