反贪污贿赂的经济学分析

发布时间：2018-03-11 04:22

本文选题：反贪污贿赂　切入点：经济学分析　出处：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：贪污贿赂行为是人类社会的通病,无论是历史还是现世,无论是国内还是国外,反贪污贿赂都是须严阵以待的法学、政治学命题。由于反贪污贿赂天然的法律性,及其浓重的政治意味,人们往往会忽略经济、经济学与反贪污贿赂的重要联系。然而,不仅贪污贿赂“以权谋私”行为本身通常以经济的形式表现出来,其直接的危害也恰恰反映在经济上。甚而,贪污贿赂行为的本质是对各类有限资源的掠夺和交换,其经济属性无法回避。与此相对,反贪污贿赂在法律、政治使命外,也负有经济使命—不仅在于挽回经济损失、维护经济秩序,反贪污贿赂本身也无法摆脱其经济代价是否合理、成本与收益是否相匹配的经济考验。也可以说,经济学为我们提供了另一个审视贪污贿赂与反贪污贿赂的视角,给我们创造了另一个检验反贪污贿赂成功高效与否的评价标准。近年来,我国对反贪污贿赂越来越重视,在物质和政策上对其投入也不可谓不多,然而国内公众和国际社会对我国反贪污贿赂的效果并不满意。在透明国际的清廉指数排名中,我国仍属于“比较腐败”国家的行列。近期网络爆出的“表哥”和“房叔”事件更是引发了民众对我国反贪污贿赂低效益的叩问。因此,我们需要反思我国对反贪污贿赂的社会投入未达到预期效果的原因何在?以及如何提高反贪污贿赂的效益?本文的研究背景即是目前对贪污贿赂犯罪的重治无效,由此提出反贪污贿赂成本与收益不相符的假设,通过经济学分析的方法论证该假设,查找造成该现象的原因,大胆设想更为高效合理的反贪污贿赂模式,最后得出结论。本文正文分为四章。第一章为反贪污贿赂的经济理性,以经济学为视角探讨贪污贿赂行为造成的直接经济损失和间接经济代价,探讨反贪污贿赂的经济目的。第二章为反贪污贿赂的效益分析,通过对最高检工作报告、上海反贪年报、以及国际组织的指数中数据的收集,来阐释反贪污贿赂的成本与收益,在此基础上分析我国目前的反贪污贿赂效益。第三章为反贪污贿赂效益的抑制因素,在对我国反贪污贿赂效益分析的基础上,反思抑制反贪污贿赂效益的原因,包括犯罪成本过低、制度滞后乏力,以及国际刑事司法合作不畅。第四章为反贪污贿赂的战略调整,通过借鉴国际经验,提出调整反贪污贿赂侧重点、整合反贪污贿赂组织的设想。
[Abstract]:Corruption and bribery is a common disease in human society. Whether in history or in the world, whether at home or abroad, anti-corruption and bribery is a legal and political proposition that must be confronted with in full force. Because of the natural legal nature of anti-corruption and bribery, With its strong political implications, people tend to ignore the important links between the economy, economics and the fight against corruption and bribery. However, not only is corruption and bribery "abuse of power" itself usually in the form of an economy. Its direct harm is also reflected in the economy. Even, the essence of corruption and bribery is the plundering and exchange of all kinds of limited resources, and its economic attribute cannot be evaded. In contrast, the anti-corruption and bribery is beyond the legal and political mission. There is also an economic mission-not only to recover the economic losses and maintain the economic order, but also to fight corruption and bribery itself without getting rid of the economic test of whether the economic costs are reasonable and whether the costs and benefits match. Economics provides us with another perspective to examine corruption and bribery and creates another evaluation standard to test the success and efficiency of anti-corruption bribery. In recent years, our country has paid more and more attention to the fight against corruption and bribery, and has put more money into it in terms of material and policy. However, the domestic public and the international community are not satisfied with the effectiveness of our country's fight against corruption and bribery. China is still one of the "relatively corrupt" countries. The recent "cousin" and "Uncle Fang" incidents on the Internet have even aroused people's question about the low efficiency of the fight against corruption and bribery in our country. We need to reflect on the reasons why our social investment in the fight against corruption and bribery has not achieved the expected results. And how to improve the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and bribery? The research background of this paper is that the current treatment of corruption and bribery is ineffective, so the assumption that the cost of anti-corruption and bribery is inconsistent with the income is put forward, and the hypothesis is proved by the method of economic analysis to find out the causes of this phenomenon. Boldly imagine a more efficient and reasonable anti-corruption and bribery model, and finally come to a conclusion. This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the economic rationality of anti-corruption and bribery. From the perspective of economics, this paper discusses the direct economic loss and indirect economic cost caused by corruption and bribery. Chapter two is an analysis of the benefits of combating corruption and bribery. The cost and benefits of combating corruption and bribery are explained through the collection of data from the Supreme Inspection report, the Shanghai Annual report on Corruption and Corruption and the index of international organizations. The third chapter is about the restraining factors of anti-corruption and bribery benefit. On the basis of the analysis of anti-corruption bribery benefit in China, the reasons of restraining corruption and bribery benefit are reconsidered. Chapter 4th is the strategic adjustment of anti-corruption and bribery. By drawing lessons from international experience, it proposes to adjust the focus of anti-corruption and bribery. The idea of integrating anti-corruption and bribery organizations.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D924.392;D90-059

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