我国光伏上网电价政策在WTO反补贴协定下的合规性研究
发布时间：2018-12-15 00:41
【摘要】：为支持光伏电的发展,我国自2013年起开始实施光伏上网电价政策。上网电价政策分为中央和地方两个层级,既包括人大制定的法律,也包括各级政府出台的地方性文件。从内容上看,该政策主要包括三部分内容:一是要求电网企业按照中央政府制定的标杆电价保价收购光伏电;二是要求电网企业按照中央政府的规定保量收购光伏电;三是允许地方政府对光伏电给予地方补贴。虽然该政策在福利经济学的"外部性"理论下具有一定合理性,且有利于光伏电的发展,但因其具有政府干预市场的性质,故其仍受到WTO《补贴与反补贴措施协议》("SCM协定")的规制。本文旨在结合SCM规则及有关专家组和上诉机构报告,分析我国现行光伏上网电价政策在SCM协定下的合规性。SCM协定规定了两种补贴类型,即可诉性补贴和禁止性补贴。构成可诉性补贴的措施需满足以下三个条件:1)该措施属于政府或公共机构提供的财政资助;2)该措施给予相关受众以利益;3)该措施需具有专向性。构成禁止性补贴的措施除需满足以上条件外,还需满足"视出口实绩为条件而给予补贴"或"使适用国产货物而非进口货物的情况为条件而给予补贴"这一条件。笔者认为,我国大部分地区实施的上网电价政策符合以上三个条件,属于可诉性补贴。第一,负责执行上网电价政策的电网企业因受到政府的"有意义控制"而属于"公共机构",而其购买光伏电的行为属于SCM第1.1(a)(1)条中"政府购买商品"这一类型的"财政资助"。第二,光伏上网电价政策使光伏发电企业获得利益。根据WTO上诉机构在"加拿大-可再生能源"案中的观点,判断是否获益应在相关产品市场中选择比较基准。由于光伏电在供给侧和需求侧都不能被传统能源所发的电所替代,因此在分析是否获益时,相关产品市场应为"光伏电市场",而比较基准则应为光伏电市场上的招标电价。通过对比光伏招标电价和光伏标杆电价,发现大部分地区的招标电价低于标杆电价,符合"给予利益"的要件要求。第三,光伏上网电价政策具有专向性,因为其仅适用于光伏发电企业。除此之外,部分地方政府根据上网电价政策给予光伏发电企业的地方性补贴构成禁止性补贴,因其要求只有使用本地光伏设备达到一定比例的企业才可以获得其补贴。根据以上分析可知,我国现行光伏上网电价政策之所以可以被认定为补贴,主要原因在于政府标杆电价高于招标电价。而之所以会出现这种情况,很大程度是因为我国目前的光伏发电技术还未完全成熟,仍处于发展阶段而尚未达到规模经济效应。如果断然降低标杆电价,虽符合了 SCM的规则,但不利于我国光伏产业的长远发展。此种状况体现了 SCM协定与可再生能源发展之间存在的潜在冲突。学界提出了三种化解该冲突的方案:一是通过谈判恢复并修改不可诉补贴;二是将GATT第20条适用于SCM协定;三是适用演进性思路对SCM协定进行解释。笔者认为,第三种方案是目前为止最可行的解决方案。
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D996.1
本文编号：2379619
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D996.1
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相关期刊论文 前2条
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2 卢现祥;柯赞贤;张翼;;论发展低碳经济中的市场失灵[J];当代财经;2013年01期
，本文编号：2379619
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