WTO补贴争端解决机制研究
发布时间：2018-11-11 10:31
【摘要】：补贴是世贸组织成员实施产业政策的重要工具之一。若受补贴产品给其他成员利益造成不利影响，补贴争端将不可避免地产生。入世以来，，涉及中国的补贴案件有9起。可以预见，随着中国产业政策的不断调整，涉及中国的补贴争端会不断增加。补贴争端具有与其他争端不同的特殊性。世贸组织规则规定解决补贴争端不仅应适用解决一般争端的程序，而且还应适用专门针对补贴争端的特殊与附加程序。本文重点阐述解决补贴争端中的特殊程序，也一并探讨了适用于补贴争端的一般程序。本文共分为引言、正文和结语三个部分，正文共有五章。 第一章为补贴争端产生的经济学分析。本章指出补贴争端的产生有着深刻的政治经济背景。一成员采取补贴措施有时是出于国民经济的战略考量，有时迫于民主政治的选票压力或受到利益集团的软硬兼施。因补贴措施而利益受损的其他成员自然要奋起反击，维护国家利益以及自身的政治利益，否则可能会引起国内选民和利益集团的不满，危及其政治前途。 第二章为补贴争端解决机制中的磋商程序。本章首先从国际公法的角度介绍了与磋商程序近似的谈判程序，进而阐述了适用于一般争端案件的世贸组织争端解决机制中的磋商程序，最后详细分析了针对补贴争端案件磋商程序中的特殊性规定以及专家组和上诉机构在实践中作出的与此有关的解释。 第三章为补贴争端解决机制中的审理程序。该章是文章的重点，共分为五节。本章阐述了补贴争端的加速程序、常设专家小组程序规则、搜集严重侵害信息程序等补贴争端中的特殊程序与补贴争端密切相关的专家组的设立要件与职权范围以及补贴争端的举证责任。 第四章为补贴争端解决机制中的执行措施。本章分析了一般争端中的撤销或修改不当措施、补偿以及报复措施等执行措施。以此为基础，本章着重探讨了补贴争端中撤销补贴与反措施两种主要的执行措施。 第五章为补贴争端解决程序中的中国实践。本章主要深入分析了中国—影响汽车进口零部件措施案和中国—涉及风力发电设备措施案中各争端当事方的举证责任，并检讨中国产业政策的合法性，总结中国参与补贴争端解决程序的经验教训。
[Abstract]:Subsidies are one of the important tools for WTO members to implement industrial policies. If subsidized products adversely affect the interests of other members, subsidy disputes will inevitably arise. Since China's entry into the WTO, there have been nine subsidy cases involving China. Predictably, as China's industrial policy continues to adjust, China's subsidy disputes will continue to increase. Subsidy disputes are different from other disputes. WTO rules stipulate that the settlement of subsidy disputes shall be governed not only by the procedures for the settlement of general disputes, but also by special and additional procedures specifically for subsidy disputes. This paper focuses on the special procedures in the settlement of subsidy disputes, as well as the general procedures applicable to subsidy disputes. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The first chapter is the economic analysis of subsidy disputes. This chapter points out that the existence of subsidy dispute has a profound political and economic background. A member's subsidies are sometimes based on national economic strategic considerations, sometimes under pressure from democratic votes or by interest groups. It is natural for other members who suffer from subsidy measures to fight back and defend their national interests and their own political interests, otherwise they may cause dissatisfaction among domestic voters and interest groups and endanger their political future. The second chapter is the consultation procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter first introduces the negotiation procedure similar to the consultation procedure from the perspective of public international law, and then expounds the consultation procedure in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism applicable to general dispute cases. Finally, the particularity of the consultation procedure in the case of subsidy dispute is analyzed in detail, as well as the explanations of the panel of experts and the appellate body in practice. The third chapter is the trial procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter is the focus of the article, a total of five sections. This chapter sets out the accelerated procedures for subsidy disputes, the rules of procedure of the standing expert Group, The establishment elements and terms of reference of the panel of experts, which are closely related to the subsidy dispute, and the burden of proof of the subsidy dispute. The fourth chapter is the implementation measures in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter analyzes the enforcement measures of revocation or modification of improper measures, compensation and retaliatory measures in general disputes. On this basis, this chapter focuses on the two main enforcement measures in subsidy disputes: withdrawal of subsidies and countermeasures. The fifth chapter is the practice of China in the procedure of subsidy dispute settlement. This chapter mainly analyzes the burden of proof of the parties to the dispute in the case of China-measures affecting imported parts of Automobile and China-involving measures for Wind Power Generation equipment, and reviews the legality of China's industrial policy. Summarize the experience and lessons of China's participation in the subsidy dispute settlement procedure.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D996.1
[Abstract]:Subsidies are one of the important tools for WTO members to implement industrial policies. If subsidized products adversely affect the interests of other members, subsidy disputes will inevitably arise. Since China's entry into the WTO, there have been nine subsidy cases involving China. Predictably, as China's industrial policy continues to adjust, China's subsidy disputes will continue to increase. Subsidy disputes are different from other disputes. WTO rules stipulate that the settlement of subsidy disputes shall be governed not only by the procedures for the settlement of general disputes, but also by special and additional procedures specifically for subsidy disputes. This paper focuses on the special procedures in the settlement of subsidy disputes, as well as the general procedures applicable to subsidy disputes. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The first chapter is the economic analysis of subsidy disputes. This chapter points out that the existence of subsidy dispute has a profound political and economic background. A member's subsidies are sometimes based on national economic strategic considerations, sometimes under pressure from democratic votes or by interest groups. It is natural for other members who suffer from subsidy measures to fight back and defend their national interests and their own political interests, otherwise they may cause dissatisfaction among domestic voters and interest groups and endanger their political future. The second chapter is the consultation procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter first introduces the negotiation procedure similar to the consultation procedure from the perspective of public international law, and then expounds the consultation procedure in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism applicable to general dispute cases. Finally, the particularity of the consultation procedure in the case of subsidy dispute is analyzed in detail, as well as the explanations of the panel of experts and the appellate body in practice. The third chapter is the trial procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter is the focus of the article, a total of five sections. This chapter sets out the accelerated procedures for subsidy disputes, the rules of procedure of the standing expert Group, The establishment elements and terms of reference of the panel of experts, which are closely related to the subsidy dispute, and the burden of proof of the subsidy dispute. The fourth chapter is the implementation measures in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter analyzes the enforcement measures of revocation or modification of improper measures, compensation and retaliatory measures in general disputes. On this basis, this chapter focuses on the two main enforcement measures in subsidy disputes: withdrawal of subsidies and countermeasures. The fifth chapter is the practice of China in the procedure of subsidy dispute settlement. This chapter mainly analyzes the burden of proof of the parties to the dispute in the case of China-measures affecting imported parts of Automobile and China-involving measures for Wind Power Generation equipment, and reviews the legality of China's industrial policy. Summarize the experience and lessons of China's participation in the subsidy dispute settlement procedure.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D996.1
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