阳奉与阴违：清代审转制度下地方官的规避策略

发布时间：2018-05-25 01:03

  本文选题：清代审转制度 + 规避策略　； 参考：《贵州大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：针对地方命盗重案,清代设计出了多重功能的审转制度,以期达到控制地方司法权,追求司法公正的目标。清代地方司法实践运作的考察却呈现出了另一幅图景,清代地方审转制度并没有达到设计的预期,甚至产生了制度背离的现象,清代地方官在审转制度下往往会采取一系列的规避策略,以摆脱制度的束缚。本文以清代审转制度下地方官的规避策略作为研究对象,通过对相关典籍,档案及案例资料的梳理,概括出地方官员采用的主要规避策略及其具体的实施手段,进一步分析其形成原因,最后则探讨其现实意义。本文的内容从结构上分为五个部分。绪论部分,对于相关研究的学术史进行回顾和分析,同时对于本文使用的主要概念进行界定,介绍使用的基本史料及采取的研究路径。第一章,对于清代审转制度的制度设计及其理念进行论述。制度设计方面主要包括了审转制度的历史沿革以及清代审转制度的具体规定。理念方面则从控权和慎刑两个方面进行了讨论,认为清代审转制度的目的在于控制地方司法权与追求司法公正之间的平衡。第二章,对于清代审转制度下地方官的规避策略进行论述。具体来看,其一是釜底抽薪的规避策略,即清代地方官会通过隐匿不报以及自行外结的手段,将案件排除于审转制度之外或者掌控在地方权限范围之内;其二是锻炼弥缝的规避策略,即通过对于司法文书的精心制作,达到天衣无缝,驳无可驳;其三是上下勾连的规避策略,即通过多种渠道,形成利益共同体,寻求上级的回护。第三章,对于地方官采取规避策略的原因进行了博弈分析。通过引入博弈论的相关理论,分别对于制度设计及制度运行建立博弈模型并求解,认为由于制度初创时成本收益的失衡,导致了制度预期博弈均衡的偏离,产生了预期之外的均衡。制度运行中片面地提升惩处力度并不能有效降低官员采取规避策略的概率,而随着惩处力度的不断增加,反而加重了这种偏离。结语部分,对全文进行简要回顾并论述了对于当代的启示意义,认为制度的设计必须充分考虑人的社会人与经济人的双重属性,摒弃过于理想化的设计,通过合理的制度设计,引导法官将自利行为与司法公正融为一体,将制度规范内化为法官的自主行为,从而最终实现制度与行动者的协调统一。
[Abstract]:In order to control the local judicial power and pursue the judicial justice, the Qing Dynasty designed a multi-function trial and transfer system in view of the serious case of local order theft. However, the investigation of the local judicial practice in the Qing Dynasty showed another picture. The local trial and transformation system in the Qing Dynasty did not meet the design expectations, and even produced the phenomenon of system deviation. Local officials in the Qing Dynasty often adopted a series of circumvention strategies in order to get rid of the shackles of the system. This paper takes the circumvention strategy of local officials under the system of trial and transfer in Qing Dynasty as the research object, through combing the relevant classics, archives and case data, summarizes the main circumvention strategies adopted by local officials and their specific means of implementation. Further analysis of the causes of its formation, and finally explore its practical significance. The content of this paper is divided into five parts from the structure. In the introduction part, the author reviews and analyzes the academic history of relevant research, defines the main concepts used in this paper, introduces the basic historical materials used and the research path adopted. The first chapter discusses the system design and concept of Qing Dynasty. The system design mainly includes the historical evolution of the system and the specific provisions of the system in the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, the author discusses from two aspects of control power and careful punishment, and thinks that the purpose of the system of trial and transfer in Qing Dynasty is to control the balance between the local judicial power and the pursuit of judicial justice. The second chapter discusses the circumvention strategy of the local officials in the Qing Dynasty. Concretely, one is the strategy of evading the basic salary, that is, the local officials of the Qing Dynasty will exclude the case from the system of trial and transfer or control the scope of local jurisdiction through the means of hiding and not reporting. The second is the strategy of circumventing the training seam, that is, through the careful production of judicial documents, to achieve seamless, refutable; third, up and down the evasive strategy, that is, through a variety of channels to form a community of interests, to seek the protection of the superior. In the third chapter, game analysis is made on the reasons why local officials take circumvention strategy. By introducing the relevant theory of game theory, the game model of system design and system operation is established and solved, and it is considered that the imbalance of cost and income in the initial stage of institution leads to the deviation of institutional expected game equilibrium. An unexpected equilibrium is created. The one-sided increase of punishment in the operation of the system can not effectively reduce the probability of officials taking circumvention strategy, but with the increasing of punishment, the deviation is aggravated. In the conclusion part, the author briefly reviews the full text and discusses the enlightening significance for the contemporary era. The author thinks that the design of the system must fully consider the dual attributes of the social person and the economic person, and abandon the design that is too idealized, and adopt the reasonable system design. To guide judges to integrate self-interest behavior with judicial justice, and to internalize institutional norms as judges' autonomous behavior, so as to achieve the coordination and unification of institutions and actors.
【学位授予单位】：贵州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D929
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本文编号：1931364