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立法中地方利益本位的政治经济学解释

发布时间:2019-06-04 13:00
【摘要】:当前我国立法中存在的地方利益本位问题,已成为一种制度化的现象,因而具有深厚的合法化基础和逻辑。对此,形式主义法学的解释存在明显限度。比较而言,财政分权条件下的政治问责机制、国家能力、去政治化的政治问题以及立法意识形态等政治经济学因素,对其制度化特征的形成更具决定性作用。要探讨立法中地方利益本位倾向的实质成因,还原出立法的实际运作过程,就必须确立一种与立法相关的政治经济学的"总体性"视角。
[Abstract]:At present, the problem of local interest standard in the legislation of our country has become an institutionalized phenomenon, so it has a profound legalization foundation and logic. In this regard, there are obvious limits to the interpretation of formalism. In comparison, the political accountability mechanism, national capacity, depoliticized political issues and legislative ideology under the condition of fiscal decentralization play a more decisive role in the formation of its institutionalized characteristics. In order to explore the substantive causes of the tendency of local interest standard in legislation and restore the actual operation process of legislation, it is necessary to establish a "overall" perspective of political economy related to legislation.
【作者单位】: 山东大学(威海)法学院;山东大学(威海)政府法制研究中心、立法研究服务基地、立法研究中心;
【基金】:国家社科基金一般项目“地方立法的精细化研究”(17BFX162)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】:D920.0


本文编号:2492743

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