清洁发展机制下的减排量买卖协议法律问题研究
发布时间:2018-04-22 08:52
本文选题:清洁发展机制项目 + 核证减排量 ; 参考:《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:清洁发展机制是一种市场机制,《京都议定书》设计这种机制(以及联合履行、排放贸易两种市场机制)的目的在于协助《联合国气候变化框架公约》附件Ⅰ国家实现其量化的限制和减少排放的承诺,并使得实施清洁发展机制项目的发展中国家得到投资或技术转让,实现可持续发展。该机制的核心环节在于,将清洁发展机制项目所产生的核证减排量转让给附件一国家或该国负有减排义务的主体。 自2004年以来,中国在清洁发展机制项目市场的市场份额始终处于领先地位,同时也是核证减排量的最大卖方。但中国清洁发展机制项目的实施方在谈判中仍无法掌握话语权,受制于买方的定价;在市价低迷时面临买方毁约的风险。这不禁让人怀疑,中国的清洁发展机制项目开发者是否从相关项目中获得了可能的最大收益;如果没有,又是哪些因素阻碍了中国清洁发展机制项目更好的发展。 本文共分为五部分。 第一章首先介绍调整清洁发展机制项目的国际法规范、国内法规范,随后介绍项目的开发、运营和产生核证减排量的流程,以及基于项目的核证减排量交易与其他碳交易模式的区别和联系。从对上述国际法规范和项目流程的分析可以看出,规则和程序在清洁发展机制项目中的重要性,也表明自该项目产生、最终由执行理事会签发的核证减排量是制度拟制的产物——从而为下一章有关核证减排量性质的讨论奠定基础。在对国内相关法规的讨论中,笔者将对中国法律未界定核证减排量权属、限制项目实施机构资格作出评论。 第二章讨论的是核证减排量交易与清洁发展机制项目运营的之间的关系。笔者将首先界定核证减排量、核证减排量协议的定义、分析其性质。通过对相关法律规定的解读和比较法研究,笔者认为核证减排量是一种法定权利,可以作为物权客体;核证减排量协议是买卖远期碳信用的长期协议,该协议的不同阶段均需要不同第三方的协助。随后的讨论围绕减排量买方在清洁发展机制项目中可能的角色展开,并分析各自利弊。最后,笔者对于“单边开发”这种项目开发模式给中国项目实施机构带来的风险和限制进行探讨。 第三章是对核证减排量协议条款的分析、评述。该章将首先对核证减排量交易中需要考虑的制度性风险和项目风险作概括性描述,随后有关主要条款的逐条研究将参照《核证减排量购买协议通用条款》、《清洁发展机制减排量购买协议》及《核证减排量买卖协议(模板)》这三份核证减排量买卖领域的标准协议展开,并按照交易实践中的惯常做法,以英国法为准据法进行分析,笔者力求对于分析中对买卖双方的利益、风险均有所兼顾。 第四章讨论的是《京都议定书》第一承诺期之后,核证减排量交易的前景。尽管《京都议定书》第二承诺期将于2013年1月1日开始,但这并没有改变核证减排量市场低迷和买方信心不足的现状。笔者分析了核证减排量交易(及作为其基础的清洁发展机制)所面临的挑战、买卖双方的应对之道,并针对中国政府和项目实施机构给出建议。 第五部分为结语。
[Abstract]:The clean development mechanism is a market mechanism. The design of the Kyoto Protocol (and the joint implementation of the two market mechanisms for emissions trading) is aimed at assisting the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change (UN Framework Convention on climate change), Annex I, to achieve its commitment to quantifying and reducing emissions, and to implement the development of CDM projects. The core of the mechanism is to transfer the certification reductions generated by the CDM project to the annex one country or the country that has the responsibility to reduce the emission reduction obligations.
Since 2004, China has always been in the leading position in the clean development mechanism market market share, and is also the largest seller of certification reduction. However, the implementation of China's clean development mechanism project is still unable to grasp the right of discourse in the negotiation, and is subject to the buyer's pricing; the risk of the buyer's destruction when the market price is low. It helps to wonder whether China's clean development mechanism project developers have obtained the greatest possible benefit from the related projects; if not, what are the factors that have hindered the better development of China's CDM projects.
This article is divided into five parts.
The first chapter introduces the norms of the international law for the adjustment of the CDM projects, the norms of domestic law, and then the development of the project, the process of operation and the production of certified emission reduction, and the difference and connection between the project based certification reduction transaction and the other carbon trading models. The importance of the rules and procedures in the CDM project also indicates that the amount of certified emission reduction issued by the Executive Council is the product of the system proposed by the Executive Council - the basis for the discussion of the next chapter on the nature of the certification reduction. Define the authority of certification emission reduction and comment on the qualification of project implementation agencies.
The second chapter discusses the relationship between the certification of the volume reduction transaction and the operation of the CDM project. First, the author will define the definition of the certification reduction, the definition of the agreement of the verification of the volume reduction, and the analysis of its nature. It is a long-term agreement on the sale of long-term carbon credit. The different stages of the agreement require the assistance of different third parties. The subsequent discussion around the possible role of the buyer in the clean development mechanism project and the analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the author of the "unilateral development" of the project development model. The risks and restrictions brought to Chinese project implementation institutions are discussed.
The third chapter is an analysis of the terms and conditions of the agreement. This chapter will first give a general description of the institutional risks and project risks that need to be considered in the transaction of the certification reduction volume. The standard agreement of the three areas of sale and sale of certifying reduction and displacement (template) is carried out and analyzed in accordance with the usual practice in the practice of the transaction and the British law as the applicable law. The author seeks to take care of the interests of both buyers and sellers in the analysis.
The fourth chapter discusses the prospects for the verification of reduced volume transactions after the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. Although the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will begin in January 1, 2013, it does not change the current situation of the market downturn in the certification reduction market and the lack of buyer's confidence. The challenges faced by the clean development mechanism, the response of buyers and sellers, and suggestions for Chinese government and project implementation agencies.
The fifth part is the conclusion.
【学位授予单位】:复旦大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D996.9
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