国际气候合作中的国家博弈与立法

发布时间：2018-02-24 12:16

本文关键词： 气候合作博弈成本-收益国际环境法　出处：《河北经贸大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：国际气候合作已从科学研究阶段延伸至气候公约的谈判、履行阶段,目前已初显成效,国际社会围绕减排方案已经签署并生效了诸如《联合国气候变化框架公约》、《京都议定书》、《巴厘岛路线图》、《哥本哈根协议》、《坎昆协议》等若干国际公约,缔约国在减排政策与减排行动上不断修正策略的谈判本质是国家间的谈判博弈。鉴于国家行为体的理性假设,在国际气候合作问题上不一定为增进集体利益采取一致的合作策略。由于公共物品的非排他性,不合作的国家也能同等程度的享用其他国家提供的公共物品,导致国际气候合作出现“供给不足”、“搭便车”的制度困境。本文在借鉴相关研究成果的基础上,从博弈理论和“成本收益”理论的角度出发,系统分析国际气候合作中出现的问题根源及解决方案。本文首先分析国际气候变化的“自然属性公共物品”的特性,阐释国际气候合作的必要性。通过考察国际气候谈判的历史进程,阐述国际气候谈判的实质是缔约国国家利益间的博弈。其次,阐述国际气候谈判格局变化的国家(利益集团)博弈本质,主要分析六种基本博弈,归纳时间、数目、收益分配、谈判民主制以及主权国家政策的互动影响等国际气候合作成败的博弈因素。在气候谈判的过程中协调各国的国家利益难度凸显,建立公平合理的谈判机制是保证国际气候合作成效的关键。另外,运用“成本-收益”的经济学分析方法分析气候变化国际公约的缔约谈判、履约机制和国内实施以及对“成本-收益”的程序价值的论述,降低减排成本,完善减排方案,提高国际气候条约履约成效。最后,运用历史考察、比较分析的方法分析国际气候合作中的主要国家政策与立法现状,进而从协调我国生存权、发展权和环境权的角度,重点阐述中国在气候谈判中的基本立场、中国气候变化战略的优先行动领域及中国应对气候变化的立法构建。
[Abstract]:International climate cooperation has been extended from the stage of scientific research to the negotiation and implementation of the UNFCCC, and is now beginning to show results. The international community has signed and entered into force a number of international conventions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Road Map, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreement, etc. The negotiating nature of the parties' constantly revising their strategies in terms of emission reduction policies and actions is essentially a negotiation game between countries. In view of the rational assumptions of national actors, International climate cooperation is not necessarily a coherent cooperative strategy for the collective good. Because of the non-exclusivity of public goods, non-cooperative countries have equal access to public goods provided by other countries, This paper, based on the relevant research results, starts from the point of view of game theory and cost-benefit theory, and leads to the system dilemma of "insufficient supply" and "free rider" in international climate cooperation. Systematically analyze the root causes and solutions of the problems in international climate cooperation. This paper first analyzes the characteristics of "natural attributes of public goods" of international climate change, and explains the necessity of international climate cooperation. The essence of the international climate negotiation is the game between the national interests of the parties. Secondly, the essence of the national (interest group) game with the change of the international climate negotiation pattern is expounded, and the six basic games are analyzed, including induction time, number and income distribution. Negotiation democracy and the interaction of sovereign state policies are the game factors of the success or failure of international climate cooperation. It is difficult to coordinate the national interests of various countries in the process of climate negotiations. The establishment of a fair and reasonable negotiating mechanism is the key to ensuring the effectiveness of international climate cooperation. In addition, the "cost-benefit" economic analysis method is used to analyze the negotiations on the conclusion of international conventions on climate change. The implementation mechanism and domestic implementation, as well as the procedural value of "cost-benefit", reduce the cost of emission reduction, perfect the scheme of emission reduction, and improve the performance of international climate treaties. The comparative analysis method analyzes the current state of national policies and legislation in international climate cooperation, and then expounds China's basic position in climate negotiations from the perspective of coordinating China's rights to subsistence, development and environment. Priority areas for action in China's climate change strategy and legislation to address climate change in China.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996.9

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