《SCM协定》中补贴利益的认定问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 13:55

本文选题：补贴利益　切入点：利益接受者　出处：《武汉大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：“利益”是《SCM协定》规定的补贴定义中两个不同的法律要素之一。作为补贴定义的核心要素,“利益”与“财政资助”一起被用来认定补贴是否存在。如果财政资助的接受者获得了比从市场上能够获得的更有利的条件,就产生了《SCM协定》第1.1条意义上的“利益”。“利益”并非抽象的概念,它隐含着某种比较,比较的侧重点在于利益的接受者而不是授予财政资助的机关。利益必须由接受者或受益者能够接受或者受益,并使得接受者处于比没有接受财政资助之前“更好”的地位,而确定接受者是否比它本来应处于的更有利的情况的适当依据是“市场”。作为解释第1.1(b)条“利益”的有关上下文,《SCM协定》第14条规定的市场基准是判断利益的接受者是否因为财政资助而获得较市场上更为有利的条件的准则。在认定补贴利益存在与否时,提供国或购买国市场中的私营价格是调查机关必须使用主要基准。但是如果市场上的私营价格由于政府所扮演的占优势的角色而被扭曲,调查主管机关可以使用提供国或购买国私营价格以外的替代基准以确定财政资助的条件是否优于市场条件。不过,在反补贴调查中,替代基准往往很容易被调查主管机关滥用而成为一个核心的争议问题,尤其是如何判断替代基准可以取代主要基准,以及如何选定具体的替代基准等问题,至今仍然没有明确的答案。至于补贴的利益传递问题,《SCM协定》并没有对此作出明确规定,对于补贴利益是否以及在何等程度上传递至交易后或私有化后的产品或企业,缺乏一致的判断标准。实践中,补贴利益的确可能经由常规交易和公平市场价格而消除,但并非当然自动消除,必须视个案情况认定补贴利益是否己实际上被传递。我国经济目前仍然是以国有经济为主,政府在市场上往往扮演重要角色,国有企业和国有商业银行广泛参与经济活动,导致市场基准很可能被认定受到扭曲而适用国外的替代基准,因而在应对外国对中国出口产品反补贴调查中处于非常不利的地位。但是,对于上诉机构在适用和解释《SCM协定》第14条时关于替代基准所得出的结论,尤其是《入世议定书》第15(b)条,要从根本上改变难度比较大。不过,在某些具体方面应该仍然可以采取一些应对措施或者提出自己的合理主张,将替代基准被滥用的可能性和不利影响限制在最低限度。此外,我国应尽快在《反补贴条例》及其配套规章中对上游补贴问题作出规定,尽早填补法律漏洞,使调查主管机关在反补贴调查中有法可依。
[Abstract]:"interest" is one of the two different legal elements in the definition of subsidy under the SCM Agreement. As the core element of the definition of subsidy, "interest" is used together with "financial assistance" to determine whether a subsidy exists. The recipient of the aid received more favourable conditions than could be obtained from the market, "interest" in the sense of Article 1. 1 of the SCM Agreement. "interest" is not an abstract concept. It implies some comparison. The focus of the comparison is on the recipient of the benefit rather than on the organ that grants the financial assistance. The benefit must be accepted or benefited by the recipient or the beneficiary and put the recipient in a "better" position than before the recipient does not receive the financial assistance. The appropriate basis for determining whether the recipient is in a better position than it should be is the "market". As a relevant context for interpreting Article 1.1 / b) "interest", the market benchmark set out in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement is the next step in determining the interest. Criteria for whether the recipient obtains more favourable conditions than in the market as a result of financial assistance. In determining whether a subsidy benefit exists or not, Private prices in the market of the supplier or buyer are the primary benchmark that the investigating agency must use. But if the private price in the market is distorted by the dominant role of the Government, The investigating authority may use alternative benchmarks other than private prices in the country of supply or the State of purchase to determine whether the conditions for financial support are superior to market conditions... however, in countervailing investigations, Alternative benchmarks are often vulnerable to abuse by investigative authorities as a core issue of controversy, in particular how to determine whether alternative benchmarks can replace the main benchmarks and how to select specific alternative benchmarks, There is still no clear answer. As for the question of the transfer of benefits from subsidies, the SCM Agreement does not specify whether and to what extent the benefits of subsidies are passed on to post-transaction or privatized products or enterprises. Lack of a consistent standard of judgment. In practice, subsidy benefits may indeed be eliminated through conventional trading and fair market prices, but not automatically, of course. Depending on the individual case, we must determine whether the subsidy benefits have actually been transferred. At present, our economy is still dominated by the state-owned economy, the government often plays an important role in the market, and state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks are extensively involved in economic activities. Market benchmarks are likely to be found distorted to apply foreign alternative benchmarks and are therefore at a very disadvantage in responding to foreign countervailing investigations on Chinese exports. The conclusions reached by the appellate bodies when applying and interpreting Article 14 of the SCM Agreement on alternative benchmarks, in particular Article 15B of the Protocol on accession to the WTO, are more difficult to fundamentally change. There should still be specific areas where some response measures or legitimate claims can be made to minimize the possibility and adverse effects of the abuse of alternative benchmarks... in addition, As soon as possible, China should make provision for the upstream subsidy in the "countervailing regulations" and its supporting regulations, fill the legal loophole as soon as possible, so that the investigating authorities can abide by the law in the countervailing investigation.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D996.1

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