后危机时代资产证券化国际监管制度改革对我国的启示
发布时间：2018-12-28 08:54
【摘要】：本文从分析本次金融危机中资产证券化国际监管体系暴露的不足和缺陷入手,解读相关国际组织和欧美各国监管机构在本次金融危机后发布的相关修订意见和补充文件,对资本充足率监管、系统性风险监管、信用评级机构监管及信息披露监管四方面进行了改革。最终,结合我国资产证券化监管的现状及缺陷,着重阐述资产证券化国际监管制度的改革对中国资产证券化监管的启示。论文主要内容分为三章。 第一章阐述相关国际监管制度在金融危机中暴露的缺陷。首先,作为本次金融危机诱因的合成型资产证券化的含义和流程,其与传统型资产证券化相比扩大了金融风险。其次,当前相关国际监管制度的缺陷是对合成型资产证券化交易中新增风险的关注不够,对资产证券化等项目的资本计提不足；监管理念对资产证券化带来的系统性风险考虑不足；缺乏对信用评级机构的监管；没有对资产证券化中信息不对称问题的解决办法。 第二章分析金融危机后相关国际监管制度的改革。金融危机后,相关国际组织和欧美各国监管机构都发布了对原有资产证券化监管制度的修订意见和补充文件,对资本充足率监管、系统性风险监管、信用评级机构监管及信息披露监管四方面进行了改革。引入了杠杆率监管标准,增加了风险捕捉能力,完善了风险权重设计,提高了资本充足率监管标准；增加了宏观审慎监管,加强了流动性监管；加强了评级活动的独立性和可审性,明确了评级机构的法律责任；加强了基础资产、资产池转移和再证券化方面的信息披露。 第三章讨论上述改革对我国资产证券化监管的启示。对我国资产证券化监管现状的概括,缺陷是单一的资本充足率监管无法全面防范风险；对系统性风险监管缺失；对信用评级机构的监管制度不够完善；资产证券化定量信息披露制度不健全。改革的启示是：资本监管方面,不仅要加强资本充足率监管,还有增加杠杆率监管；风险监管方面,增加对系统性风险的监管；完善证券化信用评级制度；加强对资产证券化信息披露的监管力度。
[Abstract]:Starting with the analysis of the deficiencies and defects of the international regulatory system of asset securitization exposed in the financial crisis, this paper interprets the relevant revised opinions and supplementary documents issued by relevant international organizations and European and American regulators after the financial crisis. Capital adequacy regulation, systemic risk regulation, credit rating agency regulation and information disclosure regulation are reformed. Finally, combined with the current situation and defects of asset securitization supervision in China, the author emphasizes on the enlightenment of the reform of international supervision system of asset securitization to the supervision of asset securitization in China. The main content of the paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter describes the defects of the relevant international regulatory system in the financial crisis. Firstly, the meaning and process of synthetic asset securitization, which is the inducement of the financial crisis, expands the financial risk compared with the traditional asset securitization. Secondly, the defects of the current relevant international regulatory system are insufficient attention to the new risks in the transaction of synthetic asset securitization, insufficient capital collection of assets securitization and other items; The concept of supervision does not consider the systemic risks brought about by asset securitization; it lacks the supervision of credit rating agencies; and there is no solution to the problem of information asymmetry in asset securitization. The second chapter analyzes the relevant international regulatory system reform after the financial crisis. After the financial crisis, relevant international organizations and regulatory bodies in Europe and the United States have issued revised opinions and supplementary documents on the original regulatory system of asset securitization, regulating capital adequacy and systemic risk. Credit rating agencies and information disclosure regulatory reform in four areas. It introduces the regulation standard of leverage ratio, increases the ability of risk capture, improves the design of risk weight, improves the supervision standard of capital adequacy ratio, increases macro-prudential supervision and strengthens the supervision of liquidity. It strengthens the independence and verifiability of rating activities, clarifies the legal responsibility of rating agencies, and strengthens the disclosure of basic assets, asset pool transfer and resecuritization. The third chapter discusses the above reform to our country asset securitization supervision enlightenment. The shortcomings of the supervision of asset securitization in China are that the single supervision of capital adequacy rate can not prevent risks completely, the supervision of systemic risk is absent, the supervision system of credit rating agencies is not perfect enough, and the supervision system of credit rating agencies is not perfect. Asset securitization quantitative information disclosure system is not perfect. The enlightenment of the reform is that capital supervision should not only strengthen the supervision of capital adequacy ratio, but also increase the leverage ratio, increase the supervision of systemic risk, improve the credit rating system of securitization, and improve the credit rating system of securitization. Strengthen the supervision of asset securitization information disclosure.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996.2;D922.287;F832.51
本文编号：2393758
[Abstract]:Starting with the analysis of the deficiencies and defects of the international regulatory system of asset securitization exposed in the financial crisis, this paper interprets the relevant revised opinions and supplementary documents issued by relevant international organizations and European and American regulators after the financial crisis. Capital adequacy regulation, systemic risk regulation, credit rating agency regulation and information disclosure regulation are reformed. Finally, combined with the current situation and defects of asset securitization supervision in China, the author emphasizes on the enlightenment of the reform of international supervision system of asset securitization to the supervision of asset securitization in China. The main content of the paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter describes the defects of the relevant international regulatory system in the financial crisis. Firstly, the meaning and process of synthetic asset securitization, which is the inducement of the financial crisis, expands the financial risk compared with the traditional asset securitization. Secondly, the defects of the current relevant international regulatory system are insufficient attention to the new risks in the transaction of synthetic asset securitization, insufficient capital collection of assets securitization and other items; The concept of supervision does not consider the systemic risks brought about by asset securitization; it lacks the supervision of credit rating agencies; and there is no solution to the problem of information asymmetry in asset securitization. The second chapter analyzes the relevant international regulatory system reform after the financial crisis. After the financial crisis, relevant international organizations and regulatory bodies in Europe and the United States have issued revised opinions and supplementary documents on the original regulatory system of asset securitization, regulating capital adequacy and systemic risk. Credit rating agencies and information disclosure regulatory reform in four areas. It introduces the regulation standard of leverage ratio, increases the ability of risk capture, improves the design of risk weight, improves the supervision standard of capital adequacy ratio, increases macro-prudential supervision and strengthens the supervision of liquidity. It strengthens the independence and verifiability of rating activities, clarifies the legal responsibility of rating agencies, and strengthens the disclosure of basic assets, asset pool transfer and resecuritization. The third chapter discusses the above reform to our country asset securitization supervision enlightenment. The shortcomings of the supervision of asset securitization in China are that the single supervision of capital adequacy rate can not prevent risks completely, the supervision of systemic risk is absent, the supervision system of credit rating agencies is not perfect enough, and the supervision system of credit rating agencies is not perfect. Asset securitization quantitative information disclosure system is not perfect. The enlightenment of the reform is that capital supervision should not only strengthen the supervision of capital adequacy ratio, but also increase the leverage ratio, increase the supervision of systemic risk, improve the credit rating system of securitization, and improve the credit rating system of securitization. Strengthen the supervision of asset securitization information disclosure.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996.2;D922.287;F832.51
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