反大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资研究
发布时间：2018-09-16 21:08
【摘要】：大规模毁灭性武器以其巨大破坏能力,将人类战争的残酷性和毁灭性推向极致。冷战期间,大规模毁灭性武器的扩散主要集中在两大阵营的范围之内,基于对立的两大阵营固有的遏制力,扩散的范围和路径均相对狭窄。但是,冷战结束后,随着对立的双边主义演化成单极主义,大规模毁灭性武器的扩散非但没有得到有效的控制,相反却出现了扩散范围、扩散路径不断扩大的发展趋势。也就是说,为了控制扩散的蔓延,冷战期间的国际军控领域曾以“大国均势”的理论模型构筑起传统的防扩散机制,两个超级大国和两大军事阵营在尖锐的对抗中逐步建立起了一种核威慑和核恐怖的平衡,避免了核战争的爆发,维护了世界武器战略的稳定。然而,从20世纪90年代开始,国际恐怖主义所追求的最大化杀伤效果与大规模毁灭性武器的巨大杀伤能力相互交集,恐怖组织控制或渗透的一系列跨国有组织犯罪集团,甚至跨国公司和自然人,都参与到了大规模毁灭性武器技术、零部件、设备和原材料的交易之中。这一现象致使恐怖组织与恐怖武器结合的趋势愈加明显清晰。基于完善的组织结构、强大的财力和融资能力、多元武器购买渠道,核生化恐怖主义引发出的巨大的现实危险,影响到了世界绝大部分国家。在此意义上,当代人类生活可谓构建在文明与火山之间。大规模毁灭性武器私有化扩散表现出的参与主体多元、融资渠道多元、交易方式多元、武器来源多元等一系列全新特点规律,表现出完全不同于主权国家间的武器扩散状况。传统军控政策,无论是基本理论还是条约实践都受到了强烈的质疑。传统防扩散机制的核心理论——“确保相互摧毁”在核生化恐怖主义猖獗泛滥的后冷战时代,其“双边”、“对称”、“威慑”的控制逻辑丧失了基本的落实空间,迅速变得不堪一击,甚至于被彻底颠覆。究其原因,非国家行为体不同于主权国家,没有稳定居民和固定领土,无需担心实施恐怖袭击后会遭到无法承受的报复性打击。对于这种游离于传统军控机制范围之外的威胁,核国家乃至整个国际社会都无从威慑、无从谈判、无从应对。在防扩散条约体系上,传统军控条约的缔约方均为主权国家,义务主体均为主权国家,控制措施也仅着眼于以主权国家为单位的国与国之间,这就为从主权国家到非国家行为体之间的纵向、交叉的武器扩散留下了交易余地和规范空白,大规模毁灭性武器的私有化扩散在相当程度上无法受到有效的遏制。加之越来越多的国家在大国“核威慑”的阴影下“拥核自保”,成为恐怖武器的“潜在扩散源”,使得“国际核黑市已经达到了无所不包的程度”,①核技术和核武器走私的严重程度远远超出了人们的想象。所有这些,使得本来就是一种权宜之计的传统军控思想方法,在原料、技术、零部件的交易门槛越来越低,且呈现“组织化”、“全球化”的形势下,尤其显得捉襟见肘、苍白无力。从控制与反控制的角度看,与传统军控政策难以遏制武器私有化扩散现象一样,传统刑事政策在遏制犯罪上也面临着同样的难题与困境。当代社会的犯罪,与传统刑事政策的目的往往呈相反的发展趋势,刑罚的强度越高,犯罪的恶性程度就越严重；刑法惩罚的范围越是扩大,犯罪所涉及的领域就越是广泛；有利于犯罪的因素被控制得越是严密,犯罪的增长速度就越是加快。当前,“全球平均犯罪率已上升至3000/100000以上”,而部分北美国家的犯罪率较长时间内一直保持在7000/100000以上。②这一特殊的社会现实,对传统刑事政策的社会效果也提出了强烈的质疑。然而,自20世纪80年代以来,刑事政策及时提出了转换政策导向、改变政策路径的设想,重新定位了控制目标,找到了新的出路——反洗钱。基于对已经“组织化”、“全球化”的贩运毒品、走私人口、恐怖融资等以谋取巨额利益为目的或需要巨额资金来实施的犯罪不断恶化蔓延的担忧,刑事政策敏锐意识到,对于国际社会的特定犯罪而言,其真正的破坏力不在于犯罪行为本身,而在于年均逾3万亿美元洗钱总额背后所隐匿的巨大的破坏力量。于是,在短短的20多年中,反洗钱将传统刑事政策打击犯罪的重心由犯罪人、犯罪行为转向犯罪收益,再从监控非法资金来源拓展至监控特定资金流向和特定受益人。反洗钱的演进过程告诉我们,国际社会缔结大量的反洗钱公约,包含着明确的政策目的——以犯罪收益和犯罪融资为第一层次目标,以打击和控制衍生此类经济利益的上位犯罪为第二层次目标,以此削弱、瓦解和摧毁犯罪组织的经济能量。这一政策导向,已经逐步发展成为标新立异的标杆,体现出整个刑事政策导向和传统思想方法的彻底转换。与传统刑事政策通过对准犯罪行为和行为人来打击犯罪收效甚微相同,传统军控政策将控制目标对准主权国家和特定武器也不存在有效落实政策、控制扩散的空间和余地。现代科技的迅猛发展和信息传播的高效快捷,使得核生化武器技术、原料、零件的获取、研发和交易远比想象中要方便快捷,使得直接消灭武器获取的物质和技术基础成为空想。大量的原材料存储、原料管理的无序混乱、逐步降低的技术门槛、设备原料的多性用特征、频繁流动的科研人员,都为恐怖组织谋求大规模毁灭性武器大开方便之门。已经发生的核生化恐怖袭击和大量的刑事统计信息已经表明,部分恐怖组织已经具备了运用大规模毁灭性武器实施恐怖袭击的能力。这就给国际社会留下了一个严峻的问题：各国究竟应当如何防止愈演愈烈、猖獗泛滥并给人类社会带来巨大危险的大规模毁灭性武器的扩散?反洗钱金融行动特别工作组(Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering)英文缩写"FATF")立足于反洗钱的刑事政策立场,为国际社会指明了打击大规模毁灭性武器扩散的新方法——目标金融制裁。与传统军控思想方法不同,目标金融制裁不再沿袭传统政策着眼于武器扩散本身这一上位目标的防范；而是从下位行为入手,对准恐怖组织购买大规模毁灭性武器的巨额资金、对准拥有巨大财力和融资能力的恐怖组织,通过冻结和没收这两种严厉的金融制裁措施,在经济上对武器购买集团进行严厉封锁,在资金融通上对扩散融资进行严厉遏制,从而摧毁其获得武器的经济能量。可以说,目标金融制裁是在“均势平衡”与“武力威吓”之外的第三种控制大规模毁灭性武器扩散的政策路径。与国际社会的研究方法不尽相同的是,我国理论界长期以来将各类严重刑事犯罪的研究集中在规范学的范围之内,“以现行刑法为基础的注释性刑法理论研究已经形成空前繁荣的局面”,①对特定反社会行为的现象学研究,存在较大的理论空白。有鉴于此,立足于反洗钱刑事政策,开展通过反洗钱框架下的目标金融制裁措施来遏制大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资的交叉研究,有着积极的理论价值和实践意义。全文共分为六章。第一章全面阐述大规模毁灭性武器及其私有化扩散现象。第一节对大规模毁灭性武器的巨大杀伤性能进行介绍。大规模毁灭性武器主要包括核武器、生物武器、化学武器,及其运载工具——导弹。不同于冷战期间此类武器在主权国家间扩散,在后冷战时代,此类武器的获取和研发门槛降低,非国家行为体(恐怖组织、跨国有组织犯罪集团等)也积极参与到武器交易当中。第二节解读大规模毁灭性武器私有化、恐怖组织化的扩散现象。指出恐怖组织与恐怖武器相结合是历史必然,其获取武器渠道包括：自行研制或改造、走私和黑市交易、主权国家提供、主权国家散落民间、盗窃等。第二章分析评价反大规模毁灭性武器扩散传统机制。第一节回顾传统反扩散机制的演进,指出其在两次世界大战期间、冷战阶段、冷战后至今不同特点；介绍支撑传统反扩散机制的军控理论；剖析以不扩散核武器条约、禁止化学武器公约、禁止生物武器公约为支柱的传统反扩散法律体系及传统的反扩散措施；第二节分析指出传统反扩散机制的积极作用和存在不足——在应对当代大规模毁灭性武器私有化扩散问题上,其自身缺陷不断被放大和利用,历史局限性进一步凸显。第三章研究预测通过反洗钱刑事政策遏制大规模毁灭性武器扩散的思想方法、现实依据和理论可行性。第一节总结反洗钱形成的历史背景及其形成和发展过程,以及其所具备的的刑事政策功能。第二节论述反洗钱政策功能在应对恐怖主义融资中的拓展。第三节阐述运用反洗钱刑事政策控制大规模毁灭性武器扩散的可行性。第四章全面剖析目标金融制裁的基本原理,构建反大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资行动中的“制裁名单”判断机制。该章从“如何怀疑”、“如何相信”到“如何救济”三个步骤设计。第一节宏观分析目标金融制裁的基本定义、法律性质和主要类型。第二节依据一般思维方式确立“临时名单”和“最终名单”两个递进层次,分别对应“有理由怀疑”和“证据优先”的证明要求；提出对于最终列名对象,法律应当允许推定其交易目的。第三节考察相关案例和信息,设计“临时名单”的确定依据——交易的异常性指标,而后设计出武器交易的发现途径。第四节构建“最终名单”的确定方法。第五章全面阐述反洗钱框架下遏制大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资的措施——冻结和没收。第一节、第二节分别论述目标金融制裁的核心措施——冻结和最终目标——没收。第三节设计制裁对象的权利救济措施体系。第四节结合反恐融资实践,分析运用目标金融制裁打击特定反社会经济力量的国际实践。第六章对目标金融制裁的发展趋势进行预测。第一节讨论大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资的国际犯罪化可能。第二节在论述反社会非国家行为体相互间的经济驰援形成强大融资能力的基础上,预测通过目标金融制裁遏制大规模毁灭性武器扩散融资的政策功能。第三节结合目标金融制裁这一措施所蕴含的新危险犯观念,预测目标金融制裁将成为国际刑事司法应对犯罪的基本制裁方法。
[Abstract]:Weapons of mass destruction, with their great destructive power, have pushed the cruelty and destructiveness of human wars to the extreme. During the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was mainly concentrated in the scope of the two camps. Based on the inherent deterrent power of the opposing camps, the scope and path of proliferation were relatively narrow. With the development of opposing bilateralism into unipolarism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not been effectively controlled, on the contrary, the scope of proliferation has appeared and the path of proliferation has been expanding. The two superpowers and two military camps gradually established a balance between nuclear deterrence and nuclear terrorism in the sharp confrontation, avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war and maintaining the stability of the world weapons strategy. However, since the 1990s, international terrorism has pursued the maximum lethal effect. As a result of the intersection of the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction, a series of transnational organized criminal groups controlled or infiltrated by terrorist organizations, even transnational corporations and natural persons, are involved in the trade in weapons of mass destruction technology, components, equipment and raw materials. This phenomenon has led to terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons. The trend toward integration is becoming increasingly clear. Based on sound organizational structures, strong financial and financing capabilities, multiple weapons purchasing channels, and the enormous real dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, most countries in the world are affected. In this sense, contemporary human life is built between civilizations and volcanoes. The proliferation of arms privatization shows a series of new characteristics and laws, such as multi-participants, multi-financing channels, multi-trading methods and multi-sources of weapons, which are totally different from the situation of arms proliferation among sovereign states. In the Post-Cold War era when nuclear, biochemical and terrorism was rampant, the control logic of "bilateral", "symmetrical" and "deterrent" lost its basic space for implementation, quickly became vulnerable and even completely subverted. Without stable inhabitants and fixed territory, there is no need to worry about an unsustainable retaliatory strike after a terrorist attack. The nuclear states and the international community as a whole are unable to deter, negotiate or respond to this threat, which is outside the scope of traditional arms control mechanisms. All parties are sovereign states, the subjects of obligations are sovereign states, and the control measures are only between countries with sovereign states as their units. This leaves room for trade and regulatory gaps in the vertical cross-proliferation of weapons from sovereign states to non-state actors, and the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a considerable extent. In addition, more and more countries "embrace nuclear self-protection" under the shadow of the "nuclear deterrence" of big powers, and become the "potential source of proliferation" of terrorist weapons, making "the international nuclear black market has reached an all-inclusive level". The smuggling of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons is far more serious than people think. All these make the traditional arms control thought and method, which is a kind of expediency, become more and more difficult to control the private ownership of weapons with the traditional arms control policy from the angle of control and counter-control. Similar to the phenomena of chemical diffusion, the traditional criminal policy is faced with the same difficulties and dilemmas in curbing crime. Crime in contemporary society tends to have the opposite development trend with the purpose of the traditional criminal policy. The higher the intensity of penalty, the more serious the crime is; the wider the scope of criminal penalty, the more involved in the field of crime. At present, the average global crime rate has risen to more than 3000/100000, while the crime rate in some North American countries has been maintained at more than 7000/100000 for a long time. However, since the 1980s, criminal policy has promptly put forward the idea of changing policy orientation, changing policy path, repositioning control objectives, and finding a new way out - anti-money laundering. Concerns about the deteriorating spread of crimes committed for the purpose of obtaining huge profits or requiring huge sums of money have led criminal policy to realize that the real destructive power of a particular crime in the international community lies not in the crime itself, but in the tremendous destructive power hidden behind the total amount of money laundering exceeding $3 trillion annually. Therefore, in a short period of 20 years, anti-money laundering has shifted the focus of the traditional criminal policy against crime from the perpetrator to the criminal proceeds, and then expanded from monitoring illegal sources of funds to monitoring the flow of specific funds and specific beneficiaries. The evolution of anti-money laundering tells us that the international community has concluded a large number of anti-money laundering conventions, including This policy orientation has gradually evolved into a benchmark for innovation, reflecting the whole process. The traditional criminal policy has little effect on combating crime by targeting criminals and perpetrators. The traditional arms control policy aims at sovereign states and specific weapons, and there is no room for effective implementation of the policy and control of proliferation. The rapid development of modern science and technology With the rapid and efficient development and dissemination of information, the acquisition, R&D and trading of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, raw materials and parts are far more convenient and efficient than expected, making it a dream to eliminate the material and technical basis of weapons acquisition directly. Sexual characteristics and frequent flow of scientific researchers have opened the door for terrorist organizations to seek weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear, biochemical and biological terrorist attacks and a large number of criminal statistics have shown that some terrorist organizations have the ability to use weapons of mass destruction to carry out terrorist attacks. A serious question remains: how should countries prevent the proliferation of increasingly rampant, rampant and dangerous weapons of mass destruction? The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is based on anti-money laundering criminal policy. Different from the traditional arms control ideology, the target financial sanctions no longer follow the traditional policy of focusing on the prevention of weapons proliferation itself, but start from the subordinate behavior and purchase large-scale against terrorist organizations. The enormous funds of weapons of destruction, targeted at terrorist organizations with enormous financial and financing capabilities, impose severe economic blockades on arms purchasing groups by freezing and confiscating these two severe financial sanctions, and severely curb proliferation financing in the financing of funds, thereby destroying the economic energy of weapons acquisition. It is said that target financial sanctions are the third policy path to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in addition to "balance of power" and "threat of force". The annotated criminal law theory based on the law has formed an unprecedented prosperous situation. "(1) There is a big theoretical gap in the phenomenological study of specific anti-social behavior. In view of this, based on the anti-money laundering criminal policy, we should carry out targeted financial sanctions to curb the financing of weapons of mass destruction proliferation through the anti-money laundering framework. The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 gives a comprehensive account of weapons of mass destruction and their privatization and proliferation. Section 1 introduces the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction mainly include nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons and so on. Unlike the proliferation of such weapons between sovereign states during the cold war, the threshold for acquisition and R&D of such weapons has been lowered in the Post-Cold War era, and non-state actors (terrorist organizations, transnational organized criminal groups, etc.) have been actively involved in the arms trade. It is pointed out that the combination of terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons is a historical necessity. The channels of acquiring weapons include self-development or transformation, smuggling and black market trade, supply by sovereign states, dispersal of sovereign states among the people, and theft. The evolution of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism points out its different characteristics during the two world wars, during the cold war period and since the cold war; introduces the arms control theory supporting the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism; analyzes the traditional anti-proliferation legal system and the traditional anti-proliferation legal system supported by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The second section points out the positive role and shortcomings of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism. In dealing with the problem of the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its own shortcomings are constantly amplified and utilized, and its historical limitations are further highlighted. The first section summarizes the historical background of the formation of anti-money laundering and its formation and development process, as well as its criminal policy functions. The second section discusses the expansion of anti-money laundering policy functions in dealing with terrorism financing. The third section describes the use of anti-money laundering criminal policy control. Chapter IV analyzes the basic principles of targeted financial sanctions and establishes a "sanctions list" judgment mechanism in financing operations against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The chapter is designed from "how to doubt", "how to believe" to "how to remedy". Section 2 establishes two progressive levels of "provisional list" and "final list" according to the general thinking mode, which correspond to the proof requirements of "reasonable suspicion" and "evidence priority"; and proposes that the law should allow the presumption of the transaction purpose of the final listed object. Section III examines relevant cases and information, designs the basis for determining the "temporary list" - the abnormal indicators of transactions, and then designs the way to discover arms transactions. Section IV establishes the method for determining the "final list". Chapter V comprehensively expounds the measures to curb the financing of weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation under the framework of anti-money laundering - freezing. Settlement and confiscation. Section I and Section II discuss the core measures of targeted financial sanctions - freezing and ultimate goal - confiscation.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D99
，
本文编号：2244805
[Abstract]:Weapons of mass destruction, with their great destructive power, have pushed the cruelty and destructiveness of human wars to the extreme. During the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was mainly concentrated in the scope of the two camps. Based on the inherent deterrent power of the opposing camps, the scope and path of proliferation were relatively narrow. With the development of opposing bilateralism into unipolarism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not been effectively controlled, on the contrary, the scope of proliferation has appeared and the path of proliferation has been expanding. The two superpowers and two military camps gradually established a balance between nuclear deterrence and nuclear terrorism in the sharp confrontation, avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war and maintaining the stability of the world weapons strategy. However, since the 1990s, international terrorism has pursued the maximum lethal effect. As a result of the intersection of the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction, a series of transnational organized criminal groups controlled or infiltrated by terrorist organizations, even transnational corporations and natural persons, are involved in the trade in weapons of mass destruction technology, components, equipment and raw materials. This phenomenon has led to terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons. The trend toward integration is becoming increasingly clear. Based on sound organizational structures, strong financial and financing capabilities, multiple weapons purchasing channels, and the enormous real dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, most countries in the world are affected. In this sense, contemporary human life is built between civilizations and volcanoes. The proliferation of arms privatization shows a series of new characteristics and laws, such as multi-participants, multi-financing channels, multi-trading methods and multi-sources of weapons, which are totally different from the situation of arms proliferation among sovereign states. In the Post-Cold War era when nuclear, biochemical and terrorism was rampant, the control logic of "bilateral", "symmetrical" and "deterrent" lost its basic space for implementation, quickly became vulnerable and even completely subverted. Without stable inhabitants and fixed territory, there is no need to worry about an unsustainable retaliatory strike after a terrorist attack. The nuclear states and the international community as a whole are unable to deter, negotiate or respond to this threat, which is outside the scope of traditional arms control mechanisms. All parties are sovereign states, the subjects of obligations are sovereign states, and the control measures are only between countries with sovereign states as their units. This leaves room for trade and regulatory gaps in the vertical cross-proliferation of weapons from sovereign states to non-state actors, and the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a considerable extent. In addition, more and more countries "embrace nuclear self-protection" under the shadow of the "nuclear deterrence" of big powers, and become the "potential source of proliferation" of terrorist weapons, making "the international nuclear black market has reached an all-inclusive level". The smuggling of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons is far more serious than people think. All these make the traditional arms control thought and method, which is a kind of expediency, become more and more difficult to control the private ownership of weapons with the traditional arms control policy from the angle of control and counter-control. Similar to the phenomena of chemical diffusion, the traditional criminal policy is faced with the same difficulties and dilemmas in curbing crime. Crime in contemporary society tends to have the opposite development trend with the purpose of the traditional criminal policy. The higher the intensity of penalty, the more serious the crime is; the wider the scope of criminal penalty, the more involved in the field of crime. At present, the average global crime rate has risen to more than 3000/100000, while the crime rate in some North American countries has been maintained at more than 7000/100000 for a long time. However, since the 1980s, criminal policy has promptly put forward the idea of changing policy orientation, changing policy path, repositioning control objectives, and finding a new way out - anti-money laundering. Concerns about the deteriorating spread of crimes committed for the purpose of obtaining huge profits or requiring huge sums of money have led criminal policy to realize that the real destructive power of a particular crime in the international community lies not in the crime itself, but in the tremendous destructive power hidden behind the total amount of money laundering exceeding $3 trillion annually. Therefore, in a short period of 20 years, anti-money laundering has shifted the focus of the traditional criminal policy against crime from the perpetrator to the criminal proceeds, and then expanded from monitoring illegal sources of funds to monitoring the flow of specific funds and specific beneficiaries. The evolution of anti-money laundering tells us that the international community has concluded a large number of anti-money laundering conventions, including This policy orientation has gradually evolved into a benchmark for innovation, reflecting the whole process. The traditional criminal policy has little effect on combating crime by targeting criminals and perpetrators. The traditional arms control policy aims at sovereign states and specific weapons, and there is no room for effective implementation of the policy and control of proliferation. The rapid development of modern science and technology With the rapid and efficient development and dissemination of information, the acquisition, R&D and trading of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, raw materials and parts are far more convenient and efficient than expected, making it a dream to eliminate the material and technical basis of weapons acquisition directly. Sexual characteristics and frequent flow of scientific researchers have opened the door for terrorist organizations to seek weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear, biochemical and biological terrorist attacks and a large number of criminal statistics have shown that some terrorist organizations have the ability to use weapons of mass destruction to carry out terrorist attacks. A serious question remains: how should countries prevent the proliferation of increasingly rampant, rampant and dangerous weapons of mass destruction? The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is based on anti-money laundering criminal policy. Different from the traditional arms control ideology, the target financial sanctions no longer follow the traditional policy of focusing on the prevention of weapons proliferation itself, but start from the subordinate behavior and purchase large-scale against terrorist organizations. The enormous funds of weapons of destruction, targeted at terrorist organizations with enormous financial and financing capabilities, impose severe economic blockades on arms purchasing groups by freezing and confiscating these two severe financial sanctions, and severely curb proliferation financing in the financing of funds, thereby destroying the economic energy of weapons acquisition. It is said that target financial sanctions are the third policy path to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in addition to "balance of power" and "threat of force". The annotated criminal law theory based on the law has formed an unprecedented prosperous situation. "(1) There is a big theoretical gap in the phenomenological study of specific anti-social behavior. In view of this, based on the anti-money laundering criminal policy, we should carry out targeted financial sanctions to curb the financing of weapons of mass destruction proliferation through the anti-money laundering framework. The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 gives a comprehensive account of weapons of mass destruction and their privatization and proliferation. Section 1 introduces the enormous lethality of weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction mainly include nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons and so on. Unlike the proliferation of such weapons between sovereign states during the cold war, the threshold for acquisition and R&D of such weapons has been lowered in the Post-Cold War era, and non-state actors (terrorist organizations, transnational organized criminal groups, etc.) have been actively involved in the arms trade. It is pointed out that the combination of terrorist organizations and terrorist weapons is a historical necessity. The channels of acquiring weapons include self-development or transformation, smuggling and black market trade, supply by sovereign states, dispersal of sovereign states among the people, and theft. The evolution of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism points out its different characteristics during the two world wars, during the cold war period and since the cold war; introduces the arms control theory supporting the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism; analyzes the traditional anti-proliferation legal system and the traditional anti-proliferation legal system supported by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The second section points out the positive role and shortcomings of the traditional anti-proliferation mechanism. In dealing with the problem of the privatization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its own shortcomings are constantly amplified and utilized, and its historical limitations are further highlighted. The first section summarizes the historical background of the formation of anti-money laundering and its formation and development process, as well as its criminal policy functions. The second section discusses the expansion of anti-money laundering policy functions in dealing with terrorism financing. The third section describes the use of anti-money laundering criminal policy control. Chapter IV analyzes the basic principles of targeted financial sanctions and establishes a "sanctions list" judgment mechanism in financing operations against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The chapter is designed from "how to doubt", "how to believe" to "how to remedy". Section 2 establishes two progressive levels of "provisional list" and "final list" according to the general thinking mode, which correspond to the proof requirements of "reasonable suspicion" and "evidence priority"; and proposes that the law should allow the presumption of the transaction purpose of the final listed object. Section III examines relevant cases and information, designs the basis for determining the "temporary list" - the abnormal indicators of transactions, and then designs the way to discover arms transactions. Section IV establishes the method for determining the "final list". Chapter V comprehensively expounds the measures to curb the financing of weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation under the framework of anti-money laundering - freezing. Settlement and confiscation. Section I and Section II discuss the core measures of targeted financial sanctions - freezing and ultimate goal - confiscation.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D99
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本文编号：2244805
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