民间借贷中的暴力冲突:清代债务命案研究

发布时间：2018-06-20 11:25

本文选题：高利贷 + 超经济强制　；参考：《经济研究》2014年09期

【摘要】：本文利用清代1732—1895年间刑科题本中的近5千件命案记录,对民间借贷双方的关系进行了定量分析。研究表明,在借贷纠纷引发的命案中,一旦借贷利率高于零,被打死方为贷方的概率超过借方,而且利率越高,贷方死亡的可能性也随之增加。这说明一旦发生债务违约,贷方对包括生命风险在内的违约成本是不对称地更高。这一发现不仅与传统"高利贷剥削"论和放贷者"超经济强制"论的推断相反,而且从人命风险等交易违约成本的角度说明传统高利贷的成因。如果忽视契约执行时可能的暴力冲突所要求的风险溢价,人们可能难以完整解释民间借贷的高额利率。另外,本文也发现,对高利贷的道义批判可能加剧了借贷纠纷中的极端冲突。上述发现有助于人们更好地认识当下的民间金融改革。
[Abstract]:This paper makes use of the nearly 5,000 records of death cases from 1732 to 1895, and makes a quantitative analysis of the relationship between the two sides of the folk loan and loan. Studies show that in the case of a loan dispute, once the lending rate is above zero, the probability of being killed is higher than that of the borrower, and the higher the interest rate, the more likely the lender will die. This suggests that in the event of a default, the cost of default, including life risks, is asymmetrically higher. This finding not only contradicts the traditional theory of usury and the theory of super economic compulsion of lenders, but also explains the cause of traditional usury from the perspective of the cost of transaction default, such as the risk of human life. It may be difficult to fully explain the high interest rates on private lending if the risk premium required by possible violent conflict in the execution of the contract is ignored. In addition, we find that moral criticism of usury may aggravate the extreme conflict in loan disputes. The above findings help people to better understand the current private financial reform.
【作者单位】：耶鲁大学管理学院;中国人民大学清史研究所;河南大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“中国利率的变动与金融市场发展:一项历史计量与制度分析”的资助,项目批准号为70928002
【分类号】：K249;D929;D923

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